

DOCUMENTEN
BETREFFENDE DE
BUITENLANDSE POLITIEK
VAN
NEDERLAND 1919 — 1945

PERIODE C 1940 — 1945

DEEL III

1 JUNI — 7 DECEMBER 1941

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's-Gravenhage
verkrijgbaar bij MARTINUS NIJHOFF
1980

Tot stand gekomen met steun van de Nederlandse Organisatie voor Zuiver-Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek (Z.W.O.) te 's Gravenhage.

Deze publikatie is mogelijk gemaakt door de minister van Onderwijs en Wetenschappen, die echter voor de inhoud geen verantwoordelijkheid draagt.

Auteursrechten voorbehouden
ISBN 90 247 9036 0

LIST OF DOCUMENTS

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ADA	Anglo-Dutch-Australian Staff Conference Singapore
ADB	American-Dutch-British Staff Conference Singapore
BD	British Dutch Staff Conference Singapore
BOAC	British Overseas Airways Corporation
BPC	British Purchasing Committee
CIC	Commander in Chief
CNF	Comité National Français (French National Committee)
CORVO	Commissie Rechtsverkeer in Oorlogstijd (Wartime Legal Rights Committee)
ITC	International Tin Committee
KB	Koninklijk Besluit (Royal Decree)
KLM	Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschappij (Royal Dutch Airlines)
KNIL	Koninklijk Nederlands Indisch Leger (Royal Netherlands East Indies Army)
KNILM	Koninklijk Nederlands Indische Luchtvaart Maatschappij (Royal Netherlands Indies Airways Company)
NEI	Netherlands East Indies
NSTC	Netherlands Shipping and Trading Committee
RAF	Royal Air Force (United Kingdom)
RD	Royal Decree
UK	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
US(A)	United States of Northern America
USSR	Union of Socialist Soviet Republics

LIST OF DOCUMENTS¹

No.	Date; from/to	Description
1	2.6.1941 From Balfour to Albarda	<i>KLM: co-operation with BOAC.</i> In agreement with proposals of II, No. 398. Proposals of II, No. 422 acceptable on condition that KLM came to an arrangement about this with BOAC and that an agreement was concluded between the governments concerning KLM's contribution to transport facilities connected with the conduct of the war.
2	3.6.1941 From Hart to Van Starckenborgh	<i>USA: purchase of rubber in NEI.</i> US Government intended to centralise the purchase of rubber in the hands of the Rubber Reserve Co. There was no reason for giving all NEI export licences to Rubber Reserve Co. just because the USA was by far the biggest buyer of NEI rubber. US Government has been asked about division of purchased rubber between Rubber Reserve and manufacturers in connection with strategic stockpiling. Hart had no objection to allocation of all export licences intended for USA to Rubber Reserve as a token of good will. Van Starckenborgh's opinion sought.
3	3.6.1941 From Van Bylandt to Michiels van Verduynen	<i>KLM: co-operation with British airlines.</i> KLM prepared to co-operate with British airlines, provided it was commensurate with the number of aircraft operated by the parties concerned, at equal rates and on the basis of equality. Government was prepared to conclude agreement on this.
4	3.6.1941 From Van Hoorn (Jerusalem)	<i>Yugoslavia.</i> Government wished to leave for Great Britain or Canada without diplomatic corps. Instructions requested.
5	3.6.1941 Troutbeck	<i>Trade talks in Batavia: rubber.</i> Discussion between Leith-Ross and Hart. Announcement of cessation of rubber exports to be dissociated from ending of negotiations, pending outcome of British-Thai negotiations on Thai rubber

¹ The numbers in the first column refer to the numbers of the documents. The date of the document, the sender's and addressee's names and the place where the document was written are shown in the second column. Where the Minister for Foreign Affairs was the sender or the addressee, this was not indicated. Where names might be confused, first initials have been added. Titles have not been added; complicated names have sometimes been simplified, e.g. *Van Starckenborgh* instead of *Tjarda van Starckenborgh Stachouwer*. Where extracts from diaries, notes minutes of meetings and other documents that were not dispatched are concerned, only the author's name or that of the institution in question has been indicated (i.e. without the addition of *from* or *to*). The place where the document was written has not been listed if it was London. The third column contains a short description of the content of the document. See the *List of Abbreviations* for such abbreviations as occur in the text. When in the description is referred to documents in the first and second volumes the number of the volume is indicated with Roman cyphers (*I, II*).

No.	Date; From/to	Description
6	4.6.1941 From Kielstra to Loudon (Paramaribo)	<p>exports to Japan. After breaking off of negotiations exports of other products to be limited to a minimum. <i>France: merchant shipping.</i> The Netherlands were prepared to seize French ships in NEI waters. <i>Thailand: oil deliveries.</i> Netherlands Government would be prepared to put pressure on oil companies regarding oil deliveries to Thailand.</p> <p><i>NEI: Pacific policy.</i> Welter thought that <i>cessation of rubber and tin exports to Japan</i> could be interpreted by the latter as breach of the status quo policy. In view of small volume of these exports the risk of Japanese military action should not be run.</p>
7	5.6.1941 From Van Bylandt to Council of Ministers	<p><i>Ratification of ADA and ADB protocols.</i> Elucidation of the contents of II, Nos. 253 and 371. Van Kleffens and Welter approved of ratification, as did Van Starckenborgh. Ratification by the Netherlands might help to overcome opposition thereto within the British War Cabinet. American ratification unlikely. Government could decide to ratify complete protocols or only the essentials. British Government could be informed of this and given details of the measures taken as a result. In regard to ADB protocol steps to be taken in Washington only in consort with Great Britain.</p>
8	5.6.1941 From Van Bylandt to Scheltus	<p><i>Merchant navy.</i> Order of occupation authorities prohibiting Masters of ships sailing between enemy territory and neutral ports from having contact with Netherlands consuls was in contravention of international law. Measures to hold the coasters concerned in Sweden would be too costly.</p>
9	5.6.1941 From De Wilde to Van Starckenborgh (Batavia)	<p><i>Japan: Pacific policy.</i> Reliable Japanese informer of East Asian Affairs Department had reported on lecture he had given at Tokyo Pacific Institute to audience of senior officials, including Matsuoka. Theme: Japan's foreign policy was hampering the very thing it aimed at: raw materials from NEI. His impression was that Japan would not for the present proceed to armed expansion in southerly direction, since it was military incapable of doing so.</p>
10	5.6.1941 From Lincoln to Hart	<p><i>NEI: rubber exports to Japan.</i> Urgent request to cease rubber exports now that those from Thailand could not be prevented.</p>

