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BUITENLANDSE POLITIEK
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LIST OF DOCUMENTS

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ABD	American-British-Dutch
ADA	Anglo-Dutch-Australian
BD	British-Dutch
BPC	British Purchasing Committee
CONAS	Central Office for Northern American Supplies
IRRC	International Rubber Regulation Committee
ITC	International Tin Committee
KLM	Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschappij (Royal Dutch Airlines)
MEW	Ministry of Economic Warfare (British)
NEI	Netherlands East Indies
NPC	Netherlands Purchasing Committee
NSTC	Netherlands Shipping and Trading Committee
USA	United States of America
USSR	Union of Socialist Soviet Republics

LIST OF DOCUMENTS¹

No.	Date; from/to	Description
1	1.11.1940 From Van Starckenborgh to Welter (Batavia)	<i>Japan: oil negotiations.</i> In his reply to I, No. 432, Mukai asked for more aircraft fuel and underscored Japan's interests in exploitation of oil fields. Oil companies had announced terms of delivery and refused to increase quantities. Japan's request for Government guarantees for deliveries would not be granted.
2	1.11.1940 From A. Loudon (Washington)	<i>Japan.</i> Ishii hoped that negotiations in Batavia would produce results and progress satisfactorily. <i>USA.</i> Gordon had not sought to establish contact since his arrival in Washington.
3	2.11.1940 From Gerth van Wijk (Tangier)	<i>Tangier.</i> Spanish High Commissioner in Morocco had informed writer and Belgian consul that they would no longer be permitted to perform their duties and would be interned; later resignation from Comité de Contrôle demanded only.
4	3.11.1940 Van Voorst tot Voorst	<i>Price legislation and contraband goods.</i> Discussion with Colonial Ministry and the Navy. Dispute between Colonial Ministry and the Navy on desirability of 'Naval Instructions' in connection with implementation of price regulations settled. Proposal for the compilation and publication of lists of 'conditional' and 'non-conditional' contraband goods, taking into account the standpoint adopted before May 1940. In practice, however, goods should be labelled as 'conditional' contraband goods in very exceptional cases only. Non-publication of list of 'conditional' contraband goods not to be recommended.
5	4.11.1940 From Elink Schuurman to Van Starckenborgh (Sydney)	<i>Australia: arms deliveries.</i> East Indies military committee had started its activities. Every assistance provided by Australia.

¹ The numbers in the first column refer to the numbers of the documents. The date of the document, the sender's and the addressee's names and the place where the document was written are shown in the second column. Where the Minister for Foreign Affairs was the sender or the addressee, this is not indicated. Where names might be confused, first initials have been added. Titles have not been added; complicated names have sometimes been simplified, e.g. *Van Starckenborgh* instead of *Tjarda van Starckenborgh Stachouwer*. Where extracts from diaries, notes, minutes of meetings and other documents that were not dispatched are concerned, only the author's name or that of the institution in question has been indicated (i.e. without the addition of *from* or *to*). From 16 May 1940 onwards the place where the document was written has no longer been listed if it was London. The fourth column contains a short description of the text of the document. See the *List of Abbreviations* for such abbreviations as occur in the text. When in the description is referred to the documents of the first volume it is indicated with the Roman cypher *I* and the number of the regarding document.

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No.	Date; from/to	Description
6	4.11.1940 From Roos (Tokyo)	<i>Japan.</i> According to Ishizawa Tripartite Pact was directed against intervention by the USA in Asia. He counted on Netherlands support for efforts to keep the Netherlands East Indies and Indo-China out of the war.
7	5.11.1940 Council of Ministers	<i>Tangier.</i> Countries concerned considering taking joint diplomatic steps with Spain in connection with No. 3. <i>Germans interned in NEI.</i> Approval of Van Kleffens's and Welter's standpoint with respect to I, No. 469. <i>Great Britain: making available Dutch gold and inclusion of NEI in sterling area.</i> Approval of Kielstra's proposal that gold be transferred from Canada to Surinam. Summary of discussion referred to in I, No. 470.
8	5.11.1940 From Bland	<i>France.</i> Request that occupied and unoccupied France, French Morocco, Somaliland and Tunisia be declared enemy territory.
9	6.11.1940 To Bosch van Rosenthal	<i>Exchange of consuls with Germany</i> had been arranged. <i>Germans interned in NEI.</i> Proposal in I, No. 469 rejected by Netherlands Government.
10	6.11.1940 From Welter to Van Starkenborgh	<i>Italy.</i> Italian warships in Indian Ocean to be regarded as raiders and merchantmen as support craft without evidence to the contrary.
11	6.11.1940 From Verniers van der Loeff to Welter	<i>Arms deliveries.</i> Great Britain had again urged that an early reply be given to I, No. 454. Plan for CONAS to function as sole channel of communication not feasible for the NEI.
12	6.11.1940 From Furstner to Gerbrandy	<i>Pacific policy.</i> According to Van Kleffens the Netherlands would fight against Japan in the event of war breaking out between Japan on the one hand and the USA and Great Britain on the other. Standpoint not to be communicated to USA until it was certain that the USA would provide military assistance if Japan attacked the NEI. Writer felt that the attitude of political reserve adopted impeded highly important discussions between military staffs.
13	7.11.1940 From Schuller tot Peursum (Madrid)	<i>Tangier.</i> Great Britain had protested officially against the abolition of the international administration of Tangier; Netherlands protest would have to show a sympathetic attitude towards Spanish claims.
14	7.11.1940 From Welter to Van Starkenborgh	<i>Japan.</i> British Government informed about I, No. 473. Possibilities for re-exportation to Germany limited.
15	7.11.1940 To Michiels van Verduynen	<i>Requisitioning of Netherlands Danube barges.</i> Documents sent to Belgrade (see I, No. 462)

No.	Date; from/to	Description
16	7.11.1940 From Kingsley Wood to Welter	deliberately written in Dutch to gain time. No further steps would be taken. <i>Great Britain: making available Dutch gold.</i> Great Britain appreciated Netherlands objections to selling gold, but hoped that the Netherlands would not allow them to prevail over prosecuting the war to victory.
17	9.11.1940 From Pabst (Tokyo)	<i>Japan: trade talks in Batavia.</i> Unofficial warning by Gaimusho against dragging on discussions too long.
18	9.11.1940 From Welter to Van Starkenborgh	<i>Great Britain: cooperation in the Pacific.</i> Government in favour of exchange of confidential information with British fleet in Singapore.
19	9.11.1940 From Van Starckenborgh to Welter (Batavia)	<i>Japan: trade talks in Batavia.</i> Oil agreement to be signed shortly. Netherlands delegation urging submission of complete programme for discussions. Pabst to be instructed to urge early submission of Japanese programme as negotiations would otherwise be broken off and discussions conducted through normal diplomatic channels.
20	10.11.1940 From Schuller tot Peursum (Madrid)	<i>Tangier.</i> Recommendation that Spain be informed orally that the Netherlands did not automatically exclude the possibility of the statute regulating the International status of Tangier being amended in favour of Spain after the war.
21	11.11.1940 To Pabst	<i>Japan: trade talks in Batavia.</i> Monopoly position for Japan impossible. No question of any American pressure on the Netherlands. Instructions in conformity with No. 19.
22	11.11.1940 From Van Starckenborgh to Welter (Batavia)	<i>Great Britain: cooperation in Pacific.</i> In exchanges of information British naval authorities had asked to be informed on matters which should, strictly speaking, be the subject of discussions between military staffs. Request not refused outright on account of increasing gravity of international situation.
23	12.11.1940 Council of Ministers	<i>Great Britain: making available Dutch gold.</i> Great Britain continued to press for Dutch gold being made available. <i>Tangier.</i> No joint diplomatic steps taken as yet. <i>Gold.</i> Efforts would be made to transfer gold from Netherlands Bank in South Africa to Surinam.
24	12.11.1940 To A. Loudon	<i>USA: Pacific policy.</i> Authorities to be informed that strengthening of air and naval forces in the Philippines would improve position of the NEI.

No.	Date; from/to	Description
25	12.11.1940 Van Bylandt	<i>Great Britain: cooperation in the Pacific.</i> Great Britain requested that instructions be given to Van Starckenborgh for discussions between naval authorities; according to Noble he was a stumbling block. Bland informed of No. 18.
26	12.11.1940 From Welter	<i>Japan.</i> Enclosure of No. 26A. Van Starckenborgh recommended that rubber and tin exports be restricted by Malacca first.
26A	8.11.1940 From Van Starckenborgh to Welter (Batavia)	<i>Japan.</i> I, No. 473 continued. Indo-China had yielded to Japanese demands. Summary of goods to be supplied. Japan was now independent of other countries for supplies of rubber and rice.
27	12.11.1940 From Michiels van Verduynen	<i>Great Britain: military cooperation.</i> No. 27A discussed with Makins and British military experts by Teixeira de Mattos. British objections to Netherlands proposal that British troops be automatically placed under Netherlands command on liberation of the country.
27A		<i>Great Britain: military cooperation.</i> Text of a joint Dutch-British draft concerning the Netherlands army in Great Britain.
28	13.11.1940 From Van Starckenborgh to Welter (Batavia)	<i>Price legislation: Japan.</i> Should ships sold by Germany to Japan be seized in accordance with price regulations?
29	13.11.1940 From Van Boetzelaer (Washington)	<i>USA: Royal Decrees A 1 and A 6.</i> American freezing of Netherlands assets made it impossible for Netherlands nationals in occupied territory to exercise control of their accounts in the USA.
30	14.11.1940 Council of Ministers	<i>Allied war objectives.</i> Discussion of British draft resolution relating to allied conference. Further discussion on 15 November after discussion of <i>Steenbergh Memorandum</i> .
31	14.11.1940 To Gerbrandy	<i>Great Britain: Royal Decrees A 1 and A 6.</i> Request contained in No. 8 strange as Great Britain was not prepared to give explicit recognition to Royal Decree A 1. Reply to be given to the effect that the Netherlands would take all steps desired by it and counted upon full and unconditional British recognition of Royal Decrees.
32	14.11.1940 From Makins to Michiels van Verduynen	<i>Air link with Trinidad.</i> Resumption of KLM service between Curaçao and Trinidad possible after British demands had been agreed to.
33	14.11.1940 From Bosch van Rosenthal to Pilet-Golaz (Berne)	<i>Switzerland: clearing for the occupied Netherlands.</i> Clearing Agreement between Switzerland and Germany of 20 September at variance with the Rules of Land Warfare of 1907 and

No.	Date; from/to	Description
34	15.11.1940 Council of Ministers	Royal Decree A 1. Official protest. <i>Steenberghe Memorandum</i> . Lengthy discussions on Memorandum, in the course of which it was urged that Steenberghe did not advocate the conclusion of a separate peace with Germany but wanted to improve cooperation with Great Britain by defining the Allied war objectives. <i>Allied war objectives</i> . Approval of draft resolution referred to in No. 30 on condition that resolution should not be regarded as a contract imposing definite obligations.
35	15.11.1940 From Van Starckenborgh to Welter (Batavia)	<i>Portuguese Timor</i> . Lisbon had granted Japan permission to make test flights between Palao and Dilly. British Government to be asked to take steps against this in Lisbon.
36	15.11.1940 To Michiels van Verduynen	<i>KLM: Bringing KLM into Allied cooperation</i> . Government prepared to conclude agreement referred to in I, No. 440, but company and its crews were not to be exposed to unnecessary danger with a view to ensuring continued existence of the airline after the war.
37	15.11.1940 Philipse	<i>Great Britain: trade policy</i> . Report on writer's discussion with Hall and Leith-Ross. British Government wished to work together with the Netherlands Government to take measures to protect raw materials and foodstuffs on whose export certain colonial regions were entirely dependent. In writer's opinion this would shift the problems to other regions. Reasonable price to be paid for such support purchases, which Great Britain declined to do for Netherlands East Indies sugar and tea. Further talks of importance in the context of post-war relief plans for the Netherlands.
38	15.11.1940 From Teppema to Van Mook (Buenos Aires)	<i>Argentina: trade with the NEI</i> . Argentina did not have dollars for payments of imports from the NEI.
39	15.11.1940 From Helfrich to Van Starckenborgh (Surabaja)	<i>Italy</i> . Execution of No. 10 could lead to difficulties. Seizing Italian ships for searching safer, and possible under existing rules. All commanders instructed to that effect.
40	15.11.1940 From Van Boetzelaer to Van Bylandt (Washington)	<i>Netherlands: Pacific policy</i> . Policy of independence in Pacific should be replaced by one of cooperation with Great Britain and the USA. This would deter Japan and make it possible for cooperation in defence matters to be initiated.

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No.	Date; from/to	Description
41	16.11.1940 From Van Starckenborgh to Welter (Batavia)	<i>Boerstra-Jongejan mission.</i> Arrival in Tokyo of Boerstra and Jongejan. They wished to discuss problem of <i>interned Germans</i> with writer, who regarded their information as important and proposed to send Idenburg on a secret mission to Manila for the purpose.
42	16.11.1940 From Van Starckenborgh to Gerbrandy (Batavia)	<i>Transfer of seat of Netherlands Government.</i> Transfer to Netherlands East Indies would underscore the independent nature of the policy pursued by the Netherlands Government, and would strengthen the latter's position vis-à-vis Great Britain. It was also desirable from the point of view of developments in the NEI. All these arguments would gain in strength as the war progressed.
43	17.11.1940 From Roberts to Michiels van Verduynen	<i>Great Britain: sale of Dutch gold.</i> Great Britain had made its foreign currency and gold reserves available for purchase of military equipment in the USA. Reserves nearly depleted. The sale of £23,000,000 worth of gold against sterling requested.
44	17.11.1940 From Van Sevenster (Vichy)	<i>France: closure of the Netherlands consulates.</i> Under German pressure the French Government had ordered the closure of Netherlands consulates as from 22.11.1940. French had suggested that the latter's work be continued by 'offices néerlandais'. No certainty that Germany would tolerate such offices. Pending Van Kleffens' decision the writer had agreed to the provisional transformation of the consulates into 'offices néerlandais'.
44A	16.11.1940 French Foreign Office to Consulate-General (Vichy)	<i>France: closure of Netherlands consulates.</i> Under German pressure to take effect from 22.11.1940.
44B	French Foreign Office (Vichy)	<i>France: establishment of 'offices néerlandais'.</i> Scope of authority of 'offices néerlandais' defined as well as competency of the director-general, who would represent the offices with the French authorities.
45	18.11.1940 From Meyer Ranneft to Furstner (Washington)	<i>Cooperation in the Pacific.</i> Lack of cooperation between NEI Navy and naval forces of the USA, Great Britain and Australia given as reason for refusal to supply naval equipment. Cooperation essential from naval point of view.
46	18.11.1940 From A. Loudon (Washington)	<i>USA: Pacific policy.</i> Chance of unequivocal reaction to No. 24 would be greater if Netherlands cooperation policy were clearly explained. Attitude concerning secret charts, com-

No.	Date; from/to	Description
47	18.11.1940 Michiels van Verduynen	<p>munication media and appointment of US naval attachés in the NEI disadvantageous to the Netherlands. Present situation could lead to a strategic decision on the NEI being taken without the Netherlands being consulted.</p> <p><i>Great Britain: Pacific policy.</i> Discussion with Butler on British guarantee of assistance in the event of Japanese aggression. Butler had stated that Great Britain did not wish to enter into commitments.</p>
48	18.11.1940 To all diplomatic and consular missions	<p><i>Contact with Germany.</i> All contact with Germans forbidden for diplomatic and consular staff.</p>
49	18.11.1940 From Bosch van Rosenthal (Berne)	<p><i>Switzerland: Royal Decree A 1.</i> Swiss Government had refused permission for official publication of Royal Decree A 1. Publication as an advertisement not to be recommended.</p>
50	19.11.1940 Albarda	<p><i>Allied war objectives.</i> War to be continued until armistice with prospects of an acceptable peace was possible. No restoration of pre-war situation but the establishment of a peace organisation like the League of Nations – though one restricting the sovereignty of States – preferably on a world-wide scale, and not excluding any country (e.g. the USSR). Simultaneous disarmament of victors and vanquished. International labour and financing plans essential for effective approach. Constant attention to be given to problem of unemployment, which aroused anti-democratic tendencies. To avoid unchecked international competition efforts should be made to arrive at international arrangements concerning production. Period of free competition and private enterprise was past. <i>Chances of peace.</i> German and Italian prestige greatly diminished as a result of the failure of the German offensive against Britain and the course of the war in the Mediterranean theatre. Great Britain was growing stronger and the administration of the occupied territories was a heavy burden for Germany; war weariness among people in Germany and Italy.</p>
51	19.11.1940 Council of Ministers	<p><i>Allied war objectives.</i> Halifax informed by Van Kleffens on position concerning resolution. <i>Boerstra-Jongejan mission.</i> Welter agreed to No. 41 because of accompanying chance of obtaining information on the occupied Netherlands. Ministers hesitant about contact with mission. Decision to inform the Queen and to</p>

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No.	Date; from/to	Description
		take action afterwards. Great Britain not to be informed. <i>Steenberghe Memorandum</i> . Van Kleffens strongly opposed to suggestion that proposals be made to British Government on the basis of the hypotheses contained in the Memorandum. Gerbrandy against spirit of Memorandum. Freedom, independence and cessation of aggression to be achieved only through defeat of Germany. Statement by Steenberghe that memorandum did not advocate peace negotiations at that moment. Government should endeavour to ensure that the liberation of the Netherlands remained part of Allied war objectives; useless destruction through British bombing of occupied territory should be avoided. The speaker reaffirmed his belief in allied victory but predicted that the Government would eventually have to choose between peace through negotiation and the destruction of the Netherlands. Gerbrandy's proposal that no definite conclusions be drawn from the discussion and that it be continued was accepted, under protest from Steenberghe and Welter. <i>Information activities in the USA</i> . Funds to counter German propaganda in the USA requested by Van Kleffens.
52	19.11.1940 From De Booy to Welter	<i>Japan: oil negotiations</i> . Agreement initialled in Batavia: quotas on an annual basis and six-month contracts.
53	20.11.1940 Van Kleffens	<i>Great Britain: cooperation in the Pacific</i> . Request referred to in I, No. 457 refused in discussion with Bland and adequate division of responsibility urged. The Netherlands did not wish to provoke Japan as long as the USA and Great Britain had not provided guarantees of assistance in the event of Japanese aggression.
54	20.11.1940 From Furstner to Dyxhoorn	<i>USA: Pacific policy</i> . Discussion between writer and Ghormley on US Pacific policy. Ghormley would urge strengthening of forces in the Philippines to emphasise American neutrality. American guarantee of military assistance in the event of Japanese aggression not to be expected.
55	20.11.1940 From Schuller tot Peursum (Madrid)	<i>Spain: Royal Decree A 6; Philips</i> . Philips, Eindhoven, was supplying goods to Philips, Iberica, with the fore knowledge of the managing directors of Philips, New York: this was at variance with the provisions of Royal Decree A 6.