No.	Date; from/to	Description
11	6.6.1941 From Loudon (Washington)	<i>Pacific policy.</i> Van Kleffens had conferred with Roosevelt and Hull. USA was considering possibility of agreement with Japan to freeze situation in Far East for a few months. <i>Rubber:</i> Japanese threats to NEI in connection with refusal to increase rubber exports were not taken seriously by Roosevelt.
12	6.6.1941 From Van Starckenborgh to Welter (Batavia)	<i>Japan-NEI: trade talks in Batavia.</i> Elucidation of No. 13. Export quota for rubber and tin mentioned therein subject to change in connection with war operations. Abrupt cessation considered inopportune. Japan told that this was extreme limit. Japanese delegation did not give impression that instant rejection was intended.
13	6.6.1941 From Van Starckenborgh to Welter (Batavia)	<i>Japan-NEI: trade talks in Batavia.</i> Reply to II, No. 411. General principle of NEI economic policy was development of NEI in the interest of native population. Now also obliged to take account of war conditions. Although Japanese proposals were moderate compared with II, No. 176A, majority of them were unacceptable as they would lead to discrimination against third parties. Explanation of immigration policy, admission of foreign concerns, communications, transport and commerce with reference to Japanese proposals. Netherlands proposals: guaranteed exports of 150,000 tons of sugar, ivory and coffee; allocation of currency for trade between NEI and Japan, and removal of obstacles to Netherlands trade in Japan. <i>Great Britain: application of Royal Decree A 1.</i> Meeting agreed to Beyen's proposal of II, No. 445. Michiels van Verduynen to be consulted on how to inform British Government of this. <i>Post-war World Order.</i> Smuts advocated an alliance between USA and Great Britain, which would include, inter alia, the Netherlands. Neutrality policy after the war impossible. Economic reconstruction primary task of this Alliance of the Democracies. Van Kleffens' opinion sought.
14	6.6.1941 Inter-Ministerial Meeting	Meeting agreed to Beyen's proposal of II, No. 445. Michiels van Verduynen to be consulted on how to inform British Government of this.
15	6.6.1941 From Van Lennep (Pretoria)	<i>Post-war World Order.</i> Smuts advocated an alliance between USA and Great Britain, which would include, inter alia, the Netherlands. Neutrality policy after the war impossible. Economic reconstruction primary task of this Alliance of the Democracies. Van Kleffens' opinion sought.
16	7.6.1941 From Loudon (Washington)	<i>Lend-Lease agreement with USA.</i> Van Kleffens requested authorisation to sign a draft agreement pertaining to the conditions for application of the Lend-Lease Act to the Kingdom of the Netherlands.
17	7.6.1941 From Colonial Ministry to Van Starckenborgh	<i>France.</i> Seizure of French ships by British Navy impossible on account of political situation. Seizure by the Netherlands to be based on belligerent rights. Stern action to be avoided in

No.	Date; from/to	Description
18	7.6.1941 From Hart to Van Starckenborgh	enforcement of prize rights in regard to France and Japan. <i>USA: purchase of rubber in NEI.</i> USA had now presented an official proposal regarding plan No. 2. Wished to operate on basis of export licensing system. Shipment from specified ports. Hart was preparing his own comments on proposal. Van Starckenborgh asked to state his views.
19	9.6.1941 From Verniers van der Loeff to Council of Ministers.	<i>Ratification of BD report.</i> Text of II, No. 372 received; summary of contents and necessary additions to implementation measures referred to in No. 7.
20	9.6.1941 From Hart	<i>Prize law and contraband.</i> Text of Prize Regulations to be adapted to decision that the owner of conditional contraband has to prove that cargo was not destined for enemy.
21	9.6.1941 From Pabst (Tokyo)	<i>Japan: Pacific policy.</i> Proposal to decline invitation to participate in Pacific exhibition on account of Japan's co-prosperity policy.
22	9.6.1941 From Flaes (Peking)	<i>Germany: Pacific policy.</i> Not likely that Wohltat Mission would have demanded control of Dutch companies. Germany had probably demanded recognition as agent for trade relations between territories in Asia brought under the New Order and German-occupied territories in Europe. Negotiations proceeding with difficulty. In the event of Nanking Government being recognised, Germany would probably demand departure of representatives of, inter alia, the Netherlands.
23	9.6.1941 From Hart to Van Bylandt	<i>Ratification of ADA and ADB reports.</i> Suggestion that notification of Netherlands willingness to ratify be made via representatives in Australia and Singapore, thus reducing chance of British refusal.
24	10.6.1941 Council of Ministers	<i>Ratification of ADA and ADB reports.</i> Suggestions of Nos. 7 and 19 approved. Notification thereof to Foreign Office to strengthen Eden's position vis-à-vis Churchill, who was prepared to withdraw from the Pacific since in his opinion the conflict would have to be resolved in W. Europe. <i>NEI-Japan: trade talks in Batavia:</i> all demands tending towards political and economic dependence of NEI rejected. British mediation in regard to rubber and tin declined. <i>Defence of Curaçao:</i> discussion postponed until Welter's return, as replacement of British troops was no longer urgent. <i>Lend-Lease agreement</i>

No.	Date; from/to	Description
25	11.6.1941 To Loudon	<i>with USA:</i> Van Kleffens not given permission to sign owing to conditions stipulated. <i>Great Britain: new ships for Netherlands merchant navy.</i> Suggestion that the ships to be delivered by Britain should sail under British flag rejected. If necessary, Netherlands Government would undertake building of new ships itself. <i>Lend-Lease agreement.</i> Netherlands Government had no fundamental objections to draft agreement of No. 16, but desired clarification regarding use of equipment in British context, advance payment and right of ownership before it could proceed to authorisation.
26	11.6.1941 From Van Starckenborgh to Colonial Ministry (Batavia)	<i>Thailand: oil deliveries.</i> To avoid open deviation from oil policy pursued towards Japan, Thai Government should be informed that Netherlands Government would not continue to encourage companies to export oil if Thailand did not comply adequately with Allied requirements in the matter of rubber and tin.
27	11.6.1941 From Michiels van Verduynen	<i>Pacific Policy.</i> Discussion with Shigemitsu, who saw American and British pro-Chinese policy as cause of Tripartite Pact of 27.9.1940. Economic measures against Japan were aggressive. <i>Japan: trade talks in Batavia:</i> The Netherlands prepared to supply Japan with raw materials provided guarantee was given that these would not be reexported to Germany.
28	12.6.1941 From Van Kleffens to Morrison	<i>Great Britain: interned Netherlands nationals.</i> Draft Note of protest against transfer of internees, qualified for release, from internment camp to Leeds prison. Proposal that internment be continued in hotel at Netherlands expense.
29	12.6.1941 From Michiels van Verduynen to Eden	<i>Ratification of ADA and ADB reports.</i> Netherlands Government prepared to ratify ADA and ADB reports. Preference for agreement containing political clauses and those relating to strategic command. Willingness to ratify ADB report to be notified to Washington jointly.
30	13.6.1941 From Michiels van Verduynen	<i>Ratification of ADB and ADA reports.</i> During presentation of No. 29, Eden had raised question of publicizing ratification. Discussion to be postponed pending British agreement.
31	13.6.1941 From Michiels van Verduynen	<i>Immunity of Netherlands Government.</i> British Government prepared to grant diplomatic status only to those civil servants whose duties were comparable to those of Secretary of Legation. Military personnel not to be included in this list. Maximum for A list: 80 persons.

XVIII

No.	Date; from/to	Description
32	13.6.1941 From Michiels van Verduynen	<i>Trade talks in Batavia: Britain's good services.</i> British refusal to render good services taken calmly in Tokyo.
33	14.6.1941 From Loudon (Washington)	<i>Japan: trade talks in Batavia.</i> According to US representative in Berlin, Germany was bringing pressure to bear on Japan to spare no effort to obtain tropical raw materials for Germany. In exchange, Japan would receive arms.
34	15.6.1941 From Van Starckenborgh to Hart (Batavia)	<i>USA: purchase of rubber in NEI.</i> Prepared to co-operate in sales of rubber exclusively to Rubber Reserve Co. provided the latter did not establish its own purchasing organisation in NEI, but used existing trade channels. Conditions relating to fixed price and avoidance of stagnation in transport in outer islands.
35	16.6.1941 From Pabst (Tokyo)	<i>Trade protection.</i> Serious objections to appointment of a nautical adviser of consular rank in Kobe on account of stringent Japanese anti-espionage laws and military status of candidate for post.
36	16.6.1941 From Van Bylandt to Steenberghe	<i>Switzerland: implementation of Royal Decree A 1.</i> After custodianship in USA and Great Britain had been arranged, attention would have to be devoted to how this could best be handled in Switzerland.
37	16.6.1941 From Meyer Ranneft to Van Boetzelaer van Oosterhout (Washington)	<i>Journey of Welter and Van Kleffens.</i> Questions discussed by Welter with Stark had not been put to the right person.
37A	16.6.1941	<i>Talks between Welter and Stark.</i> In view of importance of <i>Surinam bauxite</i> for war effort, Welter had requested that US Navy patrols be intensified and purchase of anti-aircraft guns facilitated. <i>Arms deliveries to NEI</i> needed to be expedited; notably lack of small-arms ammunition. British request for transfer of <i>Netherlands merchant shipping</i> from Pacific to Atlantic could be met if American vessels took over Pacific trade.
38	17.6.1941 Council of Ministers	At inter-allied meeting resolution on <i>war aims</i> had been adopted. Proposal to British Government concerning <i>replacement of lost ships</i> by Great Britain would be drawn up by Steenberghe and Michiels van Verduynen. War expected between <i>Germany and USSR. Immunity of Netherlands Government.</i> British Government wished to limit number of Netherlands civil servants with diplomatic status. Proposal to raise objections to this.

No.	Date; from/to	Description
39	17.6.1941 From Van Starckenborgh to Colonial Ministry (Batavia)	<i>Japan: trade talks in Batavia.</i> Upon refusal to change contents of No. 13, Yoshizawa had announced end of talks. Text of joint communiqué. Continuation of normal relations promised.
40	18.6.1941 From Visser (Ankara)	<i>Turkey: Royal Decree A 6 and Philips.</i> Urgent request to permit deliveries to Philips Turkey from Eindhoven on limited scale under supervision of Envoy. British Embassy in agreement.
41	18.6.1941 From Scheltus (Stockholm)	<i>Germany: exchange of honorary consuls with the Netherlands.</i> German Government would not permit Netherlands consuls to leave for Switzerland until last four German consuls were permitted to leave NEI.
42	18.6.1941 From Steenberghe to Beyen	<i>Netherlands gold in South Africa.</i> Plan to ship gold valued at Dfl. 70 million, belonging to Netherlands Bank and Equalisation Fund, to New York had been abandoned owing to practical transport problems and bad impression on British ally.
43	18.6.1941 From Groenman (Ottawa)	<i>Canada.</i> Enclosure of No. 43A.
43A	17.6.1941 From Legation Ottawa to Canadian Government (Ottawa)	<i>Canada.</i> In the interest of optimum Allied cooperation, two questions: Was Canadian Government prepared to resolve problem of <i>exchange tax</i> (II, No. 255) for NEI, and what should NEI do in order to share in the advantages of <i>Sterling countries</i> ?
44	19.6.1941 From Pabst (Tokyo)	<i>Japan: trade talks in Batavia.</i> Japanese press had reacted moderately to termination of talks, but continued to be very anti-Dutch.
45	19.6.1941 From Loudon (Washington)	<i>Lend-Lease agreement.</i> Comments of No. 25 discussed with Welter and Van Kleffens and with American Government. Writer felt that comments presented no obstacle to signing agreement.
46	19.6.1941 From Van Bylandt to Colonial Ministry	<i>Germans interned in NEI.</i> Suggestion that a number of elderly internees be permitted to leave NEI as an autonomous measure.
46A	18.6.1941 From Scheltus (Stockholm)	<i>Germans interned in NEI.</i> Ribbentrop had suggested that 200-300 vacant berths on ship carrying released German women and children be occupied by elderly Germans. Possibility of effect on position of <i>Netherlands internees in Germany.</i>
47	19.6.1941 From Van Bylandt to Steenberghe	<i>France.</i> Settlement of claims on French Government in connection with cargo seized before 10 May 1940 to be presented to French Government via Sweden if Sevenster's efforts

No.	Date; from/to	Description
48	19.6.1941 From British Legation	in Vichy produced no results. Captured vessels accrued to the State. <i>Seizure of French vessels</i> as 'forfeits' for claims to be discussed upon Welter's and Van Kleffens' return. <i>Prize law.</i> British Government requested transfer of captured French ships 'Arica' and 'Winnipeg' as British prize law offered more guarantee than the corresponding Dutch law for condemnation of ships as prizes. Arrangements should be made for dealing with similar cases.
49	19.6.1941 Ashley Clarke	<i>Pacific policy.</i> Teixeira de Mattos had asked whether British off-the-record statement in Tokyo (Great Britain should necessarily be concerned with the outcome of forcible action between the Netherlands and Japan) was the preliminary to a commitment. Clarke had not endorsed this.
50	20.6.1941 From Loudon (Washington)	<i>USA: military observer for Surinam</i> had left to take up his post.
51	20.6.1941 From Van Bylandt to Loudon	<i>USA: Royal Decree A 1.</i> Council of Ministers had laid down rules for custodianship of claims under Royal Decree A 1, although official recognition had not yet been secured. Where these differed from the policy of the US Treasury pursuance of Netherlands policy should be advocated. Official steps to be deferred until after Kleyn Molekamp's talks with Government in London.
51A	20.6.1941 Ministry of Finance	<i>USA: Royal Decree A 1.</i> According to Beyen, custodianship of RD A1 assets was not in conformity with the substance of this Decree, which implied freezing and thus did not permit any change to be made in the investments. Orders from occupied territory consequently not to be carried out, not even switch orders pertaining to the sale or purchase of securities. Pending the outcome of the test case, US banks were said to be acquiescing in this. In Beyen's view, decisions regarding the freezing or custodianship principle should be taken by the Council of Ministers. The writer was of the opinion that, in fact, the principle of custodianship had invariably been followed. Of decisive importance was the attitude of the US banks in the event of a prohibition against following instructions from occupied territory. The interests of owners in occupied territory were worst served by the freezing principle.
51B	8.5.1941	<i>USA: Royal Decree A 1.</i> Recommendation to