No.	Date; from/to	Description
56	20.11.1940 From Van Boetzelaer (Washington)	<i>USA: coffee imports.</i> State Department not prepared to revise agreement with Latin American countries on quotas of coffee imported into the USA in favour of European colonies.
57	20.11.1940 From Matsuoka to Pabst (Tokyo)	<i>Japan: trade talks in Batavia.</i> Items for agenda to be presented by new leader of delegation.
58	21.11.1940 From Van Starckenborgh to Welter (Batavia)	<i>USA, IRRC: rubber export quotas for 1941.</i> In connection with American purchases for strategic reserves and ordinary deliveries, export quota of 90% desirable for first three months; gradual decrease in the following months to avoid sharp fluctuations in production.
59	22.11.1940 To A. Loudon	<i>The Netherlands: Pacific policy.</i> The Netherlands should not allow itself to be too heavily influenced by a policy based on the overly pessimistic view of the situation in the Pacific painted by the British and US navies. Non-binding exchange of information with British navy in Singapore. Concessions to USA after it had strengthened its forces in the Philippines. Stationing of naval attachés unacceptable. Text of No. 54. Secret charts on their way.
60	25.11.1940 Albarda	<i>KLM: London-Lisbon service.</i> Discussion with Balfour. British operation of KLM service contrary to Netherlands interests and honour. Discussion of matter in Council of Ministers. No objection to having British courier on board for diplomatic mail.
61	25.11.1940 Mackay	<i>Great Britain: financial position.</i> USA demands that British assets in that country be fully used up before there could be any question of US credits. <i>Arms deliveries.</i> According to British purchasing committees in the USA and Canada competition between British and Netherlands pro-purchasing committees had driven prices up.
62	25.11.1940 From Sevenster (Vichy)	<i>France: closure of Netherlands consulates and establishment of 'offices néerlandais'.</i> Subject discussed with J. Loudon and consular representatives, who concurred with the proposal. French Government informed. Purely consular activities to be carried out by the Swedish representatives, while the 'offices' would be unofficial Dutch offices recognised by the French Government as representing Dutch interests. Suitable person for post of director-general being sought. Writer would remain for the time being in France. No action undertaken regard-

No.	Date; from/to	Description
62A	21.11.1940 Consulate-general to French Foreign Office (Vichy)	ing the transformation of consulates in French colonies into 'offices'. Telegraphic approval of course of action and further instructions awaited. <i>France: establishment of 'offices néerlandais'.</i> Agreement of consulate-general to transformation of consulates into 'offices néerlandais' to be headed by a director-general who would maintain contact with the French Foreign Office. Consular affairs to be handled by Sweden. Professional Dutch consuls to remain in France and to be issued with exit permits should they so desire.
63	26.11.1940 Van Kleffens	<i>Great Britain: Pacific policy.</i> According to Halifax Great Britain had abandoned attempts to get US naval unit stationed in Singapore after Japanese warning. Strengthening of forces in the Philippines now urged. Japanese attack on the NEI would be a matter of most immediate concern to British Government.
64	26.11.1940 Council of Ministers	<i>Boerstra-Jongejan mission.</i> The Queen approved of meeting with Idenburg at Manila. <i>Allied war objectives.</i> Proposed conference postponed because of attitude of Greece. Halifax not opposed to statement on Allied war objectives to inform German people, but the time was not ripe for discussing Allied peace terms.
65	26.11.1940 From Kielstra to Welter (Paramaribo)	<i>French Antilles.</i> French military wanted support of Surinam troops in surprise attack designed to bring Cayenne over to side of De Gaulle. Welter's opinion asked because of political consequences.
66	26.11.1940 From A. Loudon (Washington)	<i>European cooperation.</i> Establishment of American Committee on European Reconstruction by Michalowski; Central European countries were members. Committee urged appointment of an official Netherlands observer.
67	27.11.1940 From Welter to Van Starkenborgh	<i>Great Britain: troop ships.</i> Despite serious objections it was difficult to withhold NEI ships on account of commitment of ships by other Allied nations. Writer recommended a positive decision.
68	27.11.1940 From Van Starkenborgh to Welter (Batavia)	<i>Japan: trade talks in Batavia; re-exportation to Germany.</i> Japanese delegation intended to request purchase of large quantities of rubber and tin. In view of I, No. 473 and No. 26A and of large carrying capacity of trans-Siberian railway the goods ordered were probably intended for re-exportation to Germany. Consideration

No.	Date; from/to	Description
69	28.11.1940 Mackay	should be given to following Malacca example in imposing restrictions on exports to Japan. <i>Great Britain: sale of Dutch gold.</i> Reasons adduced in No. 43 took no account of Netherlands expenditure on Allied war effort. If, however, Great Britain were really to run into trouble where credits were concerned, the Netherlands should help as it would be impossible to achieve Netherlands war objective if hostilities were discontinued. Discussions of a delicate nature would be called for to avoid giving the impression that the Netherlands was not bearing its share of the war effort.
70	28.11.1940 From Welter	<i>France: Royal Decree A 6.</i> Comments on initial agreement in principle to No. 8 in response to latest international developments. Application of Royal Decree A 6 to French colonies would have serious consequences for the import and export position of the Netherlands colonies.
71	28.11.1940 From Wilson-Young to Michiels van Verduynen	<i>Central Commission for the Navigation of the Rhine.</i> Activities discontinued for the duration of the war. Request that Commission be informed that the Netherlands Government did not agree to the Commission's property passing into other hands.
72	29.11.1940 Council of Ministers	<i>Great Britain: sale of Dutch gold.</i> Discussion of British proposal postponed until after submission of Memorandum by Welter. <i>Interned Netherlands nationals.</i> Van 't Sant admitted to meeting. Surprise expressed at the number of interned Netherlands nationals not being known. Criticism of Central Intelligence Service and failure of Britain to provide adequate information.
73	29.11.1940 To Van Nagell	<i>Exchange of consuls with Germany.</i> German consuls had arrived at their destination; departure of Netherlands consuls for Switzerland to be requested through Swedish Government.
74	29.11.1940 From Van Starckenborgh to Welter (Batavia)	<i>Boerstra-Jongejan mission.</i> If news of meeting with Idenburg in Manila leaked out writer would admit that it had taken place but would reveal nothing of what had been discussed.
75	30.11.1940 From Van Starckenborgh to Welter (Batavia)	<i>Great Britain: troop ships.</i> Ships requested in No. 67 would be available by February or March. Shortage of tonnage expected on USA route. Ships would remain available as troop carriers until the end of the war but no longer; preferential treatment in re-equipping desired.

No.	Date; from/to	Description
76	30.11.1940 Meeting at Ministry of Economic Warfare on 27.11.1940	<p><i>Surplus NEI agricultural products</i> to be disposed of by selling at reasonable prices to inter alia Great Britain, especially oils, fats, sugar and tea. New surpluses to be prevented by slowing down production and by stockpiling for <i>post-war relief</i> in Europe, for which international plan to be drawn up. The Netherlands to finance purchases itself. <i>Trade with Japan</i> to be used as a means of exercising political pressure now that Japan had joined the Axis. Deliveries to be confined to what was needed for domestic consumption. Larger deliveries, especially of oil, rubber and tin, would facilitate the stockpiling of war supplies and re-exportation of these commodities to Germany. Netherlands disquiet at U.S. embargo against Japan, which would engender difficulties for other countries and especially for the NEI in the matter of oil. An embargo on imports from Japan recommended.</p>
76A	21.11.1940 Government of Straits Settlements to London (Singapore)	<p><i>Contact between Dutch and British senior civil servants</i> in need of improvement, particularly as regards the exchange of information on general political, economic and military policy. <i>Deliveries of rubber and tin to Japan</i>. In connection with heavy Japanese pressure on NEI and increasing Japanese purchases rubber and tin export quota for Japan should be reduced because of additional Japanese purchases in Thailand and Indo-China. Future exports to Japan should be based on cooperation with NEI as proposed by Van Mook.</p>
77	1.12.1940 Van Asch van Wijck	<p><i>Great Britain: sale of Dutch gold</i>. War justified use of gold of Netherlands Bank by Government, but enough should be retained to back banknotes. British Government should be asked to explain its financial position to the Netherlands Government so as to enable the latter to ascertain the extent of the assistance required. Writer advocated consultation with British Government on cooperation in defence matters; the Netherlands might, for instance, make military purchases which would relieve Great Britain of some of its financial burden. This would be more satisfactory from the point of view of Netherlands patriotic sentiment than simply selling gold.</p>
78	2.12.1940 From Pabst (Tokyo)	<p><i>Japan: maltreatment of Japanese nationals in NEI</i>. No. 78A received from Ohashi. Protest by</p>

No.	Date; from/to	Description
78A	28.11.1940 From Ohashi to Pabst (Tokyo)	Ohashi. Writer had expressed the opinion that an informal and friendly discussion of the matter was to be preferred to a protest, which had an aggressive ring. He recommended that apologies be offered to Japan for flag incident at Bandung and Ariyoshi affair. <i>Japan: maltreatment of Japanese nationals in NEI.</i> Violence against Japanese nationals rapidly increasing. Strong measures demanded from East Indies authorities. Four recent incidents cited. <i>Checking of mail of Japanese trade mission and consulate-general.</i> Request that this cease.
79	3.12.1940 Council of Ministers	<i>Boerstra-Jongejan mission.</i> Decision to send Idenburg to Tokyo as suggested by Van Starckenborgh. <i>Great Britain: interned Netherlands nationals.</i> Decision taken to draw up list of internees whose release was deemed necessary. The names of all internees about whom the Government knew nothing would also appear on the list.
80	3.12.1940 From Welter to Van Starckenborgh	<i>Japan: re-exportation to Germany.</i> Introduction of licensing system of No. 68 infringement of economic status quo. In discussions with Japanese delegation the fact should be stressed that the Government was prepared to export goods to Japan, but only to supply its domestic needs, and taking account of Japanese imports from other countries.
81	4.12.1940 From Ransome (Oxford)	<i>European reconstruction.</i> Invitation to conference on European reconstruction after the war.
82	5.12.1940 From Van Starckenborgh to Welter (Batavia)	<i>Boerstra-Jongejan mission.</i> Boerstra and Jongejan wanted personal interview with writer. Preference given to Shanghai for meeting with Idenburg. Unless question of <i>interned Germans</i> was settled, reprisals of considerable magnitude would be taken in the occupied Netherlands.
83	5.12.1940 From Ronald to Teixeira de Mattos	<i>Anglo-Dutch economic cooperation.</i> Talks agreed upon in September to be conducted between officials of departments concerned and no special organisation to be set up. Decision taken to institute regular discussions between civil servants on economic matters. Occasional political consultations between officials in addition to regular ministerial consultations also approved.

No.	Date; from/to	Description
84	5.12.1940 From Boerstra to Van Starkenborgh (Tokyo)	<i>Boerstra-Jongejan mission.</i> Van Starckenborgh's motives for refusing mission admittance to the NEI appreciated; risk of the Netherlands and the NEI drifting further apart.
85	7.12.1940 From Elink Schuurman to Van Starckenborgh (Sydney)	<i>Eastern Group Conference</i> highly important. Conference not very favourably disposed towards NEI; this was the result of the lack of knowledge of NEI policy; could only be changed through closer contact. Visit referred to in No. 5 important for that reason. <i>Pacific policy.</i> Netherlands Pacific policy not always understood in Dominions.
86	9.12.1940 From A. Loudon (Washing- ton)	<i>Hoover relief plan.</i> Complaints by Hoover about obstruction by British Government; was under the impression that the Netherlands was also against his plan.
87	9.12.1940 From Elink Schuurman to Van Starckenborgh (Sydney)	<i>Australia: arms deliveries.</i> NEI military mission had left Australia. Promises of deliveries of ammunition friendly gesture on the part of Australian Government. Close cooperation desirable between Washington, Sydney and Batavia to achieve optimum defence purchases policy.
88	10.12.1940 Council of Ministers	<i>KLM: London-Lisbon service.</i> Great Britain no longer objected to exclusively Dutch crews. <i>Great Britain: interned Netherlands nationals.</i> Discussions focused on arrest of Netherlands civil servants without the foreknowledge of the Netherlands Government. <i>Allied war objectives.</i> Halifax did not consider time propitious for the publication of Allied plans with respect to Germany.
89	10.12.1940 From Merens to Van Starkenborgh (Simla)	<i>Eastern Group Conference.</i> Linlithgow very pleased with results of conference. The NEI, as observer at the conference, would not receive a full report.
90	10.12.1940 From Gerbrandy to Welter	<i>Royal Decree A 6: Philips.</i> Permission given by Corvo, Willemstad, Curaçao, for trade between Philips, Eindhoven, and subsidiaries in neutral countries. Permission deprived Royal Decree A 6 of its effect.
91	11.12.1940 To A. Loudon	<i>Netherlands assets in the USA.</i> Rumours of British or Netherlands loans in USA with Netherlands assets as surety not to be taken seriously.
92	11.12.1940 From Van Bylandt to Sevenster	<i>France: closure of Netherlands consulates.</i> Approval of action taken by Sevenster. Netherlands diplomatic and consular interests to be protected by Sweden. Sevenster to remain in

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		unoccupied France as long as possible. Transformation of consulates in French colonies into 'offices néerlandais' would be effected when local French authorities so requested.
93	11.12.1940 From Lovink to Van Starckenborgh (Batavia)	<i>Japan</i> . Ishizawa had apologised and denied that he had given information to journalists on his interview with Van Starckenborgh.
93A	10.12.1940	<i>Japan</i> . Report on discussion between Ishizawa and Van Starckenborgh.
94	12.12.1940 From Pabst (Tokyo)	<i>Japan: trade talks in Batavia</i> . Yoshizawa satisfied with oil agreement. Japan to develop untapped mineral resources in the NEI. It was not always possible to avoid political matters in discussions of an economic nature.
95	12.12.1940 From A. Loudon (Washington)	<i>Hoover relief plan</i> . Presentation of No. 95A. Hull unwilling to challenge British standpoint on breaking blockade for consignments of food.
95A	10.12.1940 From Lothian (Washington)	<i>Hoover relief plan</i> . Food aid to occupied Europe regarded by British Government as material aid to the German war effort.
96	13.12.1940 From Van Starckenborgh to Welter (Batavia)	<i>Chances of peace</i> . Visser had reported from Ankara that Von Papen was seeking to establish contact with him.
97	13.12.1940 From Van Bylandt to Gerbrandy	<i>Pacific policy</i> . According to US naval authorities defence of the NEI would no longer be possible if Singapore fell. Solidarity with Great Britain required in interests of the NEI. No guarantees of American assistance in the event of Japanese aggression.
98	13.12.1940 From A. Loudon (Washington)	<i>US Envoy to The Hague</i> . Welles had established on inquiry that Gordon had abstained from comment after departure for London of the Queen and Government.
99	13.12.1940 From A. Loudon (Washington)	<i>Netherlands assets in the USA</i> . Johnson Act had made it impossible to grant a loan to Great Britain. Suggestion to the effect that the loan be granted to the Netherlands, which would then pass it on to Great Britain. The problem was to find an acceptable legal formula for using Netherlands assets as surety. Disadvantage was that after the war the position of the Netherlands in the USA would be dependent on British repayments.
100	14.12.1940 From Wouters to Welter (Willemstad)	<i>Air link with Trinidad</i> . KLM permitted to resume services with the exception of the Trinidad-Barbados route.
101	16.12.1940 From Welter to Van Starckenborgh	<i>Contact with Germans</i> . In connection with text of No. 96 Visser to be informed by wire that contact with Von Papen was permitted only

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102	16.12.1940 From Van Starckenborgh to Welter (Batavia)	through the intermediary of a third party. <i>USA: military cooperation.</i> No objection to secret charts available to the USA.
103	16.12.1940 From Van Starckenborgh to Welter (Batavia)	<i>USA: coffee imports.</i> Coffee quotas imposed by USA would not affect NEI coffee production until the end of 1941.
104	16.12.1940 To Michiels van Verduynen	<i>France: detention of Dutch ships.</i> British to be asked their opinion of plan to seize the French ship 'Yalou' in an NEI port with the object of using it as a lever to obtain the release of the Dutch ships 'Rhea' and 'Pluto' held in Oran.
105	17.12.1940 Council of Ministers	<i>Great Britain: interned Netherlands nationals.</i> Gerbrandy had not yet had an interview with Morrison. Churchill responsible for internments; insisted that Britain should have the final say in the matter as the country's security was involved. <i>Royal Decree A 1.</i> Decision not to discuss proposals for the amendment of Royal Decree A 1, despite Gerbrandy's opposition. <i>Netherlands Army.</i> With British aid Netherlands military unit beginning to take shape.
106	17.12.1940 From Welter to Van Starckenborgh	<i>Japan: talks in Batavia.</i> Events in Greece and Egypt to be used to strengthen Netherlands position when the talks were resumed. All reference to the New Order to be ignored and the questions of Japanese purchases in Indo-China and guarantees against the re-exportation to enemy states of NEI exports to Japan to be raised.
107	17.12.1940 From Van Starckenborgh to Welter (Batavia)	<i>Japan: re-exportation to Germany.</i> Reply to No. 80. All exports from the NEI to Japan subject to qualification that Germany should not benefit from them, i.e. that economic status quo should not be disturbed. Request that British Government be consulted on general directives concerning export quotas for Japan and that announcement be authorised after which detailed consultations between the appropriate authorities in Singapore and Batavia could take place.
108	17.12.1940 From Van Starckenborgh to Welter (Batavia)	<i>Great Britain: military cooperation.</i> Discussions with British naval officers had resulted in the exchange of liaison officers. Government to be asked to authorise internment of Japanese nationals and a pre-emptive attack if Japanese naval units crossed a given line. Writer opposed to such action.