No.	Date; from/to	Description
51C	12.6.1941 From Steenberghe to Council of Ministers	<p>leave rights and claims, which under RD A1 were in government hands, as they were on 15 May 1940. Acts of custodianship to be proceeded to only if rights were in danger of being lost; claims should be collected and invested; no co-operation in orders emanating from outside the Washington Legation.</p> <p><i>USA: Royal Decree A 1.</i> Custodianship of RD A 1 assets should be of a conserving nature: changes to be made only if serious disadvantage to rightful owner was feared; switch order from occupied Netherlands to be regarded as reason to consider position in question; outstanding debts to be collected and invested; voting rights of shares to be exercised and cash orders prohibited. These basic principles to be notified to US authorities and banks.</p>
52	21.6.1941 Van Voorst tot Voorst	<p><i>Prize law and contraband.</i> In view of No. 48 amendment of the Prize Regulations was necessary, entailing abandonment of the Declaration of London of 1909. Prizes made by Netherlands Navy to be dealt with by Dutch prize courts.</p>
53	23.6.1941 Van Troostenburg de Bruyn	<p><i>France: seizure of Dutch ships.</i> In connection with the seizure of the French Ship 'Compiègne' in NEI for searching, the writer wondered whether action as referred to in II, No. 104 should not again be considered. Hart had suggested matter be discussed by Welter and Van Kleffens.</p>
54	23.6.1941 From Van Bylandt to Michiels van Verduynen	<p><i>Egypt: closure of Netherlands consulates.</i> It had been made clear to Egyptian chargé d'affaires that closure of Netherlands consulates in Alexandria, Port Said and Suez could not be accepted. Michiels was to discuss this matter once more with Butler and to voice the expectation that the British Government would vigorously support the Netherlands standpoint in Cairo.</p>
54A	22.5.1941 From Bentinck van Schoonheten (Cairo)	<p><i>Egypt: closure of Netherlands consulates.</i> Despite the order to close down, the consulates were carrying on with their work. British Ambassador had urged withdrawal of closure order for allied consulates. According to British authorities, Netherlands consul at Port Said was not to be trusted.</p>
55	24.6.1941 Council of Ministers	<p><i>USSR.</i> In speech to be broadcast by the Queen about the war between Germany and the USSR a passage on the rejection of Bolshevism would,</p>

No.	Date; from/to	Description
56	24.6.1941 To all diplomatic missions	at the suggestion of Van Kleffens and Steenberghe, be amplified so as to rectify its inconsistency with the condemnation of Nazism. <i>USSR</i> . Despite joint struggle against Germany, no close collaboration. Casual contact permitted.
57	24.6.1941 From Hart to Gerbrandy	<i>Contraband</i> . Reversal of burden of proof when making prize of a ship should be formulated in the Prize Regulations in such a way that the destination of the cargo, and not the destination of the ship, was the sole determining factor since otherwise unconditional contraband would be favoured above conditional.
58	24.6.1941 From Van den Broek to Kielstra (New York)	<i>USA: arms deliveries</i> . With present production capacity Hopkins saw no possibility of increasing arms deliveries to the Netherlands. <i>Surinam: defence</i> . After his visit, Welter was convinced of need for reinforcement. Orders had been placed. Van den Broek would do everything in his power to persuade US Government to deliver, notably by pointing to the vulnerable position of the bauxite industry.
59	25.6.1941 Van Kleffens	<i>Ratification of ADA and ADB reports</i> . Talk with Eden, who appeared to be uninformed about No. 29. Eden had decided in May against declaration of solidarity in conformity with II, No. 390, for fear of provoking Japan.
60	25.6.1941 Van Kleffens	<i>USSR</i> . Talk with Eden. At Eden's request, Van Kleffens had agreed to receive Maisky should the Russians need economic aid from the Netherlands. If not specifically requested, no trade mission to be sent to Russia.
61	25.6.1941 Van Vredenburg	<i>Italy</i> . Recommendation, now that mutual acts of war were being committed by navies, that Italian Government be officially notified of state of war between the two countries.
62	25.6.1941 Van Troostenburg de Bruyn	<i>Italy</i> . Summary of Netherlands economic interests in Italy, and Italian interests in NEI, and measures taken against these interests.
63	25.6.1941 Van Weede	<i>Belgium</i> . The writer had paid his respects to Spaak as temporary chargé d'affaires. Collaboration between intelligence services suggested by Romrée. Interest in Netherlands preparations for post-war relief (Van Stolk). <i>Spanish participation in war</i> expected. Spaak's view that war between Germany and USSR to advantage of the Allies.
64	26.6.1941 From Van Bylandt	<i>Royal Decree A 6 and Philips</i> . Following discussions with Ministry of Economic Warfare,

No.	Date; from/to	Description
	to Loudon	Corvo had approved arrangement with provisos for contact between Philips Eindhoven and Curaçao management and for deliveries by Philips Eindhoven to subsidiaries in certain European countries. Necessary to ensure that arrangement was scrupulously observed.
65	26.6.1941 From Michiels van Verduynen	<i>Ratification of ADA and ADB reports.</i> Eden's statement (see No. 59) raised doubts as to his veracity. Presentation of No. 29 could not have escaped his notice (see No. 30). The same tactics had been employed previously by Eden (see II, No. 358).
66	26.6.1941 From Michiels van Verduynen	<i>Thailand: oil deliveries.</i> Following period of disinterest, USA now prepared to resume oil deliveries by Standard Oil, provided Thailand adopted reasonable standpoint regarding rubber and tin.
67	27.6.1941 Council of Ministers	<i>Welter and Van Kleffens' journey.</i> Welter and Van Kleffens, reporting on their journey, presented the following subjects for discussion: the atmosphere in NEI, <i>German interneees, negotiations with Japan, constitutional reforms, defence of Curaçao, arms deliveries by the USA</i> , opinions in USA on <i>Netherlands Pacific policy</i> , the atmosphere in the USA, staff conferences in Singapore. It was decided to discuss in greater detail the questions of German interneees, the defence of Curaçao and strategic co-operation in the Pacific.
68	27.6.1941 From Van Haersolte (Helsinki)	<i>Finland: diplomatic relations with the Netherlands.</i> Instructions requested in connection with confidential notification of closure of legation without severance of diplomatic relations.
69	27.6.1941 From Groenman to Van Starckenborgh (Ottawa)	<i>Canada: trade with NEI.</i> Because trade was stagnating owing to mutual insistence on payment for tea and wheat meal in US\$, Canadian Government suggested that both agree to pay in Sterling.
70	27.6.1941 Law	<i>USSR: diplomatic relations with Netherlands.</i> Michiels van Verduynen expected that Van Kleffens would entertain proposal for meeting with Maisky only if establishment of diplomatic relations was likely.
71	28.6.1941 To Van Haersolte	<i>Finland: diplomatic relations with the Netherlands.</i> If no official notification of No. 68 had been received, termination of mission to be announced; if it had, surprise to be expressed. Sweden to manage Netherlands affairs.

No.	Date; from/to	Description
72	30.6.1941 From Netherlands to British Government	<i>Prize law.</i> To expedite matters, No. 48 was agreed to on condition that seizure would not anticipate eventual award of prizes.
73	30.6.1941 From Michiels van Verduynen	<i>USSR.</i> Following contact with Maisky, Butler had asked Michiels whether British Government, acting as intermediary, could promote rapprochement or the entering into diplomatic relations between USSR and the Netherlands.
74	30.6.1941 From Michiels van Verduynen	<i>Ratification ADA and ADB reports.</i> Butler had given no plausible explanation for Eden's behaviour in regard to No. 59. Michiels thought that formula was being sought to cover mutual agreement without ratification.
75	30.6.1941 From Witting to Van Haersolte (Helsinki)	<i>Finland: diplomatic relations with the Netherlands.</i> Confirmation of receipt of notification of termination of mission in Finland.
76	6.1941 From Van Bylandt et al. to Gerbrandy	<i>The Netherlands: alliance with Great Britain.</i> In view of its responsibilities, Netherlands Government should play a more active role in the alliance with Great Britain. Netherlands armed forces should take part in the Middle East campaign as soon as possible. Early publication of <i>Orange Book</i> on events relating to German invasion essential.
77	2.7.1941 To Bosch van Rosenthal	<i>Germany: exchange of honorary consuls with the Netherlands.</i> Departure of German consuls to be arranged after receipt of notice that all Netherlands consuls can leave Germany if they wish.
78	2.7.1941 From Eden to Michiels van Verduynen	<i>Great Britain: Royal Decree A 1.</i> British Government regarded NSTC as Netherlands governmental institution, but as its status was that of a limited liability company, British tax would be levied on earnings which were not regarded as earnings of the Netherlands Government but as earnings of the owners of assets placed under the administration of the NSTC.
79	2.7.1941 From Bentinck van Schoonheten (Cairo)	<i>Egypt: closure of Netherlands consulates.</i> Despite the closure ordered, the consulates continued to function. The writer had come to an arrangement with the Minister for Foreign Affairs whereby consuls continued work privately in behalf of shipping and performed other consular duties normally. No flag or coat of arms to be displayed for the present. Possibility of intervention by British Ambassador in favour of the Netherlands was extremely limited.

No.	Date; from/to	Description
80	3.7.1941 From Gerth van Wijk (Tangier)	<i>Spain: Cape Spartel.</i> Instructions requested in connection with the taking over by Spain of international control of the lighthouse at Cape Spartel.
81	3.7.1941 From Welter to Van Starckenborgh	<i>NEI: trade relations with USSR.</i> Great Britain, the Dominions and colonies were exercising caution concerning deliveries to USSR. From NEI only harmless products such as tea and quinine to be supplied for the present. Requests for deliveries of tin and rubber to be dealt with dilatorily. London to be informed of Russian requests received.
82	3.7.1941 From Van Bylandt to Michiels van Verduynen	<i>Organisation and deployment of Netherlands armed forces in Britain.</i> In agreement with proposals of II, No. 266A, with the exception of Appendix IV, Article 2, placing Netherlands units in the RAF under RAF regulations.
83	3.7.1941 From Aerssen to Van Mook (Teheran)	<i>NEI: trade relations with USSR.</i> Increased efforts to promote transit trade in Iran between NEI and USSR. With a rapid German advance there would be danger of deliveries from NEI falling into German hands. Hence preference for shipment via Vladivostok. Transactions should be conducted direct between Soviet authorities and producers in NEI so as to eliminate price-raising intermediate trade.
84	4.7.1941 Butler	<i>USSR.</i> Michiels van Verduynen had stated that the Netherlands Government did not desire diplomatic relations with USSR but was willing to grant economic aid if requested by Maisky.
85	4.7.1941 From Leith-Ross to Hart	<i>NEI: restriction of exports to Japan.</i> Request not to yield to expected Japanese pressure for enlargement of export quota fixed in No. 13, as such enlargement could accrue to Germany in the event of Russia capitulating to Germany. Reduction of quota should be arranged in mutual consultation.
86	5.7.1941 To Michiels van Verduynen	<i>USSR.</i> Butler to be informed that in view of No. 60 there was no need for British initiative to restore diplomatic relations between the Netherlands and USSR.
87	7.7.1941 From Kielstra to Welter (Paramaribo)	<i>Surinam.</i> Withdrawal of 'Kinsbergen' from the Caribbean without replacement would be most unwise.
88	7.7.1941 To all legations	<i>Japan: trade talks in Batavia.</i> Summary of the negotiations with Japan from September 1940 to June 1941. They had proceeded satisfactorily and steadfastness of the Netherlands had made a favourable impression on British and