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109	17.12.1940 From Bland	<i>Great Britain: troop ships.</i> British negotiators under the impression that NSTC was not convinced of pressing need for troop ships for Middle East campaign.
110	18.12.1940 From Welter to Van Starckenborgh	<i>Great Britain: troop ships.</i> Agreed to No. 75, but impossible to refuse British request that ships be available at an earlier date.
111	18.12.1940 To Michiels van Verduynen	<i>Great Britain: interned Netherlands nationals.</i> Consuls to ascertain identity and number of Netherlands nationals interned in their districts. Morrison had given permission for prisons to be visited.
112	18.12.1940 From Gerbrandy to Churchill	<i>The Netherlands: Hoover relief plan.</i> Government in favour of relief action for the occupied Netherlands only if guarantees were forthcoming that the enemy would not benefit.
113	18.12.1940 From Schuller tot Peursum (Madrid)	<i>Tangier.</i> Spain had taken over full administration of Tangier. Britain's attitude not clear.
114	19.12.1940 To A. Loudon	<i>The Netherlands: Hoover relief plan.</i> Information on No. 112. Government of the opinion that Hoover's demand that Germany should return food removed from occupied territories was impracticable.
115	19.12.1940 From Welter to Council of Ministers	<i>Great Britain: making available Dutch gold.</i> Technically possible to comply with request for \$100,000,000.
116	19.12.1940 From Halifax to Michiels van Verduynen	<i>Netherlands Government.</i> British Government had proposed in No. 117 that special privileges and immunities be granted to the governments of Allied countries in London. Guarantee required that immunity would not be involved in instances entailing conflict with British law.
117	19.12.1940 From Halifax to Michiels van Verduynen	<i>Immunity of Netherlands Government.</i> Extent of immunity referred to in No. 116 defined and list of eligible Netherlands civil servants requested.
118	20.12.1940 Council of Ministers	<i>Great Britain: making available Dutch gold.</i> Discussion of No. 115. In spite of President Roosevelt's lend-lease scheme financial aid from the Netherlands to Great Britain was essential. Terms formulated (see No. 128).
119	20.12.1940 From Welter	<i>USA: coffee imports.</i> A formal protest could not be lodged against the imposition of quotas on coffee imports.
119A	9.12.1940 From Achilles to Welter	<i>USA: coffee imports.</i> Coffee Agreement concluded between USA and Latin American countries; quotas for non-participating countries fixed under the Agreement. Best policy for the

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119B	19.12.1940 From Welter to Achilles	NEI would be not to divide its quota among the countries concerned.
120	20.12.1940 From Foreign Office to Michiels van Verduynen	<i>USA: coffee imports.</i> Reply expressing agreement with No. 119A.
121	20.12.1940 From Visser (Ankara)	<i>Turkey: Royal Decree A 1.</i> German representatives in Istanbul interested in Netherlands shares in Turkish firms. The Netherlands should make it clear to Turkey that transactions of this kind were prohibited under Royal Decree A 1.
122	21.12.1940 From Visser (Ankara)	<i>Contact with Germans.</i> (See also Nos. 96 and 101). Writer had decided in favour of contact so as not to lose opportunity to obtain information of benefit to the Allies. <i>Chances of peace.</i> Von Papen wanted to conclude peace before German attack on Great Britain.
123	21.12.1940 To A. Loudon	<i>Turkey: Royal Decree A 6; Philips.</i> Managing directors prepared to withhold proposed loan to Philips, Turkey, if Netherlands Government so desired. Consequences would be that Philips, Turkey, would have to close down and Philips, Eindhoven, would transact business with Turkey through a pro-German branch.
124	21.12.1940 To Welter	<i>USA: Royal Decree A 1.</i> Loudon authorised to state that Netherlands Government was prepared on certain conditions to release assets of Netherlands nationals in USA.
125	22.12.1940 From Schuller tot Peursum (Madrid)	<i>France: Royal Decree A 6.</i> Comments on No. 70. Measures of No. 8 were not directed against Vichy Government but were intended to close gaps in economic warfare against Germany. Measures proposed should also be applied to <i>Italy.</i>
126	23.12.1940 From Van Starckenborgh to Welter (Batavia)	<i>Spain: diplomatic relations; Tangier.</i> The strong protest against take-over by Spain of international administration of Tangier he had been instructed to make could lead to severance of diplomatic relations.
127	23.12.1940 From Gerbrandy	<i>USA: military cooperation.</i> US naval charts of Philippines of great practical importance to the NEI. Cooperation on a basis of equality, as the NEI would otherwise be placed in the position of a country at the receiving end. Writer did not understand American objections to handing over the charts.
		<i>Great Britain: Royal Decree A 1.</i> Failure on the part of the British Government to recognise Royal Decree A 1 would delay discussions with US Government on fuller control of Nether-

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128	23.12.1940 From Welter to Kingsley Wood	lands assets. <i>France-Italy: Royal Decree A 6.</i> British authorities considering prohibition of payment of Netherlands debts in France and Italy. If the Netherlands did not adjust its legislation accordingly, the persons concerned would run the risk of their names being placed on the Statutory List. <i>Great Britain: sale of Dutch gold.</i> Reply to No. 43. The Netherlands Government was prepared in principle to make available its financial resources for the benefit of the Allied cause, but wished to receive additional information on a number of points.
129	24.12.1940 Council of Ministers	<i>Great Britain: sale of Dutch gold.</i> Report on discussion about No. 128. It was not certain whether guarantees covered participation of the NEI in transaction. Van Kleffens wanted greater certainty as regards a number of terms and conditions. Decision taken to enter into agreement. <i>League of Nations.</i> Decision to change League of Nations item in National Budget into a token entry and to make a statement to the effect that consultations on the matter with the League were taking place.
130	24.12.1940 From Van Starckenborgh to Welter (Batavia)	<i>Boerstra-Jongejan mission.</i> News about the mission had leaked out. Idenburg would arrive later than had been expected. Writer would deny peace rumours in a communiqué if necessary. Request that British Government be informed.
131	25.12.1940 From Bosch van Rosenthal (Berne)	<i>Exchange of consuls with Germany.</i> Netherlands consuls had left for Switzerland on 24 December. Hallo being detained in Germany until a German official in the NEI had been released.
132	25.12.1940 From Van Starckenborgh to Welter (Batavia)	<i>Japan: international payments.</i> Agreement concluded on rate of exchange of yen and NEI guilder and on rates of exchange of those currencies and other currencies.
133	25.12.1940 From Schuller tot Peursum (Madrid)	<i>Tangier.</i> Unofficial discussions between Spain and Governments involved impeded the establishment of satisfactory relations. Netherlands protest was sharpest and vastly different from British protest (remonstrances).
134	26.12.1940 From Van Starckenborgh to Welter (Batavia)	<i>Great Britain: sale of Dutch gold. Arms deliveries.</i> NEI prepared to make available 50% of gold to be sold but was against condition that Great Britain should ask the US Government for lend-lease terms for NEI similar to those

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135	27.12.1940 To A. Loudon (Washington)	granted to Great Britain. <i>USA: Royal Decree A 1.</i> American banks willing to consult with Netherlands Government in London on the application of Royal Decree A 1.
136	28.12.1940 From Welter to the Queen	<i>USA: military cooperation.</i> After discussions with British naval authorities in Singapore on joint action in the event of Japanese aggression, it was desirable that such similar discussions be held with US naval authorities.
137	28.12.1940 From Ronald to Michiels van Verduynen	<i>Purchasing committees in USA.</i> To enable the BPC in the USA to carry out its instructions to assist Allied governments in their arms purchases it was necessary for the BPC to be fully informed on the state of affairs.
138	30.12.1940 Council of Ministers	<i>Great Britain: interned Netherlands nationals.</i> Morrison to ascertain number of Netherlands internees. Treatment would be improved. <i>Great Britain: sale of Dutch gold.</i> Kingsley Wood had informed Welter that Great Britain did not require Dutch gold for the moment. Communication of No. 134.
139	2.1.1941 From Van Starckenborgh to Welter (Batavia)	<i>Pacific policy.</i> Elink Schuurman's interview with Menzies. Australia did not understand the semi-neutrality of the NEI in the Pacific. Menzies intended to ask for clarification of the British Pacific policy in London and to urge close cooperation with neighbouring countries. <i>Arms deliveries by Australia.</i>
140	3.1.1941 To Bland.	<i>Great Britain: cooperation with NEI in Pacific.</i> RAF refused permission to land on Sumatra during their patrols in search of German raiders. NEI prepared to assume greater share of patrols if British Government provided the requisite aircraft through the USA before 1 July 1941. These and other <i>arms deliveries</i> orders cancelled by the USA.
141	3.1.1941 From Van Bylandt to Loudon	<i>USA: Royal Decrees A 1 and A 6.</i> Discussion with representatives of major American banks in London. With regard to the implementation of Royal Decree A 1 it had been agreed that Loudon would be instructed to persuade the Treasury Department to withhold permission for transactions in the event of differences of opinion with Loudon (whose permission was required under the said Decree), as long as its validity had not been established in the USA. Appointment of Kleyn Molekamp as delegate of Curaçao Wartime Legal Rights Committee

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141A	30.12.1940 Chase National Bank and Guaranty Trust Co. to Netherlands Government	in USA had fulfilled a further wish of discussion partners. Agreed delays in decision-making to be kept to a minimum. <i>USA: Royal Decrees A 1 and A 6.</i> Suggestions of American banks regarding speeding-up of decision-making procedure for the granting of permission for transactions governed by the decrees.
142	3.1.1941 From Bos to Van Starckenborgh (Chungking)	<i>NEI: despatch of a military observer to China.</i> The posting of a military attaché in China was of importance for the acquisition of revealing information on the military situation there. A military observer would achieve much less but, on the other hand, could not be used by the Chinese Government for propaganda purposes as would be the case with a military attaché.
143	4.1.1941 From Welter to Van Starckenborgh	<i>Great Britain: troop ships.</i> Following discussions with the Ministry of Shipping it had been decided to make available the 'Van Oldenbarnevelt' and the 'Dempo' as troop ships, despite Van Starckenborgh's objections.
144	6.1.1941 From Van Starckenborgh to Welter (Batavia)	<i>Boerstra-Jongejan mission.</i> In urging the release of interned German nationals they took no account of the help these Germans could render to the Japanese in the event of an invasion by the latter and of the implications for the international position of the NEI.
145	6.1.1941 From Van Starckenborgh to Welter (Batavia)	<i>Japan: trade talks in Batavia.</i> Yoshizawa had announced the speedy presentation of proposals for the agenda. He regretted the strengthening of NEI defences. The writer considered Yoshizawa to be more difficult to deal with in negotiations than Kobayashi.
146	6.1.1941 Peekema	<i>NEI exports to Japan and USSR.</i> Outline of NEI measures to restrict exports to Japan because of the assumed <i>re-exportation to Germany</i> of rubber and tin. For a more radical restriction consultation and coordination of measures with Great Britain were essential. Deliveries of rubber and tin to USSR had been terminated in May 1940. Consideration being given to bypassing intermediaries (principally Japan) in exports to USSR.
147	6.1.1941 From Flaes (Peking)	<i>Boerstra-Jongejan mission.</i> Objections to meeting between Boerstra-Jongejan and Idenburg having been arranged in consular area of Peking without writer's knowledge. Sizeable Dutch colony in Shanghai and the defeatist attitude

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148	7.1.1941 Council of Ministers	of Jongejan rendered such a meeting dangerous, as news of it would probably leak out. <i>Great Britain: interned Dutch nationals.</i> List of internees had been received. Letter from Harinxma on situation in <i>France</i> .
149	8.1.1941 From Van Starckenborgh to Welter (Batavia)	<i>NEI: control of exports.</i> Permission of Wartime Legal Rights Committee in Batavia to be made obligatory for the export of certain goods and for exports to regions administered by France and Italy. A quota system was to be introduced for exports to countries likely to re-export goods to enemy countries. The system would be operated in close collaboration with the Singapore authorities. Welter's opinion requested.
150	8.1.1941 From Schuller tot Peursum (Madrid)	<i>Spain: diplomatic relations with Netherlands.</i> Under German pressure, the representatives of the Netherlands, Norway and Poland would no longer be invited to attend official functions arranged by the Spanish Government. According to Serrano Suñer, Spain did not intend to sever diplomatic relations.
151	9.1.1941 From Welter to Van Starckenborgh	<i>Great Britain: troop ships.</i> Because of the vital interests at stake, passenger ships already leased to or about to be leased to Great Britain would be used as troop ships on the run between Great Britain and the Middle East.
152	9.1.1941 From Steenberghe	<i>Post-war economic reconstruction of Europe.</i> Enthoven to be withdrawn from the Central and East European Committee under Polish chairmanship as membership 'à titre personnel' was no longer possible.
153	10.1.1941 From Helfrich to Furstner (Surabaya)	<i>Great Britain: cooperation in the Pacific.</i> Threat of Japanese aggression made thorough preparation for cooperation with allies in the South Pacific essential, so that timely measures could be taken in the event of a Japanese attack.
154	11.1.1941 From Van Starckenborgh to Welter (Batavia)	<i>Boerstra-Jongejan mission.</i> Idenburg instructed to divulge nothing of the talks with Boerstra and Jongejan to the British ambassador.
155	11.1.1941 From Van Starckenborgh to Welter (Batavia)	<i>NEI: Pacific Ocean policy.</i> Resumé of possible causes of delay in <i>arms deliveries</i> by USA. Postponement could be used as a means of exerting pressure on the NEI to pledge assistance in the event of an attack on Singapore. A pledge of this kind would be too binding for the NEI, even though it was very probable that the NEI and Great Britain would act in concert if Japan

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156	11.1.1941 From Van Bylandt	<p>attacked. No guarantee regarding Singapore to be given as long as America had not undertaken to provide military support in the event of Japanese aggression. It was to be made quite clear, however, that the NEI would defend itself even without the aid of Britain and the USA. Early delivery of the arms ordered to be urged.</p> <p><i>Great Britain: registration of Dutch nationals.</i> Van den Tempel was to complete the settlement of I, No. 287 with the British authorities in secret. Consuls would be informed before promulgation of the British Order.</p>
157	13.1.1941 From Van Mook to Van Starkenborgh (Batavia)	<p><i>Thailand.</i> Steenstra Toussaint had suggested that the NEI Government support the resumption of oil deliveries to Thailand by NEI oil companies. An investigation was to be carried out in Bangkok prior to deciding whether such a radical departure from policy could be made.</p>
158	14.1.1941 Council of Ministers	<p><i>Transfer of seat of Government.</i> Van Starkenborgh urged the transference of the Government to Batavia or, alternatively, that Welter and Van Kleffens visit Batavia. Discussion deferred to meeting of 17 January. <i>Great Britain: interned Dutch nationals.</i> A number of internees had been released.</p>
159	14.1.1941 From Van Starkenborgh to Welter (Batavia)	<p><i>Boerstra-Jongejan mission.</i> Discussions between Idenburg and Boerstra-Jongejan in Shanghai concluded. It was probable that an official communiqué would have to be issued soon because of the fact that the meeting had become known.</p>
160	14.1.1941 From Welter	<p><i>Arms deliveries.</i> The Netherlands was prepared to co-ordinate arms purchases in the USA with those of Great Britain. Results disappointing. Promised part of production of small calibre munition, partly financed with Dutch money, reserved for British forces. Delivery of urgently required reconnaissance aircraft postponed to 1943, though the number (12) was very small in comparison with British orders. British intervention requested with a view to speeding up delivery.</p>
161	14.1.1941 From Van Pallandt to Van Bylandt (Lisbon)	<p><i>Foreign policy.</i> Appointment of envoy of stature to Lisbon desirable. Generally speaking, legations should reflect the international activities of the Netherlands. Criticism in the NEI of various Netherlands diplomatic representatives.</p>

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162	15.1.1941 From Schuller tot Peursum (Madrid)	<i>Spain: diplomatic relations with the Netherlands.</i> Spanish Government was making strenuous efforts to minimise the implications of not having invited Schuller and others to a State dinner held on 6 January. The incident was not a first step towards the severance of diplomatic relations. The writer suggested that no action be taken and requested instructions.
163	15.1.1941 From Van Nagell (Stockholm)	<i>Sweden and Finland.</i> Germany had made a vain attempt to persuade the Swedish and Finnish governments to remove from their diplomatic lists the representatives of German-occupied countries.
164	16.1.1941 To Schuller tot Peursum	<i>Spain: diplomatic relations with the Netherlands.</i> With regard to No. 150, the position to be adopted was that Spain was the injured party on account of German pressure and not the Netherlands. The Netherlands felt assured of the sympathy of the Spanish Government. If Schuller agreed to this line, it should be communicated to those concerned.
165	16.1.1941 To Loudon	<i>USA: Royal Decree A 6.</i> Clarification requested of need for authorization urged in No. 141. Draft authorization to be forwarded.
166	16.1.1941 From Foreign Office to Michiels van Verduynen	<i>KLM: cooperation with British airlines.</i> KLM role could consist of giving priority to persons and freight of importance for the war effort and of providing aircraft for urgent military purposes.
167	16.1.1941 Foreign Office, Chungking, to Netherlands legation	<i>China: employment contracts for Chinese seamen.</i> Proposal that engagement contracts between Chinese crew members and Dutch shipping companies be endorsed by an official Chinese representative to prevent what had by then become regular conflicts about the contents of such contracts.
168	17.1.1941 Council of Ministers	<i>Transfer of seat of Government.</i> The views of various ministers on Van Starckenborgh's proposals regarding the transference of the Government to Batavia. Opinions divided.
169	17.1.1941 From Dyxhoorn	<i>Centralisation of purchasing committees in USA.</i> In agreement with No. 137, but would prefer the direct placement of orders for the navy in NEI.
170	18.1.1941 Council of Ministers	<i>Transfer of seat of Government.</i> Continuation of the discussion referred to under No. 168. Some ministers defended the view that the international stature of the Netherlands would benefit from transference to Batavia. Others

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171	18.1.1941 From Welter to Van Starkenborgh	were of the opinion that departure from England would be interpreted as lack of confidence in ultimate British victory. Minutes to be forwarded to the Queen. <i>Great Britain: troop ships.</i> Arrangements made with British Ministry of Shipping for NEI passenger ships to be used as troop ships in the Atlantic and between Britain and the Middle East. British pledges regarding repairs and the return of hired ships.
172	20.1.1941 From Pabst (Tokyo)	<i>Japan.</i> The military was urging full mobilisation, but there was resistance to this in business and government circles. Government was seeking to reach agreement with the military. The situation was highly alarming and direct action was not inconceivable.
173	20.1.1941 From Welter to Van Starkenborgh	<i>NEI: restriction of exports to Japan.</i> It had been decided in talks with the British Ministry of Economic Warfare that the aim of restricting exports to Japan was to prevent re-exportation to the enemy and the stockpiling of strategic supplies. A joint monthly quota for rubber and tin was to be introduced; the NEI quota was to be determined by the Netherlands authorities. <i>Trade with USSR</i> to be restricted as far as possible because of the likelihood of re-exportation to Germany.
174	20.1.1941 From Van Starkenborgh to Welter (Batavia)	<i>France: consular representation in NEI.</i> Suggestion that in view of the transformation of Netherlands consulates in Indo-China into 'offices néerlandais', similar action be taken in respect of French consulates in NEI.
175	20.1.1941 To British Legation	<i>NEI: bauxite.</i> Van Starkenborgh was prepared to give consideration to requests for a bauxite exploration permit. The decision would take serious account of the interests of the Netherlands East Indies Bauxite Mining Co. and NEI defence requirements.
176	20.1.1941 From Welter	<i>Japan: trade talks in Batavia.</i> Enclosure of No. 176A, showing that Japan wished to include NEI in 'the New Order' in Asia under Japanese hegemony. Discussion of each separate point.
176A	19.1.1941 From Van Starkenborgh to Welter (Buitenzorg)	<i>Japan: trade talks in Batavia.</i> Memorandum presented by Japanese delegation on 16 January with sweeping demands for economic cooperation which, if met, would give Japan most-favoured-nation position in NEI.

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177	20.1.1941 From Michiels van Verduynen	<i>Japan.</i> Writer had been assured by Shigemitsu that being a signatory to the Tripartite Pact did not alter the peaceful nature of Japan's foreign policy.
178	21.1.1941 From Welter to Van Starckenborgh	<i>Legation in Tokyo.</i> Van Kleffens wondered whether it would be possible to find out through Yoshizawa if Japan would accept a new envoy in Tokyo.
179	21.1.1941 From Bland	<i>Great Britain: cooperation in Pacific.</i> Under the terms of the agreement concluded in Singapore, the principle of reciprocity required that British supplies be stored at NEI airfields. Special measures to obviate the risk of provoking Japan proposed.
180	22.1.1941 Council of Ministers	<i>Great Britain: interned Dutch nationals.</i> Statement by Gerbrandy. Netherlands contribution to <i>League of Nations</i> . <i>Transfer of seat of Government:</i> discussion of Van Starckenborgh's proposal that Welter and Van Kleffens visit NEI to be deferred until after decision on the question of transference had been taken by the full Government. More ships leased to Britain for use as <i>troop ships</i> .
181	22.1.1941 Van Bylandt	<i>Arms deliveries.</i> Writer had learned in discussion with MacReady that a committee chaired by Lord Hankey determined the allocation of arms among the Allies. Requests for the delivery of aircraft could best be addressed to the British Air Ministry.
182	22.1.1941 From Loudon (Washington)	<i>Portuguese Timor: Japanese penetration.</i> Opening of an air route between Australia and Portuguese Timor would increase Japan's chances of establishing a similar route.
183	23.1.1941 From Layton to the Admiralty (Singapore)	<i>Great Britain: cooperation in Pacific.</i> According to Helfrich, immediate mutual aid in the event of a Japanese attack on Malacca or NEI was not possible until detailed agreement had been reached in London. Exposition of form of aid envisaged and of position of Helfrich vis-à-vis the Governor-General and Furstner.
184	23.1.1941 From Van Starckenborgh to Welter (Batavia)	<i>Japan: trade talks in Batavia.</i> Memorandum in reply to No. 176A. The facts did not support the basic assumption of the Japanese memorandum that Japan and the NEI were highly interdependent. There had been a relative decline in trade since 1930. The NEI adhered firmly to the principle of non-discrimination against third countries. Proposals for improving trade relations between the two countries.

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185	24.1.1941 From Welter to Van Starckenborgh	<i>USA: rubber and tin purchases.</i> To facilitate the granting of credits to Great Britain and the NEI – in anticipation of the Lend-Lease Act – the US Government wished to buy 100,000 tons of rubber and 50,000 tons of tin from the British and Netherlands governments. Van Starckenborgh's views requested.
186	24.1.1941 From Van Starckenborgh to Welter (Batavia)	<i>Legation in Tokyo.</i> Appointment of Harinxma thoe Slooten should not be prepared through Yoshizawa (No. 178). It would be better to work through Pabst or through Shigemitsu in London.
187	25.1.1941 From Pabst (Tokyo)	<i>Japan: trade talks in Batavia.</i> Acceptance of proposals in No. 176A would reduce the NEI to the level of a Japanese colony.
188	27.1.1941 Ministerial Order	<i>Purchasing committees in USA.</i> All purchasing committees to work under one central body, the Netherlands Purchasing Commission. Description of powers and responsibilities.
189	28.1.1941 Council of Ministers	<i>Great Britain: interned Dutch nationals.</i> Government to press for the release of Van Duyn. <i>Transfer of seat of Government:</i> the Queen opposed to transference to NEI. <i>Netherlands gold in USA:</i> Discussion on question whether Government could use Netherlands Bank gold in USA once it had obtained possession of it after US legislative amendment. Gerbrandy noted that the number of <i>diplomats accredited to the Netherlands Government</i> was small. Information on <i>Boerstra-Jongejan mission.</i>
190	28.1.1941 From Welter	<i>NEI: measures against German raiders.</i> Incoming and outgoing ships to be escorted by naval vessels as protection against German raiders. Great Britain to be asked for permission to put into British and Australian ports for re-fuelling. Reports on the political situation in the Pacific to be forwarded regularly.
191	29.1.1941 From Van Starckenborgh to Welter (Batavia)	<i>Australia: Pacific policy.</i> According to Menzies, Australia was prepared to meet the threat of Japanese aggression by working together with Britain, the Netherlands and the USA.
192	29.1.1941 To Welter	<i>Declaration of enemy territory under Royal Decree A 6: France and Italy.</i> Decision to be taken after receipt of views of governors of overseas territories. Pending decision, measures similar to those taken earlier against Italy (I, No. 318) could be introduced to prevent communication with France and French colonies. The decree would have to be amended to make

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193	29.1.1941 From Beyen to Welter	it impossible for Dutch subjects in neutral countries to communicate with Italy and France as the measures in question applied only to overseas territories. <i>Relief purchases for the Netherlands.</i> Plan for relief purchases discussed with Waley and Keynes. The latter had stressed the importance of consultation with the British Government to avoid dollar purchases in those cases where Sterling purchases were possible. The writer urged that Keynes' advice be followed.
194	29.1.1941 From Van Boetzelaer to Van Bylandt (Washington)	<i>Post-war world.</i> Van Zeeland had explained his ideas about post-war cooperation between small European states to D. Thompson. Though the time was not yet ripe for drawing up plans, setting out Dutch views to columnists like Thompson was a step in the right direction.
195	30.1.1941 Teixeira de Mattos	<i>Japan: Pacific policy.</i> Ashley Clarke believed that in her foreign policy Japan had thrown caution to the winds and was now on the downward slope. Attack on NEI not inconceivable.
196	31.1.1941 From Van Starckenborgh to Welter (Batavia)	<i>USA: rubber and tin purchases.</i> Role allotted to NEI in proposals (No. 185) easy to fulfil. Serious objections to government-to-government sales, which could jeopardise negotiations with Japan. NEI sales could take place as under earlier contracts. Large proportion of NEI tin quota for 1941 already pre-sold to USA. Because of stagnation in arms deliveries, the NEI had little need of new credits.
197	31.1.1941 From Pabst to Matsuoka (Tokyo)	<i>Japan: maltreatment of Japanese in NEI.</i> No connection between any of the cases of maltreatment referred to under No. 78A. NEI authorities had taken suitable measures before receipt of Japan's request to do so. Discussion of individual incidents.
198	1.2.1941 From Pabst (Tokyo)	<i>Pacific policy.</i> Consultation between the NEI and British military authorities on defence cooperation in the event of a Japanese attack essential in view of Japan's interest in certain regions of the NEI with abundant resources of raw materials.
199	1.2.1941 From Loudon (Washington)	<i>Relief for occupied Europe.</i> Inquiry as to whether Netherlands Government was still of the same mind as in No. 114.
200	1.2.1941 From Van Starckenborgh to Welter	<i>Staff talks in Singapore.</i> Summary of the results of staff talks with British navy in Singapore: establishment of operational areas, joint use of bases and preparations for an exchange of in-

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201	1.2.1941 To Welter	formation prior to the outbreak of hostilities with Japan. <i>Staff talks with USA</i> in Batavia on naval matters had resulted in agreement to exchange liaison officers, secret charts and navigation information. Chief of US Navy Staff was convinced that US would act if Japan attacked NEI. The writer was of the opinion that cooperation with USA was of greater value for the defence of the NEI than cooperation with Great Britain.
202	3.2.1941 From Dyxhoorn	<i>Germany: exchange of consuls.</i> Exchange of honorary consuls with Germany was only possible on the basis of reciprocity and after the exchange of professional consuls had been completed. Question of exchange was not to be arranged by Swiss consul in Batavia with NEI Government. The subject was to be dealt with at the level of the governments responsible for the protection of interests.
203	4.2.1941 To Council of Ministers	<i>KLM: cooperation with Allies.</i> No objections to British Government's proposal to work together with KLM on the Asian route. The writer assumed that aircraft lost would be replaced immediately after the war.
204	4.2.1941 Council of Ministers	<i>Immunity of Netherlands Government.</i> Submission of Nos. 116 and 117 with the recommendation that they be accepted. Request that civil servants be apprised of the contents wherever necessary. In the matter of the withdrawal of immunity from persons breaking the British law, the Netherlands Government could declare its readiness to accede to British requests to this effect in cases involving serious crimes.
205	4.2.1941 From Welter to Van Starckenborgh	<i>Immunity of Netherlands Government.</i> No. 203 approved. <i>Visit of Welter and Van Kleffens to NEI.</i> Objections to visit on the grounds that decisions about war aims and the sale of gold to Great Britain would have to be taken in their absence. Other speakers felt that Van Starckenborgh's urgent request for their presence at essential talks could not be ignored. An alternative proposal was that Van Starckenborgh send trusted aides to London.
205	4.2.1941 From Welter to Van Starckenborgh	<i>Staff talks in Singapore.</i> Brooke-Popham to visit NEI. British Government had proposed staff talks between Malaya, Australia and NEI with a view to drawing up a plan for cooperation between their respective armed forces.

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206	4.2.1941 Van Weede	<i>Poland: diplomatic relations.</i> As Bosch van Rosenthal had not been officially recalled as envoy to the Polish Government he was to be entered on the diplomatic list as an absent envoy.
207	4.2.1941 From Pabst (Tokyo)	<i>Japan: status quo NEI.</i> Writer had handed No. 207A to Ohashi and informed him that the Netherlands Government likewise declined to accept the leadership of the USA and Great Britain. <i>Trade talks in Batavia.</i> Ohashi's attention had been directed to the aggressive tone adopted by the Japanese press towards the NEI. Ohashi had stressed the purely economic nature of Japanese desiderata and expressed the hope that a compromise acceptable to both parties would be reached. There was no question of Japan trying to impose its will on the NEI.
207A	31.1.1941 From Pabst to Ohashi (Tokyo)	<i>Japan: status quo NEI.</i> The Netherlands Government rejected the idea of the inclusion of the NEI in any new order in Asia, regardless of which country had the leadership, and would resist every attempt in this direction.
208	4.2.1941 From Pabst (Tokyo)	<i>Japan: trade talks in Batavia.</i> Newspaper reports forwarded of Matsuoka's statement in Parliament concerning the negotiations in Batavia.
208A	29.1.1941 'Tokyo Nichi Nichi'	<i>Japan: trade talks in Batavia.</i> Matsuoka had declined to state in Parliament that the NEI was treating Japan's requests unfairly. He hoped in the course of the talks to be able to convince the NEI authorities of the advantages of working together with Japan.
208B	30.1.1941 'Yomiuri'	<i>Japan: trade talks in Batavia.</i> The talks were proving to be very difficult but the attitude of the NEI authorities could not be termed hostile. Matsuoka hoped to achieve success through diplomatic channels, but Japan did not intend to change her Pacific policy.
208C	31.1.1941 'Asahi'	<i>Japan: Pacific policy.</i> The operation of the lend-lease system in the Pacific and the increasing military and diplomatic activities of the USA and Great Britain in China and the Pacific could, according to Matsuoka, necessitate the implementation of the Tripartite Pact.
208D	30.1.1941 'Tokyo Nichi Nichi'	<i>Japan: Pacific policy.</i> Matsuoka's statement in Parliament: 1. further information on the oil contract with the NEI could not yet be given; 2. Western countries wrongly interpreted the

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209	5.2.1941 Council of Ministers	co-prosperity plan as an attempt to dominate the whole of East Asia. Japan wished to exercise leadership, with other countries participating in accordance with their capacities. <i>NEI: treatment of Japanese.</i> The Japanese Government was striving to prevent the hostile treatment of Japanese nationals and to change the unfriendly attitude of the NEI press.
209	5.2.1941 Council of Ministers	<i>Visit of Welter and Van Kleffens to NEI.</i> After further discussion of the opportuneness of their absence from London when decisions had to be made, and of alternatives, the Council agreed to the visit taking place. Objections to Peekema accompanying Welter for discussions on constitutional reform on account of his views on the war. Discussions to be arranged with the British Government about posting two new <i>Netherlands warships</i> to the NEI.
210	5.2.1941 From Pabst (Tokyo)	<i>Japan: jurisdiction of Netherlands Government.</i> Japan doubted whether the jurisdiction of the Netherlands Government in London extended to the NEI.
211	5.2.1941 From Welter to Van Starckenborgh	<i>NEI: exports to USSR.</i> Embargo to be placed on the export of specified products to USSR at the request of the Ministry of Economic Warfare. Detailed proposals for the <i>restriction of exports to Japan</i> would follow shortly. First monthly quotas could now be announced.
212	5.2.1941 From Welter	<i>Thailand: oil deliveries.</i> On the grounds of information received from Bangkok, Van Starckenborgh was prepared to consider the idea of NEI oil deliveries. The writer advised consultation with the Foreign Office after which, in the event of a favourable decision, the oil companies could be informed.
212A	29.1.1941 From Van Starckenborgh to Welter (Batavia)	<i>Thailand.</i> According to Steenstra Toussaint (Bangkok), Thailand had not yet linked herself to Japan. Withdrawal of British and Netherlands support could push Thailand in this direction.
213	5.2.1941 From Michiels van Verduynen	<i>Australia: diplomatic representation.</i> Bruce suggested that this question be resolved during Menzies' visit to London. <i>Pacific policy.</i> Bruce had tried to convince Hopkins of the need to maintain peace in the Pacific, for which US cooperation was essential. He felt that the hesitant US attitude was prompted by doubts about British readiness to resist Japanese aggression.

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214	5.2.1941 From Loudon (Washington)	<i>USA: war aims.</i> Discussion of this point in combination with Lend-Lease and the Hoover relief plan played into the hands of pro-German propaganda in the US.
215	5.2.1941 Steenberghe to the Council of Ministers	<i>Relief of the occupied Netherlands.</i> Report on discussion of No. 112 with Dalton. Anglo-Dutch committee to determine whether effective control could be exercised over the distribution of food consignments sent to the occupied Netherlands.
216	6.2.1941 To Pabst	<i>Japan: sovereignty of Netherlands Government.</i> Verbal message to be delivered to the effect that the utterances of the Japanese spokesman (see No. 210) undermined the basis of the negotiations in Batavia. Those concerned to receive instructions devised to avoid confusing statements on position of the NEI.
217	8.2.1941 To Achilles	<i>USA: arms deliveries.</i> Summary of NEI orders placed for aircraft, small arms, small arms ammunition and anti-aircraft guns. Request that delivery be speeded up.
218	9.2.1941 From Pabst (Tokyo)	<i>Japan: sovereignty of Netherlands Government.</i> Ohashi had apologised for the utterances of the spokesman (No. 210), whereupon the writer had delivered the message referred to in No. 216.
219	10.2.1941 To British legation	<i>Italy.</i> NEI regulations governing financial transactions with Italy meet request of I, No. 380. Identical measures to be taken in respect of Surinam and Netherlands Antilles.
220	10.2.1941 From Van Boeyen to Council of Ministers	<i>Great Britain: interned Dutch nationals.</i> Report of visit to internment camp in Lingfield. Internees' comportment was good, but many felt that the Netherlands Government was doing nothing for them. The danger here was that those of good will could be influenced by the hostile elements. Regaining their confidence would require time and tact.
221	11.2.1941 From Van Bylandt to Steenberghe	<i>Royal Decree A 6: Philips.</i> Enclosure of No. 221AB. Suggestions requested regarding ways and means of preventing the dismantling of Philips, Eindhoven, while adhering to the British principles of economic warfare.
221A	From Van Pallandt (Lisbon)	<i>Royal Decree A 6: Philips.</i> Account of discussion with De Vries of Philips, Eindhoven, about Netherlands views on trading with the enemy. Philips, Eindhoven, was in danger of being dismantled in the interests of German industry, which would constitute a heavy loss

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221B	7.2.1941 Bland	for the Netherlands after the war. Board of Directors was endeavouring to prevent this by showing a certain willingness to cooperate with the German authorities. The writer had explained to De Vries that in occupied territory, the right mentality was more important than the continued existence of an industrial concern. <i>Royal Decree A 6: Philips</i> . What could be done to prevent Philips branches abroad from working together with Philips, Eindhoven?
222	12.2.1941 Council of Ministers	<i>Visit of Welter and Van Kleffens to NEI</i> . The Queen had been informed of the decision. Secretaries-General of Colonies and Foreign Affairs to head their respective Ministries. Steenberghe to be Acting Minister of Finance. <i>Great Britain: interned Dutch nationals</i> . To speed up the process of obtaining information on Dutch nationals, Welter proposed that requests be submitted through the Foreign Office.
223	12.2.1941 From Visser (Ankara)	<i>Royal Decree A 6: Philips</i> . Permission requested for Philips, Turkey, to take delivery of goods ordered from Eindhoven before 1.1.41; the firm would otherwise be threatened with bankruptcy. British Embassy had no objections.
224	12.2.1941 From Van Starkenborgh to Welter (Batavia)	<i>Japan: recognition of Netherlands Government in London</i> . Writer had asked Pabst for clarification as it was not apparent from Japanese announcements that the Japanese Government recognised the competency of the Netherlands Government in London in NEI affairs. See No. 218.
225	12.2.1941 From Welter to Van Starkenborgh	<i>NEI: rubber and tin exports to Japan</i> . In consultation with British authorities, the combined export quota had been fixed at 42,000 tons for rubber and 4,000 tons for tin, of which NEI was to supply 20,000 and 1500 (or 1000) tons respectively. USA was under pressure to buy rubber in Indo-China. Van Starkenborgh's opinion asked.
226	12.2.1941 From Michiels van Ver- duynen	<i>Thailand: oil deliveries</i> . Oil deliveries by NEI not advisable in view of close relations between Japan and Thailand. Foreign Office should not be asked if it shared this view on account of NEI's independent economic relations with neighbouring states.
227	13.2.1941 From Pabst (Tokyo)	<i>Japan: Pacific policy</i> . Indications of independent southward move of extremists in armed

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228	13.2.1941 From Welter	forces against the wishes of the government and industry. <i>Staff talks in Singapore.</i> At meeting with Brooke-Popham, Van Starckenborgh had agreed to latter's proposal to arrange staff talks between NEI, Great Britain and Australia, with US navy as observer. <i>Pacific policy.</i> Both were opposed to a public Anglo-Dutch announcement of joint action in the event of a Japanese attack on Malacca or the NEI as long as Japan had not occupied South Indo-China, their reason being that the US had not given a similar undertaking. The tense situation in the Far East made it necessary for London and Washington to be informed if the Dutch proposed taking any action, since the need for this could be determined solely on the basis of British and American information.
229	14.2.1941 From Loudon (Washington)	<i>Relief supplies.</i> The British Government was opposed to the building-up of food stocks for relief. It was in favour of pooling dollars obtained from the sale of raw materials to the US for the purchase of arms.
230	14.2.1941 From Welter to Van Starckenborgh	<i>Trading with the enemy.</i> Request received from the British Government for cooperation in the introduction of navicerts for ships plying between America and Japanese and Chinese ports and Vladivostok with a view to facilitating control of cargoes intended for the enemy.
231	14.2.1941 Netherlands Legation to Foreign Office	<i>Pacific policy.</i> Proposal that instead of issuing the joint public statement on further Japanese aggression proposed by Brooke-Popham, Britain and the Netherlands should make a combined effort to win the agreement of the US Government to a statement being issued by the diplomatic representatives of the US, Great Britain and the Netherlands in Tokyo.
232	14.2.1941 From Steenberghe to Welter	<i>Relief purchases.</i> The writer was not in agreement with No. 229, being of the opinion that the Netherlands Government should retain control of its dollars. In purchasing food supplies, it was not always possible to act in accordance with a policy based solely on financial considerations, but here economy with dollars should be the guiding principle.
233	15.2.1941 From Pabst (Tokyo)	<i>Japan. Pacific policy.</i> Reports of Japanese troop movements in connection with the expected southward move.