No.	Date; from/to	Description
89	7.7.1941 From Michiels van Verduynen	American governments. <i>USSR.</i> The writer had informed Butler that the Netherlands desired no rapprochement or diplomatic relations with <i>USSR</i> . Prepared to supply raw materials if <i>USSR</i> asked for them.
90	8.7.1941 Council of Ministers	<i>Establishment of diplomatic relations with USSR.</i> Van Kleffens was prepared to supply goods and have a meeting with Maisky, but establishment of diplomatic relations (cf. No. 89) was out of the question. Van den Tempel advocated reevaluation of standpoint divorced from the policy previously pursued. <i>China.</i> Appointment of Netherlands envoy in Chungking after return of Chinese envoy to post in London. <i>Germany.</i> Not known whether the 'Oranje' would be recognised by Germany as a hospital ship under the Dutch flag.
91	8.7.1941 To Loudon	<i>International Wheat Conference.</i> Instruction to advocate representation of the Netherlands by an observer, in connection with its role of distributor in Europe.
92	8.7.1941 From Elink Schuurman (Sydney)	<i>Van Kleffens and Welter's voyage.</i> Visit to Australia, New Zealand and New Caledonia had earned the Netherlands considerable goodwill; Australia had given insufficient attention to the visit.
93	8.7.1941 From Elink Schuurman to Van Starckenborgh (Sydney)	<i>NEI: co-operation between KNILM and Qantas.</i> Now that a co-operation agreement was being concluded between KLM and BOAC, a similar agreement was needed to correct disadvantage suffered by KNILM in postal traffic between Australia and NEI.
94	8.7.1941 From Eden to Bland	<i>USSR: establishment of diplomatic relations with the Netherlands.</i> Michiels van Verduynen was doggedly adhering to viewpoint that meeting between Van Kleffens and Maisky was impossible without prior meeting between Michiels and Maisky. According to Eden Michiels was raising these problems because he wished to assert himself.
95	9.7.1941 To Bosch van Rosenthal	<i>Germany: exchange of honorary consuls with the Netherlands.</i> Swiss Government to be informed that Netherlands Government expected early departure of Netherlands consuls from Germany, following recent departure of German consuls from NEI.
96	9.7.1941 To Welter	<i>Germany: exchange of honorary consuls with the Netherlands.</i> Van Starckenborgh to be reprimanded for allowing German consuls to de-

No.	Date; from/to	Description
97	9.7.1941 From Van Bylandt to Michiels van Verduynen	part without permission from the Government while departure of all Netherlands consuls from Germany was not certain. <i>Great Britain: recognition and application of Royal Decree A 1.</i> Request for opinion on draft note in answer to II, No. 343.
98	9.7.1941 From Steenberghe to Leathers	<i>Placing NEI ships at the disposal of Britain.</i> Lord Leathers had requested that all merchant vessels still sailing under the Dutch flag be placed at the disposal of the British Government. Ships suitable for the purpose would be utilised to the full in accordance with US Government standards in the trade between NEI and the west coast of America. British Government could thus ask US Government for aid in transport. Non-availability of merchant navy serious loss to economy of NEI archipelago. The Netherlands prepared to investigate whether certain vessels could be released for chartering to Great Britain.
99	10.7.1941 From Welter	<i>Germany: exchange of honorary consuls with the Netherlands.</i> Reprimand as suggested in No. 96 would be unwarranted, since Government's objections to departure had reached Van Starckenborgh too late. Van Starckenborgh's proposal had been formulated in such a way that without instructions to the contrary departure would take place.
100	11.7.1941 From Welter to Van Starckenborgh	<i>NEI: trade relations with USSR.</i> Proposal that British request for delivery of 500 tons of ready tin to the USSR should be acceded to. British Government would act as buyer.
101	12.7.1941 From Pabst (Tokyo)	<i>Japan.</i> 'Nichi-Nichi' was publishing anti-Dutch and mendacious reports from Batavia correspondent.
102	12.7.1941 From Van Bylandt to all diplomatic missions	<i>Implementation of Royal Decree A.6.</i> Instructions concerning contact with occupied territory given in II, No. 278 applied only to diplomatic and consular personnel. Requests in this matter from other Netherlands subjects should be referred to Corvo.
103	12.7.1941 From Welter	<i>China: oil deliveries.</i> Request for permission to deliver high-octane aircraft fuel to China was to be dealt with only after official Chinese or American démarche.
104	12.7.1941 From Van Haersolte (Stockholm)	<i>Finland: diplomatic relations with the Netherlands.</i> Legation in Helsinki closed. No reply given to Finnish question whether diplomatic relations had also been severed. Closure of Bel-

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105	12.7.1941 From Pabst (Tokyo)	gian and Netherlands Legations had been decided upon by Finnish Government under strong German pressure, but Note No. 71 had been presented before Finnish announcement of decision. Norwegian Legation would continue to function. <i>France: consular representation in NEI.</i> If the present French consul in Batavia was prohibited from dispatching telegrams in code a supporter of the New Order could be appointed.
106	15.7.1941 Council of Ministers	<i>Trade relations with USSR.</i> Delivery of 500 tons of tin possible only if the UK resold the tin sold to her to the USSR. <i>China.</i> Delivery of 14,000 tons of aviation fuel only via British and US Governments on account of possible repercussions on Japan. <i>Defence of Curacao.</i> On her departure from Curacao the 'Van Kinsbergen' would be replaced by another Dutch warship.
107	15.7.1941 From Scheltus (Stockholm)	<i>Italy: sequestration of Netherlands oil companies.</i> Swedish Envoy in Rome had taken no further steps in connection with sequestration because a representative of subsidiaries of the Royal Dutch/Shell group was seeking to get measure rescinded and was making good progress. Moreover, Italian authorities did not recognise Sweden's <i>protection of Netherlands interests.</i>
108	15.7.1941 From Steenstra Toussaint (Bangkok)	<i>Thailand: oil deliveries.</i> Crosby had entered into negotiations with the Thai Government regarding oil deliveries via Singapore (source NEI) in exchange for regular supplies of rubber and tin ore for Malaya. Thai proposals (No. 108A) only suitable as basis for further negotiations.
108A	From Thai Government to Crosby (Bangkok)	<i>Thailand: oil deliveries.</i> Thai plan for regular deliveries of oil by British Government in exchange for regular deliveries of rubber to Malaya.
109	15.7.1941 From Hart to Leith-Ross	<i>The Netherlands: supplies for USSR.</i> In view of the chances of war, the Netherlands Government was moderating the quantities of raw materials destined for area west of the Urals. <i>NEI: restriction of exports to Japan.</i> Change in quota (cf. No. 85.) only possible if Japan, the potential enemy, completely reorientated its foreign policy. Netherlands policy continued to be aimed at withholding those goods which Japan and its friends could use against the Netherlands and the Allies.

No.	Date; from/to	Description
110	16.7.1941 Van Bylandt	<i>Post-war reconstruction.</i> Hart and Van Bylandt's discussion with Stannard. British Government was making preparations for post-war reconstruction in an international context which would also involve the USA. Formation of European bloc was evidently the aim of the British Government. Contact with other European governments' committees for reconstruction problems would be useful in the future. Appointment of Dutchman as head of Netherlands documentation department of Chatham House was desirable.
111	16.7.1941 From Groenman (Ottawa)	<i>Canada: War Exchange Tax.</i> Enclosure of No. 111A.
111A	12.7.1941 From Robertson to Groenman (Ottawa)	<i>Canada: War Exchange Tax.</i> Lifting of War Exchange Tax on imports from NEI would also mean exemption for imports from USA on account of most-favoured nation clause in trade agreement. British Government would regard exemption as infringement of British preferential tariff. Preference for arrangements for specific products.
112	16.7.1941 From Bland to Eden	<i>USSR: establishment of diplomatic relations.</i> Talk with Van Kleffens. The Netherlands prepared to grant all possible aid to USSR, but not to take any steps towards formal recognition. Quite prepared to meet Maisky unofficially, if requested. Van Kleffens had stressed grave danger of a strong communist position of power on the European continent after the war.
113	17.7.1941 From Pabst (Tokyo)	<i>Japan: Pacific policy.</i> Japan was making preparations for war; possibility of attack, first in southerly direction, with Indo China as first target.
114	17.7.1941 From Loudon (Washington)	<i>USA: coffee imports.</i> Allocation of quotas for non-signatories (Belgium, Great Britain and the Netherlands) imminent (see also No. 114A). To increase them joint démarche to US ambassadors in London recommended.
114A	8.7.1941 From Loudon to Hull (Washington)	<i>USA: coffee imports.</i> Allocation of quotas for non-signatories should be based on imports over 5 years prior to coffee agreement becoming operative. Percentage for the Netherlands then 37.61 which would not, however, cover volume of pre-war years.
115	18.7.1941 From Michiels van Verduynen	<i>Thailand: oil deliveries.</i> British Government considered proposal of No. 108A unacceptable. The Netherlands were asked to agree to

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115A	16.7.1941	counter-proposal (No. 115A) in connection with deliveries of oil from NEI. <i>Thailand: oil deliveries.</i> British Government guaranteed monthly delivery of detailed range of oil products in return for Thai Government guarantee of minimum monthly exports of 1500 tons of <i>rubber</i> to Malaya, while no more than 2500 tons would go to third countries. Exports of <i>tin</i> free. Term of agreement 2 months with tacit extension.
116	18.7.1941 From Michiels van Verduynen to Eden	<i>Great Britain: recognition and implementation of Royal Decree A 1.</i> The writer was gratified with recognition (II, No. 343). By virtue of the essence of A 1 the British Trading with the Enemy Act did not apply to assets falling under A 1. Proposals of II, No. 343 were therefore unacceptable. The Netherlands Government was prepared after the war to use moneys collected in Britain under A 1 to avoid transfer difficulties when debtors in occupied territory discharged their obligations.
117	19.7.1941 To Welter	<i>Germany: exchange of honorary consuls with the Netherlands.</i> Receipt of No. 99 had not dispelled disappointment expressed in No. 96. (In a draft that had not been despatched the Netherlands Foreign Office's version of the facts of the case contrary to No. 99 were given in full.)
118	19.7.1941 From Leathers to Steenberghe	<i>Placing NEI ships at the disposal of Britain.</i> No. 98 was obviously based on a misunderstanding. Leathers wished to ascertain with Netherlands authorities whether NEI merchant vessels could be released for chartering to Great Britain, notably from the Japan trade. Van Kleffens had spoken with Eden about <i>Russo-German war and ratification of ADA and ADB reports. Constitutional reforms.</i> Discussion of question of what could be done about the disappointment expressed by the NEI People's Council at the deferment of reforms until after the war. According to Welter, necessary amendment of the Constitution that could not be accomplished now stood in the way of reform. <i>Merchant shipping.</i> British Government wished ships to be supplied to the Netherlands Government to sail under the British flag.
119	22.7.1941 Council of Ministers	<i>Japan.</i> Japanese Government to be informed that members of Japanese economic delegation were in practice treated as persons enjoying
120	22.7.1941 To Pabst	

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		diplomatic privileges. Couriers were treated as travellers in transit. For consular personnel below the rank of chancellor an entree fee was charged. Authorisation was required for a diplomatic visa.
121	23.7.1941 From Michiels van Verduynen	<i>Pacific policy: embargo against Japan.</i> Freezing of Japanese credits and restriction of oil exports would be America's reaction to Japanese occupation of Indo China. Great Britain would probably follow suit. Request to the Netherlands to do the same.
122	23.7.1941 From Roberts to Teixeira de Mattos	<i>Spain: Cape Spartel.</i> British Government had recommended that the Netherlands, like the USA and Great Britain, should protest in Madrid against No. 80 and reserve its rights.
123	24.7.1941 From Welter to Van Starckenborgh	<i>France: requisitioning of Dutch ships.</i> Vichy intended to requisition of detained Netherlands ships. If the latest Dutch request for release was declined, the Netherlands Government would requisition French ships by way of reprisal. A start was to be made at once by bringing a few French ships into port and protracting the search for contraband.
124	24.7.1941 From Loudon (Washington)	<i>Lend-lease agreement.</i> Enclosure of No. 124A, early discussion of which had been requested by the State Department.
124A	draft agreement	<i>Lend-lease agreement.</i> Text of a draft agreement drawn up by the State Department for application of the Lend-Lease Act to the Netherlands.
125	24.7.1941 From Loudon (Washington)	<i>Dealings in Dutch securities.</i> To prevent instructions being issued in occupied territory for the sale of Dutch securities held in the USA (in contravention of Royal Decree A 1), it was necessary to register shares with Netherlands stock exchange seal in the USA.
126	25.7.1941 To Loudon	<i>Pacific policy: embargo against Japan.</i> Participation by NEI in proposed embargo measures of USA and Great Britain against Japan contained risk of war with Japan. The Netherlands wished to be included in consultation regarding extension of the embargo.
127	25.7.1941 From Pabst (Tokyo)	<i>Pacific policy: embargo against Japan.</i> In the event of American oil embargo against Japan, great pressure would be exerted on NEI. Negotiations were proceeding between Japan and the USSR.

No.	Date; from/to	Description
128	25.7.1941 From Hart to Welter	<i>Pacific policy: embargo against Japan.</i> Talks with Leith-Ross. British Government intended to follow American lead in extending embargo against Japan and freezing Japanese assets. The Netherlands were asked to join in. Hart had pointed to lack of certainty in Anglo-American policy towards Japan and obscurity about support of the Netherlands in the event of conflict with Japan through the withholding of approval of <i>ADA and ADB reports</i> . The Netherlands were prepared to make further cuts in the large quota of tin and rubber for export to Japan. Leith-Ross had mentioned other products as well.
129	26.7.1941 From Van Starckenborgh to Welter (Buitenzorg)	<i>NEI: internment of Japanese.</i> Internment of Japanese in the interest of their personal safety had been planned. Evacuation of women and children considered acceptable.
130	26.7.1941 From Welter	<i>Pacific policy: embargo against Japan.</i> Agreement with No. 130A. Right of say should be insisted upon in Washington, since proposed extension of US embargo against Japan would put vital interests of NEI at risk.
130A	24.7.1941 From Van Starckenborgh to Welter (Batavia)	<i>Pacific policy: embargo against Japan.</i> Occupation of Indo China by Japan was unacceptable to NEI. Ban on exports of oil to Japan most effective but highly dangerous. Attitude of USA in the event of Japanese aggression against NEI unclear. The Netherlands should press for joint declaration in Tokyo by Netherlands, USA and Great Britain that occupation of Indo China necessitated embargoes on exports to Japan and that an attack on any one of the three countries would be met by a joint response.
131	26.7.1941 From Bos (Chungking)	<i>China: closure of consulate in Palembang (Sumatra).</i> Hsu Mo was pained by request to close Chinese consulate in Palembang in connection with Japanese request to establish a consulate there (II, No. 302). China was prepared to assist countries with identical interests, but did not wish always to be on the losing side. Request rejected on 16 July. Reply showed that China felt confident vis-à-vis the Netherlands, Great Britain and the USA in terms of resistance to Japanese aggression, and was prepared – if necessary – to use Chinese in NEI as their trump card. Chinese Government circles greatly overestimated China's