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234	16.2.1941 Michiels van Verduynen	<i>Pacific policy.</i> Discussion with Bruce. Agitation about Japanese aggressiveness had arisen from Australian pressure on Great Britain. In agreement with No. 231. Reassuring Japanese statements.
235	18.2.1941 Council of Ministers	<i>Visit of Welter and Van Kleffens to NEI.</i> Departure scheduled for 24 February. <i>Japan</i> recognised sovereignty of Netherlands Government in NEI. <i>Situation in Pacific.</i>
236	18.2.1941 Van Kleffens	<i>The Netherlands: foreign policy</i> was characterised by a quest for security. The Netherlands was prepared at all times to help to bring about a better international order. Little could be said about the <i>post-war international situation</i> because of the doubt about US membership of a new international organisation and the condition of Germany at the end of the war. Germany should not be forced to pay large sums in reparation; demilitarization should, however, be insisted upon. It should be allowed a reasonable standard of prosperity in order to prevent the growth of aggressive feelings. The Netherlands would make no territorial demands and was in favour of free trade and an open door policy in its overseas territories.
237	18.2.1941 Van Bylandt	<i>China.</i> The writer had advised Liem to request trade credits from Batavia rather than from the Netherlands Government but had warned him that he had little chance of success.
238	20.2.1941 Van Kleffens	<i>Czechoslovakia: diplomatic relations.</i> It had been made clear to Ripka in October 1940 that the severance of relations that had taken place in 1938 (at the request of the legal Czech Government) when Czechoslovakia ceased to exist as an independent state made it impossible to accord <i>de jure</i> recognition to the provisional government under Benes. Other countries had meanwhile established relations with the provisional Benes Government. The writer had recently discussed the question of recognition with Baracek and was of the opinion that it should be arranged in the most suitable diplomatic form.
239	20.2.1941 From Welter	<i>France: declaration of enemy territory.</i> Action taken against countries cooperating with Germany such as Italy, Japan and the USSR had shown that control of trade and commerce could prevent damage to the war effort. The proposal concerning France was prompted by

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		the wish to coordinate Netherlands measures with British measures and not by a desire to prevent damage to Netherlands interests. This measure would primarily affect the overseas territories. The argument that the proposed measure would prevent Dutch nationals abroad from being placed on the British black list was not a convincing one because no sanctions attached to non-observance of Royal Decree A 6.
240	21.2.1941 From Welter to Van Starckenborgh	<i>Pacific policy.</i> Michiels van Verduynen and Butler had discussed the fact that Britain had not yet given a formal undertaking to come to the aid of the NEI in the event of Japanese aggression. According to Butler, Britain would not stand idly by. There were indications that Japan was about to adopt a definite attitude, for which reason Roosevelt had warned the new Japanese ambassador in no uncertain terms.
241	21.2.1941 From Van Starckenborgh to Welter (Batavia)	<i>USA: military attaché in Batavia.</i> Loudon instructed to request clarification and denial of Washington announcement that military attaché to be posted to Batavia.
242	21.2.1941 Van Vredenburg	<i>Post-war problems.</i> Leghait had proposed that prior to the peace conference the Belgian and Netherlands governments work closely together in studying post-war problems.
243	21.2.1941 From Loudon (Washington)	<i>USA: Pacific policy.</i> Washington reactions to tense situation in the Far East. No guarantee of participation of USA if conflict should occur. Tone of press was interventionist and press commentators were of the opinion that cooperation between the Netherlands and Great Britain was of vital importance for both.
243A	19.2.1941 'New York Herald Tribune'	<i>Pacific policy.</i> Statement by Lamsvelt: Japan would soon resume its southward march. NEI would defend itself.
243B	16.2.1941	<i>Pacific policy.</i> Loudon's statement to the press after his discussions with Hull and Welles on the Far East situation.
244	22.2.1941 From Van Starckenborgh to Welter (Batavia)	<i>Economic warfare.</i> Open rationing of exports to Japan was unwise because the quota might later have to be raised under Japanese pressure. The writer favoured a generous monthly quota that could be reduced later.
245	22.2.1941 Van Troostenburg de Bruyn	<i>Royal Decree A 1: administration.</i> Promulgation of Royal Decree A 1 of great importance for economic warfare. Nothing was being done

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		<p>about the inventorization, recovery and administration of claims. Owing to Welter's opposition, an interpretative amendment and the administration of claims that it was intended to effect had come to nothing. Formal diplomatic representatives should be designated administrators abroad, which authority they could delegate, notably in the USA. Difference of opinion between Ministries of Justice and Finance (Welter Acting Minister) about the powers of a commission to be set up under the chairmanship of Beyen. Draft Decree providing for the institution of a commission responsible for the execution of Decree A 1 was completed; the commission would concern itself solely with financial matters and would leave legal matters to Minister of Justice. The writer recommended that Van Kleffens decline to sign the Decree if it was not certain that Beyen was to chair the commission. Beyen had refused the appointment because he considered the proposed commission to be too wide-ranging. If necessary, the diplomatic representatives could be charged with the implementation of Royal Decree A 1.</p>
246	23.2.1941 From Van Starckenborgh to Welter (Batavia)	<p><i>Pacific policy.</i> The writer was in favour of an open declaration of solidarity between the Netherlands, Great Britain and possibly the USA in the event of increased tension in the Pacific. Defensive nature of such a declaration would have to be clear. Permission requested to inform consuls-general in Singapore and Sydney.</p>
247	23.2.1941 From Pabst (Tokyo)	<p><i>Japan: Pacific policy.</i> Tension somewhat relaxed. Military preparations of the Allies and USA should go ahead and incidents be avoided.</p>
248	24.2.1941 From Van Bylandt to Michiels van Verduynen	<p><i>Great Britain: recognition of Royal Decree A 1.</i> Foreign Office to be asked to reply to I, No. 365A, as Britain's failure to accord recognition to the Decree was causing difficulties. British Government had advised Netherlands Government to inform Turkey that Royal Decree A 1 formed the legal basis for action against Turkey. British recognition of the decree was of importance for allies' economic warfare policy. British recognition would be followed by attempts to secure US recognition.</p>

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249	24.2.1941 From Van Hoorn (Belgrade)	<i>Romania.</i> Events and measures taken in connection with the de facto severance of diplomatic relations.
250	25.2.1941 From Loudon (Washington)	<i>USA: diplomatic relations with the Netherlands.</i> Permission requested to join with the Norwegian representative and to propose to the State Department that the status of the legation be raised to that of embassy.
251	25.2.1941 Philipse	<i>Post-war relief measures.</i> Arrangements were to be made with the British Authorities for the purchase of goods in the British Empire; special attention was to be accorded to the political aspects of trade. Attention would also be given to deliveries to Great Britain of various NEI products. Cooperation to be arranged on a business-like basis by Leith-Ross, Hart and Lamping jointly before other countries made relief purchases.
252	25.2.1941 From Michiels van Verduynen	<i>Far East.</i> Information received from Butler on Churchill's discussion with Shigemitsu. The deterioration in Anglo-Japanese relations was caused by aggressive Japanese policy, and Anglo-American cooperation was the result of this.
253	25.2.1941	<i>ADA staff talks in Singapore.</i> Report on talks between British, NEI, Australian and New Zealand military representatives on cooperation in the event of Japanese aggression. The proposals required the approval of the governments concerned. Analysis of the situation in the Far East and summing up of possibilities of deploying the armed forces, depending on the form of Japanese attack.
253A		<i>ADA staff talks in Singapore.</i> Survey of ways of deploying the NEI navy in response to the various lines of attack which Japan could use in actions against British and NEI territory.
254	26.2.1941 From Michiels van Verduynen to Eden	<i>Purchasing committees in USA.</i> The Netherlands Government was prepared to refrain from placing defence orders in the dollar area provided they could be placed in the sterling area. The Netherlands Purchasing Committee had been instructed to work in close collaboration with the British Purchasing Committee and to be prepared to extend that collaboration to the purchase of non-military goods. Outline of the procedure followed in placing orders. The Netherlands Government hoped that the British Purchasing Committee would be fully aware of

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		the vital nature of defence orders for the NEI. Notwithstanding this wide-ranging cooperation, the Netherlands Government reserved the right to approach the US Government direct in the interests of NEI defence.
254A		An order for carbines needed for the defence of the Bankatin tin mines had been refused. Reconsideration of this decision requested.
254B		An order of 73 light tanks, the last of which should have been delivered in December 1940, had been largely requisitioned by the British Government. The Netherlands Government nevertheless wished to take delivery of the 49 tanks still outstanding.
254C		The NEI had for some time been awaiting the delivery of reserve parts for aircraft engines.
255	26.2.1941 From Groenman (Ottawa)	<i>Canada: exchange rates tax.</i> Tax was discriminatory in that the country of origin rather than the nature of the goods was the determining factor in its imposition. Inclusion of 255A.
255A	15.1.1941 From Skelton to Groenman (Ottawa)	<i>Canada: exchange rates tax.</i> Reply to I, No. 408A. To exempt the NEI from the tax it would be necessary to amend the law. Final reply to Netherlands' request could not yet be given.
256	26.2.1941 From Pabst (Tokyo)	<i>Pacific policy.</i> In mediating in the frontier dispute between Indo-China and Thailand, Japan was suspected of having gained strategic advantages for herself. Roosevelt's statement concerning aid for Great Britain had made a deep impression in Japan. The Japanese press ascribed the tense situation to British propaganda. Matsuoka had stated in Parliament that Japan had only peaceful intentions. Japan was aware of the fact that expansion to the south would come up against a front extending from Singapore to the Philippines. Recently, a slight lessening of tension. It was essential that the allies and the US continue to build up their military strength.
257	28.2.1941 From Steenberghe to Gerbrandy	<i>Great Britain: interned Dutch nationals.</i> The detention of large numbers of Dutch nationals in British prisons without trial suggested that there were many traitors amongst the Dutch. This misconception on the part of the British authorities and of public opinion should be corrected. The British would appreciate firm steps being taken. The Government should not

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258	28.2.1941 From Welter to Van Starkenborgh	tolerate the continued detention of Dutch subjects without trial. The internment of Van Duyn undermined the dignity of the Netherlands Government. <i>Visit of Welter and Van Kleffens to NEI.</i> Consideration was being given to making the journey out via the US. Disadvantages included the risk of giving the impression that the Netherlands was too firmly on the side of the US without any corresponding gesture being forthcoming from the Americans. Yet the writer was in favour of visiting the US on both the outward and homeward journeys because of its effect on Japan. Van Starkenborgh's views requested.
259	28.2.1941 Van Bylandt	<i>USA: arms deliveries.</i> Achilles had been informed by Hull that, US defence interests permitting, every effort would be made to fulfil defence orders for NEI.
260	1.3.1941 To Loudon	<i>USA: recognition of Royal Decree A 1; test case.</i> Loudon asked to advise on the role that the Wartime Legal Rights Committee and the Netherlands Government could play in the lawsuit instituted by J.P. Morgan. No steps to be taken in the matter without prior consultation with the Government.
261	1.3.1941 To the Queen	<i>Visit of Welter and Van Kleffens to NEI.</i> The plan to make the outward journey via Africa and Asia had been abandoned because of the difficulty of organising it. Though at first there had been objections of a political nature to the idea of making the outward and homeward journeys via the US (it could be wrongly interpreted as indicating close collaboration between the US and the Netherlands in the Pacific), it had been decided in view of the difficult situation in Indo-China to carry out this plan because of the tempering effect it could have on further Japanese aggression.
262	1.3.1941 From Van Bylandt to Van Breugel Douglas	<i>The Netherlands: Pacific policy.</i> Consultations were being held with Great Britain on the Pacific policy with the object of avoiding armed conflict with Japan. The alliance was less firm on this question than on the question of Germany.
263	3.3.1941 Van Vredenburg	<i>Czechoslovakia.</i> Erban's proposal that diplomatic relations be restored discussed with him. No reference should be made to either de facto or de jure recognition. Temporary chargé-d'aff-

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264	3.3.1941 To Michiels van Verduynen	fares to be appointed by both countries. <i>USA: arms deliveries.</i> The British Government was intent on procuring the largest possible share of arms produced in the US and was not disposed to cooperate seriously in the matter of securing delivery of arms ordered for the NEI. To ensure greater cooperation No. 264A was to be handed to the British Government.
264A	3.3.1941 From Michiels van Verduynen to Eden	<i>USA: arms deliveries.</i> USA regularly cancelled NEI arms orders, particularly orders for aircraft. Continued tension in the Far East rendered strengthening of NEI defences absolutely essential. NEI resistance to Japanese aggression would also be of vital importance for neighbouring British, French and American areas. British support requested for Netherlands approach to US Government with a view to obtaining immediate delivery of orders.
265	3.3.1941 From Michiels van Verduynen	<i>Far East.</i> Report on discussion with Shigemitsu. Japan had no aggressive intentions with regard to British and Netherlands territories in Asia. British-American-Japanese relations were complicated by their respective attitudes to China. The Netherlands could improve the situation in the Far East by exercising pressure on Britain to give Japan a free hand to settle the conflict with China. The writer had explained the Netherlands' grievances against Japan.
266	3.3.1941 From Michiels van Verduynen	<i>Organisation and deployment of Netherlands armed forces in Britain.</i> Enclosure of draft agreement and annexes.
266A	28.2.1941 From Foreign Office to Michiels van Verduynen	<i>Organisation and deployment of Netherlands armed forces in Britain.</i> Enclosure of draft agreement concerning the Netherlands army, navy and air force and jurisdiction over members of the armed forces. Text of the blanket agreement was based on that of I, No. 299A. Explanation of the provisions as they applied to each separate branch of the services.
267	4.3.1941 Council of Ministers	<i>Diplomatic service.</i> Difficulties anticipated in the matter of obtaining approval for successors to Sillem (Lisbon) and Van Nagell (Stockholm), who were shortly to be discharged from their posts. <i>Far East:</i> contents of No. 265.
268	4.3.1941 From Van Starckenborgh to Welter (Batavia)	<i>Visit of Welter and Van Kleffens to NEI.</i> Reply to No. 258. In favour of visit to USA on the outward journey to the NEI for political reasons.

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269	4.3.1941 From Gerbrandy to Steenberghe	<i>Great Britain: interned Dutch nationals.</i> Safeguarding the kingdom and its allies against unreliable elements was of primary importance, and had to be placed before promoting the interests of wrongly-suspected Dutch nationals. He did not agree with the view that the good name of the Netherlands was damaged by the arrest of a large number of Dutch subjects whom the British authorities considered to be suspect. The Dutch were treated in the same way as the British. The Netherlands Government had to exercise care in requesting the release of suspected persons. The Netherlands Government had a duty to provide the British authorities with all possible assistance in combating the enemy.
270	4.3.1941 From Van Starckenborgh to Welter (Batavia)	<i>Boerstra-Jongejan mission.</i> Idenburg's discussions with Boerstra and Jongejan in Shanghai constituted no reason for amending the treatment of German internees. The writer was opposed to the proposal that German internees be exchanged for Indonesian Dutch and other Dutch nationals in the Netherlands. No official announcement had been made about the discussions.
271	5.3.1941 From Hart to Van Starckenborgh	<i>NEI: rubber exports to Japan.</i> The large quantities of rubber supplied to Japan by Indo-China made it desirable that NEI exports to Japan be restricted to 1000 tons per month. No objections to the export of rice.
272	5.3.1941 From Van Starckenborgh to Welter (Batavia)	<i>Japan: trade talks in Batavia.</i> Negotiations resumed with discussions between Van Hoogstraten and Ishizawa. It had been made clear that the oil concessions required went much too far. The lack of vigorous support on the part of the Japanese for the proposals put forward was striking. Extensive fishing rights for the Japanese had been refused. The Japanese wanted a number of export quotas to be raised, but did not object in principle to the export regulations as such. In the light of the general situation Japan's attitude was ill-defined.
273	5.3.1941 From Matsuoka to Pabst (Tokyo)	<i>Japan.</i> The NEI authorities were not according the Japanese representatives the privileges to which they were entitled by international law and custom.
274	7.3.1941 From Michiels van Verduynen	<i>Far East.</i> Discussion with Butler. A British flirtation with Japan to effect a settlement of the Chinese conflict would damage Britain's

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275	7.3.1941 From Schuller tot Peursum (Madrid)	position in the US. <i>Spain: diplomatic relations with the Netherlands.</i> Spanish authorities were going to a great deal of trouble to play down the fact that the Netherlands representatives had not been invited to an official church service held on 3 March. They stressed the fact that Spain continued to recognise the sovereignty of the Netherlands. Ready Spanish cooperation in many matters. Representation in Madrid should be continued. Representatives of other countries were also hampered by strong German influence.
276	7.3.1941 From Leith-Ross to Lamping	<i>Post-war relief measures.</i> Guarantees against seizure would be given for goods purchased by the Netherlands Government in the British Empire, though subject to provisos by some dominions in respect of certain goods. Consultation between the Netherlands and British governments on all purchases of foodstuffs and raw materials was impossible because of the range this would cover. British Government could however provide information on items of importance for Netherlands relief. Goods bought in South America could be paid for in sterling.
277	8.3.1941 From Colonial Ministry to Van Starckenborgh	<i>Germans interned in NEI.</i> According to Bosch van Rosenthal, the Swiss consul in Batavia would enquire about the measures to be taken as a result of Idenburg's talks with Boerstra and Jongejan in Shanghai. He was to be answered that decisions would be taken after the arrival of Van Kleffens.
278	10.3.1941 Van Bylandt to all diplo- matic missions	<i>Implementation of Royal Decree A 6.</i> Netherlands diplomatic and consular officials were prohibited from maintaining contact with the occupied Netherlands other than for purely family or personal reasons. All other communication could be continued only after approval had been given by the Wartime Legal Rights Committee. This also applied to honorary consular officials.
279	10.3.1941 To Van Bylandt (Monte Estoril)	<i>Tokyo legation.</i> Van Harinxma thoe Slooten was willing to be posted to Tokyo. <i>Lisbon legation.</i> If approval was not forthcoming for Van Haersma de With a chargé-d'affaires was to be appointed. <i>Spain: diplomatic relations with the Netherlands.</i> If the Spanish Government again behaved with impropriety towards

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280	13.3.1941 Van Vredenburg	the Netherlands representative serious consideration was to be given to his recall. Van Kleffens to be consulted before decision was taken. <i>Czechoslovakia: diplomatic relations.</i> It had been made clear to Nosek that the Netherlands Government could only agree to the appointment of a temporary chargé-d'affaires if diplomatic relations were re-established.
281	14.3.1941 From Teixeira de Mattos	<i>Sweden: arms deliveries.</i> Discouraging Swedish reply to Netherlands request that arms required for NEI navy be sent via Siberia.
282	14.3.1941 From Van Harinxma thoe Slooten to Van Bylandt (Lisbon)	<i>Tokyo legation.</i> The writer was delighted with Van Kleffens' confidential communication that he was to be appointed envoy to Tokyo subject to the approval of Japan.
283	14.3.1941 From Van Walsem to Snijders (New York)	<i>Turkey: Royal Decree A 6: Philips.</i> Philips (Turkey) had been instructed not to order goods from enemy and occupied countries or from Hungary. The Wartime Legal Rights Committee in Curaçao had given permission to Philips (Turkey) on 8.10.40 to order goods from occupied and enemy countries but had withdrawn it on 31.12.40. If the situation continued unchanged, Philips (Turkey) would have to be liquidated and it would lose its market position to its German competitors. Specific questions of the Wartime Legal Rights Committee concerning deliveries from occupied countries had to remain unanswered for lack of information. The matter should be regulated in a way making it possible for Philips (Turkey) to continue in existence. Philips was endeavouring to support the interests of the Netherlands and Britain as far as possible and to damage the interests of the enemy.
284	15.3.1941 From Van Bylandt to Masaryk	<i>Czechoslovakia: diplomatic relations.</i> The Netherlands Government shared the Czech view that relations should be established and wished to do so at the level of temporary chargés-d'affaires.
285	15.3.1941 From De Brauw (Istanbul)	<i>Bulgaria: severance of diplomatic relations.</i> British ambassador had taken the initiative in co-ordinating the severance of relations of Britain, Belgium, Poland and the Netherlands with Bulgaria. Initiative should rightly have been left to Bulgaria. Shishmanov had given notice of severance of relations. British ambassador was not permitted by Bulgarian authori-

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		ties to leave until after the departure of the other diplomatic missions. In an interview with Minister Popov, the writer had criticised the servile attitude of Bulgaria to Germany since the former's accession to the Tripartite Pact. He had left Sofia on 9 March.
286	15.3.1941 From De Brauw (Istanbul)	<i>Protection of Netherlands interests in Bulgaria.</i> Bulgarian Government had refused to recognise Switzerland as representing Netherlands interests. American representative was prepared to assume responsibilities temporarily.
287	15.3.1941 To Van Bylandt (Monte Estoril)	<i>Germans interned in NEI.</i> Welter would meet Boerstra and Jongejan but would simply listen to what they had to say.
288	17.3.1941 From Van Starckenborgh to the Colonial Ministry (Batavia)	<i>NEI: admittance of Japanese oil tankers.</i> As no formal objection could be made to the arrival of tankers in Tarakan, the oil company should be instructed to require that at least one week was to elapse between the arrival of each ship.
289	18.3.1941 Council of Ministers	<i>Visit of Welter and Van Kleffens to NEI.</i> Arrival of Van Kleffens in USA; Welter had remained in Portugal for talks on <i>Germans interned in NEI.</i> <i>Diplomatic relations with Holy See</i> to be arranged through the usual channels only.
290	18.3.1941 Teixeira de Mattos	<i>Thailand: oil deliveries.</i> Van Mook's proposal that deliveries be resumed on a limited scale to obviate the risk of increasing Japanese influence in Thailand discussed at Foreign Office. Foreign Office shared this view, but wished to consult US first as latter had recently sold a nine-month supply of oil to Thailand.
291	18.3.1941 From Van Bylandt to Gerbrandy and others	<i>Companies (Transference of Statutory Seats) Act.</i> Reference to I, No. 374. Report received to the effect that offices of transferred companies left open in the occupied Netherlands were being forced to issue new shares. Loudon (Washington) considered a Government statement on the matter to be essential.
292	18.3.1941 From Bosch van Rosenthal (Berne)	<i>Switzerland: clearing for the occupied Netherlands.</i> According to information received from the Swiss, clearing presented major problems because no transactions were being undertaken from the Netherlands and money was being transmitted to Dutch nationals stranded in Switzerland for their maintenance. The clearing agreement was expected to be terminated shortly.

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293	19.3.1941 From van Starckenborgh to the Colonial Ministry (Batavia)	<i>Germans interned in NEI.</i> Lenzinger had been referred to the government in London for the answer to his query regarding the effect of the Boerstra-Jongejan mission on the position of German internees. The writer was still opposed to their release.
294	19.3.1941 To the Queen (Washington)	<i>Netherlands-American relations.</i> According to Roosevelt, the visit of Princess Juliana to US had increased sympathy for the Dutch cause. The writer (Van Kleffens) was pleased that Biddle had been appointed envoy. <i>Pacific policy:</i> purpose of journey to the NEI had been explained and satisfaction expressed with the strengthening of the US navy in the south-west Pacific. Details given by Roosevelt of his interview with Nomura. <i>Arms deliveries:</i> Roosevelt was prepared to cooperate in the delivery of small calibre ammunition to the NEI, but as far as aircraft were concerned, priority given to those countries actually engaged in hostilities. <i>Relief for the occupied Netherlands:</i> Attitude of the Netherlands Government that relief must not benefit the Germans had been explained. Invitation to revisit US on the return journey from NEI to London had been extended.
295	20.3.1941 From Gerth van Wijk (Tangier)	<i>Tangier.</i> Rumours to the effect that Netherlands and Belgian representatives were to be replaced by persons from occupied territory. The writer considered this to be unlikely as long as there was a Dutch envoy in Madrid.
296	20.3.1941 From Visser (Ankara)	<i>Afghanistan: establishment of diplomatic relations with the Netherlands</i> had been proposed.
297	20.3.1941 From Merens to Van Mook (Delhi)	<i>Sugar deliveries to India.</i> The agreement concerning the importation of NEI sugar into India due to expire on 31 March was not likely to be renewed. As import duties on sugar would probably not be increased, non-renewal of the agreement was favourable for the NEI sugar industry.
298	20.3.1941 From Bos to Flaes (Chungking)	<i>China.</i> Chinese Government hoped the US would be involved in the war in the Pacific. Extension of the Japanese field of action to Singapore and NEI was not expected. Japan had been very surprised by the reactions to the February crisis. A non-aggression pact between Japan and USSR was not considered

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299	22.3.1941 From Van Bylandt to Loudon	likely to constitute a threat to China. China accepted the Netherlands offer of <i>trade credits</i> . <i>Diplomatic relations</i> : Posting of Wunsz King to London was being considered. <i>ADA staff talks in Singapore</i> . Receipt of summary of talks acknowledged. Government ratification would be required. The political effect would be far-reaching. The writer and Michiels van Verduynen felt that desiderata drawn up on a purely strategic basis would not be completely viable on political terms. No request for a reply had been received from the British. Results of consultation between Van Kleffens, Welter and Van Starckenborgh awaited.
300	22.3.1941 From Van Bylandt to Masaryk	<i>Czechoslovakia: diplomatic relations</i> . Van Weede had been appointed temporary chargé-d'affaires representing the Netherlands Government with the interim Czech Government.
301	24.3.1941 From Hart to Van Starckenborgh	<i>Great Britain: new ships for Dutch merchant fleet</i> . Cross was prepared to allow the Netherlands a proportional share of new ships on the condition that they would not sail under the Dutch flag until after the war and that the Netherlands would take a share of any new ships being built in the US, as well as any old American ships.
302	24.3.1941 From Van Bylandt to Welter	<i>Japan: establishment of consulates in NEI</i> . It would be unwise to assent to Japan's request to be permitted to establish consulates in Palembang and Bandjermasin. Under the consular agreement of 1908, Japan could claim the right to establish a consulate in Palembang, where Belgium and China had consulates. Van Starckenborgh's advice should be requested. The Government could adopt the line that no new consulates were to be established by any country for the duration of the war.
303	24.3.1941 From Van Angeren	<i>Great Britain: recognition of Royal Decree A 1</i> . Further to No. 248, British Government should be informed of the fact that the Custodian of Enemy Property was replacing Dutch managers of British limited companies, of which the majority of shares were in Dutch hands, by British managers, as the former were technically 'enemies'. This was at variance with Royal Decree A 1. The Government would furthermore be unable to meet its obligation to restore control of business concerns and the debts recovered

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		to the owners three months after the end of the war if the British Government did not accord recognition to the decree. The writer suggested that the decree be repealed if the British Government continued to withhold recognition.
304	25.3.1941 Council of Ministers	<i>ADA staff talks in Singapore</i> . No. 253 received. Proposed collaboration required the approval of the governments concerned, a procedure for which had been worked out by Michiels van Verduynen and Butler.
305	25.3.1941 From Loudon (Washington)	<i>USA: recognition of Royal Decrees A 1 and A 6</i> . Refusal of Morgan's Bank to recognise the validity of the appointment of trustees for Lippmann Rosenthal provided an excellent opportunity for the legality of A 1 and A 6 in the US to be established by the court.
306	25.3.1941 From Loudon (Washington)	<i>Yugoslavia: diplomatic relations with the Netherlands</i> . Yugoslavia's accession to the Tripartite Pact meant that the Dutch representative must leave the country. No objections to his returning to the Netherlands.
307	25.3.1941 From Michiels van Verduynen	<i>Eastern Supply Council</i> . The Foreign Office had enquired whether Dutch proposals concerning the implementation of the resolutions of the Council could soon be expected. NEI cooperation was essential for coordination.
308	25.3.1941 From Michiels van Verduynen	<i>USA: arms deliveries</i> . The Foreign Office had proposed that Loudon and Halifax be instructed to point out to US Government in a friendly way that aircraft deliveries to China were less urgent than deliveries to NEI.
309	25.3.1941 From Van Nagell (Stockholm)	<i>Sweden: arms deliveries</i> . Export of arms referred to in No. 281 refused. No reply had been received to date regarding the return of advance payments.
310	26.3.1941 From Colonial Ministry to Van Starckenborgh	<i>ADA staff talks in Singapore</i> . Report sent by telegraph received, and Welter and Van Kleffens (in USA) had been apprised of the far-reaching consequences of ratification by the governments concerned. Michiels van Verduynen and Butler agreed that if the response of the British and Netherlands governments was favourable, attempts should be made to win over the US to a more positive attitude. Memorandum on <i>arms deliveries</i> had been passed on by Butler to Churchill (No. 264A).

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311	26.3.1941 From Van Bylandt to Bosch van Rosenthal	<i>Switzerland: Royal Decree A 1.</i> According to No. 49, Royal Decree A 1 could not be made public. In view of its importance for economic warfare and for the protection of the interests of owners in the occupied Netherlands, this should not be accepted. Swiss banks and other interested parties had referred to the consequences of non-observance of A 1, and specifically to Netherlands Government compensation claims. Van Haersolte to be consulted about further steps; advice on the need to establish an organisation for the administration of Royal Decree A 1 in Switzerland requested.
312	28.3.1941 From Van Bylandt to Loudon	<i>USA: arms deliveries.</i> Enclosure of No. 308 and authorisation to act in accordance with the proposal if Loudon considered the time to be ripe. Action to be coordinated with that of Lord Halifax.
313	28.3.1941 From Lamping	<i>Companies (Transference of Statutory Seats) Act.</i> Action against measures referred to in No. 291 would seem to be called for as a matter of course. No objections to radio announcement to the effect that measures taken in contravention of the Act would not be regarded as lawful.
314	29.3.1941 From Wouters to the Colonial Ministry (Willemstad)	<i>Curaçao: financial agreement with Great Britain.</i> Provision of dollars for Curaçao was regulated in the agreement of 25 July 1940. Bank of Curaçao was temporarily unable to meet Curaçao's dollar requirements. British Government to be urged to honour agreement as no dollars had been received since 1 March. Amendment to monetary policy could inflict grave damage on the interests of the oil companies in the Netherlands Antilles.
315	29.3.1941 From Van Starckenborgh to the Colonial Ministry (Batavia)	<i>NEI: admittance of Japanese oil tankers.</i> Agreement with answer to No. 288. If tankers were armed, permission to enter NEI ports would have to be requested through diplomatic channels.
316	29.3.1941 From Hart	<i>Great Britain: recognition of Royal Decrees A 1 and A 6.</i> British request to declare France and certain French colonies enemy territory was surprising because of the continuing failure on the part of Britain to accord recognition to the two decrees. Measures taken in colonies provided sufficient means of blocking financial and economic dealings with French territories. Moreover, there was a perceptible change in

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317	30.3.1941 From Van Craandijk (Budapest)	Britain's attitude to trade with French territories. Request to correct impression given Bland that the Government was divided on this question. <i>Hungary: diplomatic relations with the Netherlands.</i> Instructions requested for contingency that Germany should attack Yugoslavia through Hungary in response to the overthrow of the Yugoslav government that had signed the Tripartite Pact. Great Britain would very probably sever relations at once.
318	31.3.1941 From Colonial Ministry to Van Starckenborgh	<i>NEI: admittance of Japanese oil tankers.</i> BPM London office would inform Japanese admiralty of procedure to be followed by Japanese oil tankers when entering NEI ports in accordance with No. 315.
319	31.3.1941 Van Bylandt	<i>USA: arms deliveries.</i> Biddle advised that Van Kleffens consult Jones in Washington on the matter of arms deliveries to the NEI in view of the latter's influence. <i>ADA staff talks in Singapore.</i> Biddle had been informed that the only plans worked out required the approval of the governments concerned. Writer had discussed with him whether Britain would be prepared to go as far as full commitment. Biddle felt that Netherlands and British approval of ADA plans could induce a positive response from the US, as the US navy, in particular, was very much in favour of cooperation.
320	1.4.1941 From Loudon (Washington)	<i>Japan.</i> Matsuoka's visit to Berlin had passed off without anything unexpected occurring. <i>Pacific policy.</i> No new points of view had been put forward during Van Kleffens' talks at the State Department.
321	1.4.1941 From Craandijk (Budapest)	<i>Hungary: diplomatic relations with the Netherlands.</i> Britain intended to sever relations with Hungary on the expected outbreak of hostilities between Germany and Yugoslavia. The writer assumed that the Netherlands would do the same. Departure from Hungary was possible via the USSR; visa applications through the British Government.
322	1.4.1941 From Kleyn Molekamp (Washington)	<i>USA and Royal Decree A 1.</i> Enactment of legislation in the State of New York amending bank laws would impede endeavours of the Netherlands Government to gain possession of assets falling under Royal Decree A 1.

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323	2.4.1941 From Colonial Ministry to Van Starckenborgh	<i>NEI: restriction of trade with Japan.</i> Ministry of Economic Warfare was urging the restriction of rubber exports to Japan, which was obtaining large quantities from Indo-China. MEW also requested that Japan's far-reaching demands for vegetable oils be rejected. Van Starckenborgh's opinion requested.
324	2.4.1941 From Colonial Ministry to Van Starckenborgh	<i>Japan: oil deliveries.</i> Mitsui had proposed to BPM that the oil contract be extended by six months and that it include the quantities still to be delivered under the first contract. Welter and Leith-Ross had no objections; nor had the USA, according to Welter.
325	3.4.1941 From Colonial Ministry Van Starckenborgh	<i>NEI: admittance of Japanese naval tankers.</i> Supplementary to No. 318 Japanese Government could still be informed that the goodwill shown in this matter was not to be taken as a precedent.
326	3.4.1941 From Visser (Ankara)	<i>Turkey: Royal Decree A 6; Philips.</i> In view of attempts made by Philips, Eindhoven, to retain its market in Turkey by by-passing its subsidiary there, the writer suggested that contact between the two be permitted subject to certain conditions and under his supervision, as the continued existence of Philips, Turkey, was a matter of Netherlands interest. Speedy decision requested.
327	3.4.1941 From Van Bylandt to Colonial Ministry	<i>Germany: exchange of honorary consuls with the Netherlands.</i> Germany had proposed such an exchange. It should not be undertaken too quickly because of the risk of Dutch diplomats encountering difficulties in leaving their posts, notably in Hungary.
328	3.4.1941 From Schuller tot Peursum (Madrid)	<i>Spain: diplomatic relations with the Netherlands.</i> The Spanish Government persisted in its policy concerning the treatment of the Netherlands diplomatic mission in Madrid, as recounted in No. 162. That policy was the result of heavy German pressure.
329	4.4.1941 From Steenberghe to Van Starckenborgh	<i>Great Britain: making available Dutch gold.</i> Because the British Government was expected to repeat its request that Dutch gold be made available, Van Starckenborgh was to ask Welter if his undertaking to include NEI gold in the loan (see No. 134) still held good.
330	5.4.1941 From Roberts to Teixeira de Mattos	<i>Eastern Group Conference.</i> Once the NEI Government had decided upon its relations with the Supply Council of the Eastern Group Conference, there would be no difficulty in deter-

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331	8.4.1941 Council of Ministers	mining what Conference documents were to be passed on to it. <i>Germans interned in NEI.</i> In response to Welter's report on his discussion with Boerstra and Jongejan it was resolved that the decision would have to be taken by the full Cabinet.
332	8.4.1941 From Van Bylandt to Colonial Ministry	<i>Treatment of internees.</i> Enclosure of Nos. 332A and B concerning the treatment of German internees in the NEI.
332A	7.3.1941 From Van Vredenburg to Roberts	<i>Treatment of internees.</i> Questions regarding the treatment of German internees in Britain (allowances and disposition private assets) and of British subjects interned by the German Government (information on living conditions, forced labour, conditions in the camps).
332B	5.4.1941 From Roberts to Van Vredenburg	<i>Treatment of internees.</i> Reply to questions asked in No. 332A.
333	8.4.1941 From Van Mook to Van Starkenborgh (Batavia)	<i>Japan: trade talks in Batavia.</i> Enclosure of No. 333A. The major problem was that Japan regarded NEI measures as part of Anglo-American blockade policy. It was no longer advisable to continue the talks. Furthermore, reduction in the agreed export quotas was advisable because of the wide discrepancy it showed with other countries' exports and because of the risk of <i>re-exportation to Germany</i> and Italy. The question of breaking off the talks could be discussed during the visit of Van Kleffens and Welter.
333A	8.4.1941	<i>Japan: trade talks in Batavia.</i> Summary of Netherlands and Japanese demands, with exposition of the Japanese and Netherlands point of view.
334	9.4.1941 From the Foreign Office	<i>ADB staff conference.</i> Invitation to take part in staff talks to open in Singapore on 18.4.41, at which plans were to be drawn up for military operations in the Far East on the basis of cooperation between the USA, Britain and the Netherlands without political commitment.
335	10.4.1941 From Hart	<i>Royal Decree A 6.</i> The writer did not see the necessity to amend the Decree to cover Netherlands nationals outside Netherlands territory as long as no sanctions were attached to contravention.
336	11.4.1941 From Loudon to Van Bylandt (Washington)	<i>Pacific policy.</i> Van Kleffens and Welter had met Brooke-Popham in Manila. The general consensus of opinion was that there was a united front from Singapore to Australia. Re-

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337	12.4.1941 To the Council of Ministers	sults of <i>ADA staff conference</i> had not been discussed in detail. Welter and Van Kleffens did not believe that the US Government could be persuaded to enter into a formal alliance with other interested parties in the Pacific. The USA would probably declare war after the outbreak of hostilities. Close military cooperation with the USA to be continued as the US Government's appraisal of the situation in the Pacific was the same as that of the two Ministers. <i>Germans interned in NEI.</i> Summary of events since 10 May 1940 concerning the treatment of German internees in the NEI, the reprisals taken by the German authorities in the occupied Netherlands, proposals relating to the expulsion or release of certain categories of internees, and the Boerstra-Jongejan mission. The summary concluded with Welter's discussion with Boerstra and Jongejan in Lisbon.
338	13.4.1941 From Van Starckenborgh to the Colonial Ministry (Batavia)	<i>NEI: restriction of trade with Japan.</i> In connection with the trade talks being held with Japan in Batavia, at which export restrictions were the crucial issue, the writer wished to know whether the restriction policy pursued was devised not only to prevent re-exportation to Germany but also to limit deliveries to Japan.
339	14.4.1941 From Van Starckenborgh to the Colonial Ministry (Batavia)	<i>ADB staff conference.</i> Agreement with participation of NEI representatives. The question of when the talks should be made public would be determined by whether the Japanese threat increased or diminished. The defensive nature of the talks should be made clear.
340	14.4.1941 From Van Starckenborgh to the Colonial Ministry (Sindanglaja)	<i>ADA staff conference.</i> Owing to the fact that Australia was taking part in the conference, the eastern regions of the NEI were receiving a considerable amount of attention. Appreciation of this to be conveyed to Bruce.
341	14.4.1941 From Van Starckenborgh to Colonial Ministry (Sindang- laja)	<i>Ratification of ADA staff conference memorandum.</i> It was apparent from No. 334 that Britain was not willing to enter into a formal agreement. The Netherlands should refrain from urging Britain to do so because of the odium attached to the seeking of support. It could be assumed that the countries concerned would regard an attack on any one of them as affecting the vital interests of them all. No formal pledge would be forthcoming from the

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342	14.4.1941 From Toyoda to Reuchlin (Tokyo)	USA, according to Welter and Van Kleffens. Michiels should discuss these points at the Foreign Office. <i>Japan: diplomatic correspondence.</i> In correspondence with the Netherlands and NEI authorities no further translations from the Japanese could be supplied because of the pressing nature of much of that correspondence and also because it was apparent from among other things the censorship measures introduced that a large number of Dutch and NEI officials were acquainted with Japanese.
343	15.4.1941 From Makins to Michiels van Verduynen	<i>Great Britain: Royal Decree A1.</i> The British Government recognised the Decree but there were difficulties attached to its implementation because of various provisions of the British Trading with the Enemy Act, particularly as regards debts owing to persons in the occupied Netherlands, which would have to be paid to the British Custodian of Enemy Property. The writer proposed an arrangement whereby money collected in that way would be used as a security fund for British claims on persons in the occupied Netherlands. Also suggested a procedure that could be followed in collecting and administering such monies in Great Britain.
344	16.4.1941 From Van Nagell (Stock- holm)	<i>Sweden and Finland.</i> Instructions requested in connection with the strong German pressure on Sweden and Finland to close down allied missions or to prohibit them from functioning without expulsion.
345	16.4.1941 From Colonial Ministry to Van Starckenborgh	<i>NEI: restriction of trade with Japan.</i> The purpose of the restriction was to prevent <i>re-exportation to Germany</i> and to avoid supplying Japan with important strategic raw materials. It had been made clear to the British authorities that the NEI would have to proceed gradually and with circumspection. Maximum cooperation was required, particularly with regard to rubber, tin and manganese.
346	16.4.1941 From Albarda	<i>KLM landing rights in Persian Gulf.</i> Request that the British Government be informed that the conditions specified in I, No. 440 had been accepted by the KLM, which would appreciate receiving permission at the earliest possible date.
347	17.4.1941 From Colonial Ministry to Van Starckenborgh	<i>Ratification of ADA staff conference memorandum:</i> Reply to No. 341. Van Kleffens had consistently placed the question of cooperation

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348	17.4.1941 From Van Bylandt to Gerbrandy	in the Far East in the context of the equal interests of all parties. Formal agreement with Britain concerning the ADA memorandum was essential. <i>USA: Royal Decree A 1.</i> As Loudon had drawn up a draft memorandum for the US Government, the writer wondered whether the USA should not be asked to accord official recognition to the Decree. The memorandum should place greater emphasis on the conservative nature of the measures covered by the Decree. Gerbrandy's opinion requested.
349	17.4.1941 Discussion between Van Hoogstraten and Ishizawa (Batavia)	<i>Japan: trade talks in Batavia.</i> The Netherlands declined to raise the export quota for Japan of rubber, tin, copra, palm oil and castor-oil beans as long as no watertight, controllable guarantee had been given that Germany would not benefit either directly or indirectly. Deliveries of non-strategic goods, such as sugar, were possible.
350	18.4.1941 From Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Van Starckenborgh	<i>Evacuation of Netherlands nationals in Asia.</i> Van Starckenborgh endowed with authority to decide whether to proceed to evacuation and to make the technical preparations required. Separate evacuation from Shanghai was perhaps advisable.
351	18.4.1941 From Pabst (Tokyo)	<i>Pacific Policy.</i> Reactions of Japanese press to Van Kleffens' and Welter's meeting with Brooke-Popham in Manila and the effect this would probably have on the Japanese-Netherlands trade talks in Batavia.
352	19.4.1941 Discussion between Van Mook and Yoshizawa (Batavia)	<i>Japan: trade talks in Batavia.</i> Van Mook was prepared to reconsider the question of reducing the export quota of rubber, tin, copra, palm oil and castor-oil beans; chance of amendment was very small, as the NEI wished to supply no more than Japan needed for domestic consumption, taking into account her imports from other areas. This consideration was based on the desire to prevent the re-exportation of these raw materials to Germany.
353	21.4.1941 From Van Bylandt to Pabst	<i>Japan.</i> Members of special Japanese missions in the NEI were not automatically entitled to diplomatic privileges as demanded in No. 273.
354	21.4.1941 From Van Kleffens and Welter to Gerbrandy (Batavia)	<i>Journey of Welter and Van Kleffens: visit to Australia and New Zealand.</i> The writers were in favour of accepting the Australian Government's invitation to visit that country because of the goodwill it would engender and of the

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355	21.4.1941 From Van Kleffens and Welter to Gerbrandy (Ba- tavia)	beneficial effect it could have on arms deliveries. They would not go ahead, however, if London felt that their absence would be too prolonged. <i>Germans interned in NEI.</i> The internment of more people in the occupied Netherlands by the German authorities as a reprisal for the continued internment of Germans in the NEI would deprive the population of its spiritual and economic leaders. Yielding to German pressure was equally impossible, as was also the release and deportation of internees in the NEI. For that reason a proposal had been worked out that German internees be exchanged for persons in the occupied territory whose presence in the NEI was of importance for social or military reasons or for all persons in the Netherlands who were employed in the NEI.
356	22.4.1941 Council of Ministers	<i>Germans interned in NEI.</i> Further to No. 355. Discussion of whether negotiations could be opened with Germany about the proposal or whether they should take place through the Red Cross. Michiels van Verduynen was of the opinion that discussion with the British Government was essential.
357	22.4.1941 From Gerbrandy to Van Starkenborgh	<i>Journey of Welter and Van Kleffens to NEI.</i> The Government agreed to their returning via Australia and New Zealand.
358	22.4.1941 From Van Bylandt and Verniers van der Loeff to Van Starkenborgh (for Van Kleffens and Welter)	<i>Pacific policy.</i> Michiel had discussed No. 341 with Butler. Cordell Hull was in favour of issuing a joint statement with Britain and the Netherlands to Japan. Eden wished to leave the exact wording to the USA. Enquired whether Loudon would support the steps taken by Halifax in this matter in Washington. Michiels had urged that the statement be issued via the usual diplomatic channels. Permission requested to instruct Loudon accordingly.
359	22.4.1941 From Colonial Ministry to Van Starkenborgh (for Welter)	<i>Royal Decrees A 6 and B 30.</i> Consideration was being given, after ministerial consultation, to declaring Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary enemy territory. The same step had been decided upon in respect of Italy, but the declaration was being delayed pending the results of an investigation of the present position of unoccupied France with a view to issuing the two declarations jointly should this be decided upon in the case of the latter. Welter's opinion of the decision concerning Italy requested.

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360	22.4.1941 From Bentinck van Schoonheeten to Van Starckenborgh (Cairo)	<i>Egypt: KLM landing rights.</i> It was uncertain whether the Egyptian Government would review its earlier decision to refuse terminus facilities to foreign airlines. Decisive influence could be exercised by the British Government. Perhaps Van Kleffens could bring pressure to bear in London.
361	23.4.1941 From Van Bylandt to Loudon	<i>USA and Royal Decree A 1.</i> The Government intended to proceed to the active administration of claims falling under the Decree. Advice requested regarding the proposed appointment of Kleyn Molekamp as Custodian for the USA.
362	24.4.1941 From Schuller to Peursum (Madrid)	<i>Spain: evacuation of Netherlands nationals.</i> It was to be feared that Spain would shortly enter the war and plans for the evacuation of Netherlanders were to be prepared.
363	24.4.1941 From van Starckenborgh to Colonial Ministry (Batavia)	<i>NEI: admittance of Japanese oil tankers.</i> As a modification of No. 325, Pabst had been requested to inform the Japanese Government that if two or more tankers put into ane one port a period of at least one week was to elapse between the arrival of each.
364	24.4.1941 From Van Bylandt to the Colonial Ministry	<i>Germany: exchange of honorary consuls with the Netherlands.</i> The writer was not prepared to cooperate in implementing a plan under which the Netherlands consuls would not be permitted to leave Germany for Switzerland until the German consuls had arrived in Japan. The Swedish Government should be brought in and could, if deemed necessary, draw up an exchange plan in consultation with the Swiss Government.
365	25.4.1941 Council of Ministers	<i>Germans interned in NEI.</i> Rejection of the proposal contained in No. 355. Some insistence on more liberal treatment of internees.
366	25.4.1941 From Van Kleffens and Welter to Gerbrandy (Batavia)	<i>Germans interned in NEI.</i> After consultation with advisers, the writers were of the opinion that the proposal made in No. 355 was practicable. Draft communication for Swiss Government, stressing the importance for the NEI of the return of persons held in the Netherlands. Van Starckenborgh was in agreement with the proposal.
367	25.4.1941 From Van Bylandt to Gerbrandy	<i>Great Britain and Royal Decree A 1.</i> The writer was disappointed with the proposal of No. 343 that under Royal Decree A 1 Netherlands claims in Britain be paid into a fund covering British claims in occupied territory. Perhaps an arrangement could be worked out on the Brit-

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368	26.4.1941 From Van Bylandt to Van Starkenborgh (for Van Kleffens)	ish basis, though in considering this possibility the consequences for recognition by other countries should be taken into account. The question should be discussed with the Belgian and Norwegian Governments. <i>Publication of Orange Book.</i> Publication of Orange Book on the policy of the Netherlands Government before and after the German invasion and on the active participation of the Netherlands in the alliance was necessary.
369	26.4.1941 From Colonial Ministry to Wouters	<i>Curaçao: financial agreement with Great Britain.</i> Wouters' opinion asked on the proposal that the Bank of England provide Curaçao with dollars on the basis of the monthly statement of the bank of Curaçao. It would probably be possible to reach agreement with the British Government along these lines.
370	27.4.1941 From Gerbrandy to Van Starkenborgh (for Welter and Van Kleffens)	<i>Germans interned in NEI.</i> Council of Ministers were not in agreement with the proposal in No. 355; decision had been taken before receipt of No. 366. Reasons: the situation in the Netherlands had changed considerably through the vigorous implementation of the policy of Nazification; release of Netherlands internees by Germany could be followed by the internment of others; British cooperation would be required for the implementation of the plan, and would probably be refused; the population of the occupied Netherlands might feel that those in senior posts were receiving preferential treatment.
371	27.4.1941	<i>ADB staff conference.</i> Report on talks between 21 and 27 April. Defeat of Germany remained principal war aim. In the Pacific, resistance was to be offered in the event of a Japanese attack until an offensive could be mounted. Most important points were defence of the sea routes and of Singapore. Exposition of strategic possibilities of achieving this aim and of ways in which the armed forces of the participating countries could be deployed. The report envisaged no political commitment and was subject to ratification by the Governments concerned.
372	27.4.1941	<i>BD staff conference.</i> Elaboration of the ADA report (No. 253). Though it was assumed that the USA would remain neutral, it could also be assumed that the USA would have a moderating effect on Japanese actions against

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		British and Dutch territories. Exposition of strategic possibilities of achieving the desired results. The report envisaged no political commitment and was subject to ratification by the Governments concerned.
373	27.4.1941 From Van Breugel Douglas (Cairo)	<i>Greece.</i> Report of events attending the writer's departure for Alexandria in connection with military developments and with the proposed departure of the Greek Government.
374	28.4.1941 From Lamping	<i>Royal Decree A 6 and Philips.</i> Special permission should be granted Philips for trade with enemy territories only if such a measure were in the interests of the allied war effort. Questions concerning trade with neutral countries in general should be dealt with only by the Government in London and not by the CORVO's in Willemstad and Batavia.
375	29.4.1941 Council of Ministers	<i>Constitutional status of NEI</i> would, in accordance with a proposal by Welter, be discussed at a post-war conference to be announced at the present time. <i>Germans interned in NEI.</i> No. 366 would not change decision (No. 356) concerning exchange.
376	29.4.1941 From Loudon (Washington)	<i>USA: Royal Decree A 1.</i> As long as there was no Court ruling about this Decree, there was nothing to be gained by appointing a Custodian as proposed in No. 361. Once full control became possible, the writer would be in agreement with the appointment of Kleyn Molekamp.
377	29.4.1941 From Van Haersolte to Bosch van Rosenthal (Zurich)	<i>Switzerland: Royal Decree A 1.</i> Reply to No. 311. Satisfactory registration of claims dating from 24 May 1940 would not be possible in May/June 1941. Cooperation on the part of the Swiss authorities was not to be expected. The first step would have to be to bring the Decree to the attention of the Schweizerische Nationalbank and the Schweizerische Verrechnungsstelle in a binding manner. Only then would it be possible to solve the problem of the management of claims under Royal Decree A 1.
378	30.4.1941 From Van Bylandt to the Queen	<i>Yugoslavia.</i> Van Hoorn had not been in Belgrade at the time of the German attack. D'Ansembourg had followed the Yugoslavia Government to Greece and Egypt and was at that moment in Jerusalem. No further information available.

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379	30.4.1941 From Philips to Beyen (New York)	<i>Curaçao: financial agreement with Great Britain.</i> The Netherlands Government would have to make the decision regarding the provision of dollars for Curaçao. It was thought in Curaçao that this was in the hands of the British authorities, an impression which strengthened the feeling that the Netherlands was not concerned about Curaçao. A certain section of the population was in favour of union with the USA. Full information on the monetary policy of the Government could change this feeling. The <i>organisation of the Legation in Washington</i> left much to be desired. Recommendation that the trade section be transferred to New York had been rejected by Loudon.
379A	29.4.1941 From Philips to Steenberghe (New York)	<i>Curaçao: financial agreement with Great Britain.</i> In the negotiations on exchanging pounds for dollars for the Bank of Curaçao the Government should bring up after the war the question of the liquidation of the Sterling balances of the central banks in the Netherlands overseas territories and of business concerns.
380	1.5.1941 From Harmsen to Furstner (Liverpool)	<i>Iceland.</i> Consul General in Reykjavik urged that a Dutch diplomatic representative be sent to Iceland.
381	1.5.1941 From Balfour to Albarda	<i>KLM: cooperation with BOAC.</i> British Government was obliged to cut services operated by the BOAC (no longer operating as a commercial concern) between Sydney and Durban, via Singapore and Cairo, by half. KLM called upon to transport military post between Singapore and Lydda; negotiations had reached deadlock owing to KLM demand that it should be paid at the standard rate. British Government suggested chartering the requisite KLM aircraft.
382	2.5.1941 From Van Kleffens and Welter to Gerbrandy (Batavia)	<i>Germans interned in NEI.</i> The decision in principle referred to in No. 370 ignored the importance to the Indies of the return of persons who, in the long run, were indispensable. By agreeing to the proposed exchange Germany was conceding its position of unilateral coercion. The other arguments given in No. 370 were not convincing. No objection to consultation with Great Britain on the matter. Reconsideration of proposals requested.
383	2.5.1941 From Welter to Steenberghe (Batavia)	<i>Great Britain: making available Dutch gold.</i> There was no objection to the NEI guaranteeing half of the gold loan to be made to Great Britain by the Netherlands. Although NEI gold and

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384	2.5.1941 From Michiels van Verduynen	dollar reserves were fairly large, no increase could be expected; they were needed for defence measures and imports. Dependence on American credits was unacceptable. <i>Thailand: oil deliveries.</i> In exchange for Thai agreement to the cessation of exports of tin and rubber to Japan, the British Government was prepared to discuss the resumption of oil deliveries. The Foreign Office hoped by supplying oil to prevent the establishment of Japanese bases in Thailand. The USA appeared to regard Thailand as lost.
385	3.5.1941 From Van Pallandt (Lisbon)	<i>Japan.</i> Discussion with new Japanese envoy, to whom writer had given an exposition of German policy in Europe; the envoy had given his view of British-Japanese relations and the relation between Japan and the NEI.
386	4.5.1941 From Scheltus (Stockholm)	<i>Sweden: diplomatic relations with the Netherlands.</i> Agrément in respect of a new Dutch envoy in Stockholm impossible.
387	6.5.1941 Council of Ministers	<i>Germans interned in NEI.</i> It was decided in connection with No. 382 to continue discussions after Welter and Van Kleffens had returned. In the matter of <i>constitutional reforms</i> (see No. 375), further exchange of ideas with Van Starckenborgh and the Queen was needed.
388	6.5.1941 From the Colonial Ministry to Van Starckenborgh	<i>Japan: Pacific policy.</i> Hull considered the time was not ripe for the USA, Great Britain and the Netherlands to make similar declarations to Japan on relations in the Pacific.
389	6.5.1941 From Van Bylandt to Gerbrandy	<i>Application of Royal Decree B 30 (enemy territory).</i> The authority to decide which countries and territories were to be regarded as enemy territory should be placed in the hands of the Minister for Foreign Affairs.
390	6.5.1941 Van Kleffens	<i>Netherlands-NEI.</i> The NEI was making a considerable contribution to the war against Germany. The aim was still the complete liberation of occupied territories. The Netherlands would regard a Japanese attack on the line Singapore-Australia as a general attack in the <i>Pacific</i> . NEI was determined to defence itself against any direct aggression.
391	7.5.1941 From Van Starckenborgh to Colonial Ministry (Batavia)	<i>Thailand: oil deliveries.</i> Oil supplies were running extremely low in Thailand. The government was prepared to meet the objections of the oil companies. Proposal made that negotiations between the Thai Government and the oil companies should be initiated; supplies would take

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392	8.5.1941 Council of Ministers	place on the provisional basis of monthly contracts, so that continuous pressure could be exerted on Thailand. Van Kleffens and Welter agreed to the proposal. <i>Queen's position with regard to Germans interned in NEI and constitutional reforms. Hungary.</i> On the question of the seizure of Hungarian ship in NEI it was decided to keep it if this was admissible under international law after diplomatic relations had been broken off.
393	8.5.1941 From Furstner	<i>Prize-law and contraband.</i> The course proposed by the Colonial Ministry would require express instructions from Van Starckenborgh to Helfrich. Under no circumstances should the Dutch definition of contraband applied in practice differ from the British on account of the risk to the post-war position of the Netherlands.
394	8.5.1941 From the London Legation to the British Ministry of Home Security	<i>Great Britain: interned Dutch nationals.</i> Proposal to the effect that certain persons interned on doubtful grounds should be released, accommodated with families, and given employment with specific businesses. A precondition in each case would be the agreement of the British and Dutch authorities.
395	9.5.1941 From Mühlenfeld	<i>France: St. Martin.</i> Comment requested on the continuation of relations between the Dutch and French parts of St Martin and on instructions to the West Indian territories concerning the failure of senior French officers to visit those territories.
396	9.5.1941 From Scheltus (Stockholm)	<i>Sweden: volunteers for Netherlands Legion.</i> The Swedish Government, under German pressure, was not prepared to recognise seamen volunteering for service in the Netherlands Legion as political refugees; a flexible approach had however been promised off the record, for which reason the writer had not requested a statement of principle. Speedy departure of volunteers was desirable. Transit visums were issued by USSR and Japan even though these countries were acquainted with the object of their journey.
397	10.5.1941 From Van Bylandt to Van Starckenborgh	<i>Ratification of ADA and ADB reports.</i> The Government would have to give consideration to the matter of ratification. Views of Van Kleffens and Welter requested. Nothing known regarding readiness of British Government. Readiness on the part of the Netherlands would strengthen its position vis-à-vis Britain. Impor-

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398	10.5.1941 From Van Starckenborgh to Colonial Ministry (Batavia)	tance of ADA report was not lessened by difficulties attaching to ratification of ADB report in USA. <i>KLM: cooperation with BOAC.</i> Serious objections to charter agreement for KLM Singapore-Lyddá service. Objections to the high cost of carrying mail could be met by agreeing to much lower rates on condition that BOAC post rates to NEI were likewise considerably reduced.
399	10.5.1941 Teixeira de Mattos	<i>Thailand: oil deliveries.</i> Foreign Office agreed to supplying Thailand with limited amounts of oil. Subject to Van Starckenborgh's approval, supplies could be arranged with the companies. Deliveries were not to include crude oil.
400	12.5.1941 From Loudon (Washington)	<i>USA: recognition of Royal Decrees A 1 and A 6.</i> Lawyers were of the opinion that the Morgan Co.'s refusal to recognise the managers of Lipros designated by Loudon presented an excellent opportunity for a <i>test case</i> relating to the recognition of Royal Decrees. The State of the Netherlands would have to be joined in the action.
401	12.5.1941 From Van Bylandt to Welter	<i>Transport of diamonds from Portugal to USA.</i> Notwithstanding Portuguese export ban, transport of diamonds from Portugal to USA by Dutch couriers was required, especially for the Philips concern. Import into USA would be legal if diamonds were first sent to Curaçao, and re-exported from there to USA. Request that the Governor be given the requisite instructions.
402	12.5.1941 From Verniers van der Loeff	<i>Arms deliveries.</i> Cooperation between Netherlands Purchasing Committee and British Purchasing Committee in USA was excellent, according to Van den Broek. All information requested was supplied to BPC.
403	12.5.1941 From Hart	<i>Application of Royal Decree B 30 (enemy territory).</i> Agreement with contents of No. 389, provided regular consultation was held with the Ministers concerned.
404	12.5.1941 From Teppema to Van Mook (Buenos Aires)	<i>Argentina: trade relations with NEI.</i> To avoid the risk of jeopardising the chance of success of the proposal made to the Argentinian Government that agricultural products be purchased in exchange for NEI products or Sterling, no further steps had been taken in the matter of the manufacture of glow-lamps by Philips in Argentina for export to NEI or of the dollars to be made available for that purpose.

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405	12.5.1941 From Scheltus (Stockholm)	<i>Italy.</i> With reference to I, No. 277, the Swedish envoy to Rome reported that the liquidation of sequestered companies had been ordered. Efforts were being made on behalf of oil companies to get this order rescinded. If the Netherlands wished to take official diplomatic steps to prevent liquidation, it should be borne in mind that Italy had never recognised Sweden as representing Dutch interests. Detailed information would be required in support of any such steps.
406	13.5.1941 From Norwegian legation	<i>Norway: post-war world order.</i> Norwegian commission concerned with the study of post-war questions requested information on similar studies undertaken by the Netherlands Government.
407	13.5.1941 From Michiels van Verduynen	<i>Thailand: oil deliveries.</i> Though Crosby had discussed the matter with the Thai Prime Minister, the Foreign Office had not yet decided upon a definite policy in respect of Thailand. It was assumed that the Netherlands would agree to small monthly deliveries.
408	14.5.1941 From Van Bylandt to Scheltus	<i>Sweden: diplomatic relations with the Netherlands.</i> In the event of the expulsion of the Dutch diplomatic representatives by Sweden, the latter country could no longer be considered to be neutral and could no longer represent Dutch interests. There was little danger, however, of this happening. Instructions regarding course of action to be followed should it nevertheless occur.
409	14.5.1941 From Van Starckenborgh to Colonial Ministry (Batavia)	<i>Japan: trade talks in Batavia.</i> Export restrictions connected with the war effort constituted the main stumbling-block in the negotiations. Yoshizawa wished to end the talks but the Japanese Government wished to prolong them because of the presence of a military mission in the NEI. The talks should be concluded as soon as possible. The end position to be adopted had been worked out with Van Kleffens and Welter. Japanese proposals designed to favour Japan had been rejected. Export restrictions were based on the need for a joint war effort and on the danger of benefit accruing to the enemy, either directly or indirectly; no danger of third parties being discriminated against through preferential exports to Japan. Separate explanation on position regarding tin, rubber, vegetable oils and fats, manganese ore, nickle, bauxite,

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410	14.5.1941 From the British legation	oil and oil products. Further undertakings impossible. <i>Allied information.</i> Publications and statements issued by Allied Governments sometimes contained information that could be detrimental to the military and strategic interests of the Allies. Discussion with the Ministry of Information prior to the publication of information was essential.
411	14.5.1941 From Japanese delegation at trade talks (Batavia)	<i>Japan: trade talks in Batavia.</i> Amendments to Japanese proposals in No. 176A. The considerations underlying the preamble were unchanged. Proposal to the effect that an agreement be concluded for the export to Japan of specific quantities of products for the period of one year, which would automatically be extended unless terminated.
412	15.5.1941 From Gerbrandy	<i>Great Britain: application of Royal Decree A 1.</i> In contradiction to No. 367, no measures could be taken on the basis of No. 343 because that proposal was not compatible with the legal basis and purport of Royal Decree A 1. Compensation was inconsonant with the fiduciary nature of the transfer of property. Exchange of views with other governments was required.
413	16.5.1941 From Loudon (Washington)	<i>Royal Decree A 6: Philips.</i> Discussion with Director of Philips on an agreement under which branches in neutral countries would undertake not to trade with occupied territory without the permission of the Netherlands Government. Agreement in principle, though separate arrangements would be required for Switzerland, Sweden, Finland, Portugal, Spain and Turkey.
414	16.5.1941 From Verniers van der Loeff	<i>Arms deliveries.</i> Further to No. 402, Van den Broek had reported that because of modifications to arms ordered the BPC was obliged to request information additional to that already provided by the NPC.
415	16.5.1941 From Craandijk (Kobe)	<i>Hungary: diplomatic relations with the Netherlands.</i> The writer's course of conduct in the severance of diplomatic relations and his departure from Budapest.
415A	9.4.1941 From Craandijk to De Bardossy (Budapest)	<i>Hungary: diplomatic relations with the Netherlands.</i> As it was no longer possible for the diplomatic mission to function in the normal way, the writer proposed to leave Hungary. Sweden would represent Dutch interests.

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416	17.5.1941 From Teppema (Buenos Aires)	<i>Bolivia: diplomatic relations with the Netherlands.</i> Bolivia, under pressure from Italy, requested the writer to defer his journey to La Paz to present his credentials.
417	17.5.1941 From Scheltus (Stockholm)	<i>Sweden: diplomatic relations with the Netherlands.</i> Sweden's request that the Netherlands diplomatic mission be withdrawn was prompted by German pressure and would not depend on the goodwill of the Swedish Government.
418	17.5.1941 From Furstner to Dyxhoorn	<i>ADB staff conference.</i> Germany being regarded as the principal enemy, a defensive strategy had been decided upon which did not exclude the possibility of the loss of Netherlands territory. Van Starckenborgh was to be instructed at once to set up a mobile landing force and, furthermore, to launch military operations in the event of Japan making certain moves that would be regarded as direct acts of war. Agreement that supreme command of naval forces in Eastern theatre should be assumed by the Commander-in-Chief China Station, to which end the NEI fleet was to be placed under the command of the Commander of Naval Forces. It was imperative that a combined naval staff be set up in Singapore without delay.
419	19.5.1941 From Van Bylandt to Colonial Ministry	<i>German internees.</i> No obstacles to be placed in the way of contact between internees in Surinam and the Swiss chargé-d'affaires in Caracas as the representative of a protective power because of the possibility of German reprisals against Dutch internees. The 1929 Geneva Convention concerning prisoners of war to be observed.
420	20.5.1941 From Verniers van der Loeff to Dyxhoorn	<i>Defence of Curaçao.</i> The Ministry of Foreign Affairs wished to draw attention to the defence of Curaçao, with special reference to the replacement of British troops by Dutch troops. It was feared that the USA was interested in assuming the British role in the area. As Dutch troops could not be withdrawn from the NEI, it was suggested that 1300 men be made available from the Netherlands Legion in England.
421	21.5.1941 From Van Starckenborgh to Colonial Ministry (Batavia)	<i>ADA, ADB and BD staff conferences.</i> Protocols were not eligible for ratification. No objections to a formal undertaking concerning matters of vital importance to all parties, or to the institution of a strategic supreme command, provided the governments retained the authority to withdraw their forces from that command.

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		Formal agreement should be reached with the governments concerned on these points; the remainder of the protocols should be left to specialists. Joint solidarity and the defensive nature of that solidarity should be made evident, which in turn would enable the various countries, among other things, to hold joint military exercises.
422	21.5.1941 From Van Starckenborgh to Colonial Ministry (Batavia)	<i>KLM: cooperation with British airlines.</i> Agreement in principle with proposal in No. 166, provided that the services required be divided according to the number of aircraft available and their carrying capacity. On the Batavia-Lyddra route the KLM was subject to restrictions which did not apply to British airlines.
423	21.5.1941 From Van Starckenborgh to Colonial Ministry (Batavia)	<i>NEI: rubber exports to Japan</i> were to be discontinued.
424	21.5.1941 From Pabst (Tokyo)	<i>Japan.</i> Japan's reply to No. 353 handed to writer during a discussion with Ohashi enclosed. Displeasure caused by treatment of Japanese representatives could be lessened by a more yielding attitude on the part of the Netherlands.
424A	13.5.1941 From Matsuoka to Pabst (Tokyo)	<i>Japan.</i> Arguments presented in No. 353 unacceptable. If Japanese representatives in NEI were not treated in accordance with current international usage Netherlands representatives in Japan would not be treated in that fashion either.
425	22.5.1941 From Kielstra to Welter (Paramaribo)	<i>Cayenne.</i> In view of the anticipated occupation of Cayenne by the USA, a warship should be sent to Surinam.
426	22.5.1941 From Methöfer (Caracas)	<i>Venezuela.</i> Venezuela's attitude to the Netherlands Antilles had undergone a change since it had become apparent that European colonies would be occupied by the USA under the Havana Convention (July 1940). Venezuela strongly opposed to US occupation of, in particular, Curaçao.
427	23.5.1941 From Pabst (Tokyo)	<i>Japan: trade talks in Batavia: Britain's good offices.</i> Japan had requested the good offices of Britain in the dispute concerning rubber exports from the NEI to Japan. Pabst and Craigie were of the opinion that every effort should be made to avoid a breach. Authority requested to seek a solution in return for controllable Japanese guarantees against re-exportation to Germany.

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428	23.5.1941 Van Vredenburg	<i>Thailand: oil deliveries.</i> According to the Foreign Office, Van Mook was in favour of limited deliveries. Precondition for resumption of deliveries would have to be Thai understaking to restrict exports of tin and rubber to Japan to avoid the danger of these commodities being re-exported to Germany.
429	23.5.1941 Van Vredenburg	<i>France.</i> Helfrich had proposed to Brooke-Popham that the NEI inspect French ships on the Indo-China-Madagascar-Vichy-Réunion route in connection with the transport of rubber. The British Government wished to know whether the Netherlands Government was in agreement with this.
430	23.5.1941 From Teppema to Van Mook (Buenos Aires)	<i>Argentina: trade with the NEI.</i> The Argentine Government demanded guarantees from Philips concerning the import of raw materials from the USA for the production of glow-lamps for the NEI. It was prepared to open negotiations on the purchase of Argentine products by the Netherlands in return for the import of NEI products and payment in Sterling.
431	23.5.1941 From Steenberghe to Council of Ministers	<i>Great Britain: sale of Dutch gold.</i> With reference to No. 138, a further British request was to be expected. The situation had meanwhile undergone a radical change through Lend-Lease. The writer advised against acceding to Britain's request as the Netherlands needed its gold and dollar reserves for its own war effort and post-war reconstruction and because monetary facilities were already being extended to Britain in a number of ways, in particular by accepting payment in Sterling for services and goods purchased by the Netherlands in dollars.
432	23.5.1941 From Roëll to Hart	<i>Trade talks in Batavia: rubber.</i> Talk with Lincoln of MEW. The British Government was in possession of information to the effect that Japan did not expect the Netherlands to make concessions in the matter of the rubber export quota. Japan's reserves were seriously depleted by the large quantities supplied to Germany. The British Government would make every effort to prevent Japan from obtaining more rubber than it required for domestic purposes, in particular by joining with the USA in putting pressure on Indo-China and Thailand. The NEI was required gradually to cut back the export of rubber. The British Government was extremely disappointed by the NEI proposals relating

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433	26.5.1941 From Van Bylandt to Michiels van Verduynen	to copra and palm oil, but was satisfied with those relating to other products. <i>Thailand: oil deliveries.</i> The proposal that deliveries be made subject to maximum supplies of rubber for the Allies would cut across the trade talks on rubber being held in Batavia. The proposal would have to be put forward by the British Government.
434	26.5.1941 From Michiels van Verduynen	<i>Trade talks in Batavia: Britain's good offices.</i> The fact that the Netherlands was prepared to discontinue rubber exports to Japan (No. 423) had not been conveyed to Butler because of Japan's request for Britain's good offices. <i>Pacific policy.</i> On being informed by Butler that Eden intended to issue a statement like that made by Van Kleffens (No. 390), the writer had replied that the best course of action would be to cement Anglo-Dutch solidarity by an agreement with a view to obtaining a definite undertaking from the USA.
435	26.5.1941 From Bentinck van Schoonheeten to Van Bylandt (Cairo)	<i>Foreign policy.</i> More information on foreign policy provided by such means as the sending of political reports of other Dutch missions would simplify and render more effective the activities of diplomatic representatives abroad.
436	27.5.1941 From Van Starckenborgh to Colonial Ministry (Batavia)	<i>Trade talks in Batavia: Britain's good offices.</i> No objections to Britain's good offices provided they were restricted to the rubber and tin issues. Apart from this the negotiations in Batavia should be brought to a speedy end. The proposals of Pabst and Craigie should be approached with great caution as rubber was exported from Indo-China to Germany via other routes. The importance of stopping rubber exports to Germany should be weighed against the danger of direct action on the part of Japan.
437	27.5.1941 From Van Bylandt to Gerbrandy	<i>Royal Decree B 30 (enemy territory): application to France.</i> The British Government had supplied a list of all areas against which an economic blockade was in force. The decision to declare all French territory enemy territory should be delayed no longer.
438	28.5.1941 From Van Starckenborgh to Welter (Batavia)	<i>Defence of Surinam.</i> Kielstra wished to recruit a force of volunteers in the USA to defend the bauxite mines.
439	28.5.1941 Van Bylandt	<i>Defence of Curaçao.</i> Council of Ministers' decision against making available the Netherlands Legion in England for the defence of Curaçao and to entrust this task to NEI military

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440	29.5.1941 From Van Starckenborgh to Welter (Batavia)	units had been discussed and held up at a meeting of Gerbrandy, Dyxhoorn, representatives of the Colonial Ministry and Van Bylandt. <i>France.</i> As political reasons prevented the Royal Navy from acting against French ships carrying rubber for Germany, the writer suggested that they be seized in the Sunda Strait and brought into port.
441	29.5.1941 From Hart	<i>Transport of diamonds from Portugal to USA.</i> Because an export ban was in force in Portugal the Colonial Ministry was in principle opposed to the use of Dutch couriers for the transport to the USA of diamonds smuggled into Portugal. Doubtful origin of diamonds sent to Philips.
442	30.5.1941 Council of Ministers	<i>Defence of Curaçao.</i> Discussion of the question whether 1300 men could be sent from the Royal Netherlands Indies Army to Curaçao to replace British troops. A compromise proposal that 800 men be sent was adopted.
443	31.5.1941 From Van Bylandt to Loudon	<i>France.</i> Shipping to and from the French islands in the West Indies had been brought to a halt. Great Britain urged the seizure of French ships in the Sunda Strait to prevent the transport of rubber to Germany. Britain also wished the Netherlands' position regarding economic warfare measures against France to be brought into line with her own.
444	31.5.1941 From Van Bylandt	<i>Belgium: diplomatic relations with the Netherlands.</i> In view of the continued absence of Van Harinxma thoe Slooten, the Belgian Government had agreed to the appointment of a temporary chargé-d'affaires.
445	5.1941 From Beyen to Steenberghe	<i>Great Britain: application of Royal Decree A 1.</i> Agreement with opinion expressed No. 445 A that the British proposal contained in No. 343 was unacceptable. The British Government wished to set up a kind of clearing-house together with the Netherlands Government, but the latter was not in a position to do so. Consideration should be given to Posthumus Meyjes' suggestion concerning the settlement of British claims in the occupied Netherlands.
445A	2.5.1941 From Posthumus Meyjes to Beyen	<i>Great Britain: application of Royal Decree A 1.</i> Though formally it was not correct to use claims under Royal Decree A 1 for the repayment of British credits to debtors in the occupied Netherlands as proposed in No. 343, the negotiations on British recognition of the Decree would be favourably influenced if the

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		Netherlands were to display a readiness to try to prevent transfer difficulties for British creditors after the war. The risk, however, would have to be borne by the latter.