No.	Date; from/to	Description
131A	9.7.1941 From Chinese Foreign Ministry (Chungking)	international position. <i>China: closure of consulate in Palembang.</i> Since its establishment the NEI authorities had raised no objection to this consulate. Rumours about closure of Chinese consulate might have repercussions among the 1,500,000 Chinese in NEI. Request for closure declined.
132	27.7.1941 To Hopkins	<i>USA: arms deliveries to NEI.</i> Attention again drawn to the great military importance of the delivery of small-arms ammunition and the effect of its delay on morale in NEI.
133	28.7.1941 To Bosch van Rosenthal	<i>Germany: exchange of honorary consuls with the Netherlands.</i> Departure of remaining German consuls from NEI possible only after notification of which Dutch consuls would be leaving Germany.
134	28.7.1941 From Van Starckenborgh to Welter (Batavia)	<i>NEI: embargo against Japan.</i> Measures had been taken to restrict currency dealings and trade with Japan following upon U.S. measures of 26.7. and Japan's curtailment of exports to NEI.
135	28.7.1941 To Welter	<i>Pacific policy: embargo against Japan.</i> No. 130 discussed with Eden. British Government had not been consulted beforehand on US embargo against Japan. Joint warning to Japan to be deferred until after Japanese action against Thailand. British decision on <i>ratification of ADA and ADB reports</i> to be expected soon. <i>Post-war reconstruction: Germany.</i> The Netherlands attached great importance to international post-war control of German industrial centres; opposed to reparations. West European countries and Great Britain had common interests vis-à-vis the USA. For the <i>Far East</i> , joint defence plan of USA, the Netherlands and Great Britain.
136	28.7.1941 From Stannard to Ronald	<i>Trade relations with USSR.</i> No objections to this, but no need for regulating existing commercial links. <i>Czechoslovakia.</i> Proposal for recognition of government under Benes. Elucidation of the history of the American <i>embargo against Japan</i> and of NEI measures in this context. Van Kleffens had pressed Eden for <i>ratification of ADA and ADB reports.</i>
137	29.7.1941 Council of Ministers	<i>Japan: embargo against Japan.</i> Press comments on embargo measures by USA, NEI and Great Britain fairly calm.
138	29.7.1941 From Pabst (Tokyo)	

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No.	Date; from/to	Description
139	29.7.1941 From Loudon (Washington)	<i>Pacific policy: embargo against Japan.</i> US Government had not yet drawn up definitive provisions for implementation of the embargo. It insisted that US oil companies in NEI should observe instructions of NEI authorities. Japanese threat to NEI as a result of US embargo policy was a factor to consider in decision regarding <i>ratification of ADB report.</i>
140	30.7.1941 From Teppema (Buenos Aires)	<i>Argentina: currency dealings and trade with NEI.</i> Argentina's freezing and foreign exchange policy was a serious obstacle to trade with NEI. As the Central Bank refused to be more flexible in the unblocking of Dutch accounts and to recognise transfer of statutory seats of limited liability companies, Teppema had presented a Note setting out the Netherlands' objections.
141	30.7.1941 From Craandijk to Van Kleffens (Batavia)	<i>NEI: East Asiatic Affairs Department</i> was in possession of information and knowledge which owing to geographical distance could not be used to the full in formulating Netherlands <i>Pacific policy.</i>
142	31.7.1941 From Van Starckenborgh to Welter (Batavia)	Dispatch from Steenstra Toussaint in Bangkok. <i>Thailand</i> had asked for British military aid in the event of demands by Japan. A direct attack on NEI was expected if oil deliveries from NEI were stopped under the <i>embargo against Japan.</i>
143	31.7.1941 To Welter	<i>NEI: trade relations with USSR.</i> Proposal that request contained in No. 143A be met, since full support could be lent to Russia's war effort against Germany.
143A	23.7.1941 From Soviet Embassy	<i>NEI: delivery of rubber to USSR.</i> Rubber and latex for Promsyrje Import purchased in NEI and paid for before 10 May 1940 had been requisitioned despite Soviet requests for delivery. Request to return this property of the Soviet Government.
144	31.7.1941 To Loudon	<i>USA: recognition and implementation of Royal Decree A 1.</i> Now that procedure concerning A 1 had been laid down by the Government, it wished to explain the object and purport of the measures to the US Government and to ask for recognition or co-operation in the implementation of A 1. If possible, details of Netherlands assets collected by US Government to be asked for. Draft memorandum in No. 144A.
144A	From Legation to Department of State	<i>USA: recognition and implementation of Royal Decree A 1.</i> Elucidation of measures relating to transfer of statutory seats of limited liability

No.	Date; from/to	Description
145	31.7.1941 From Loudon (Washington)	companies, Royal Decrees A 1 and A 6 and procedure concerning assets and claims under A 1. Request to support implementation, though it went further than the provisions of the US freezing order of 10.5.1940. <i>USA: Royal Decree A 1: test case.</i> The State of the Netherlands, in public law, was the owner of assets under A 1, and therefore could not accept action by third parties who denied it the right of administration. American banks were still carrying out instructions of former owners in occupied territory. Active policy was called for. Now that Judge Shientag had confirmed legal status of A 1, there was a chance of a positive ruling if the State of the Netherlands brought a test case to force one of the big American banks to carry out the instructions of the State of the Netherlands under the right of indemnity.
146	31.7.1941 From Elink Schuurman to Van Starckenborgh (Sydney)	<i>NEI: co-operation between KNILM and Qantas.</i> Under British Empire Air Mail Scheme, lifting of ban on the carrying of mail by KNILM from Australia would be possible only if British and Netherlands governments extended agreement between KLM and BOAC to include KNILM and Qantas. If necessary, Van Starckenborgh should take the initiative.
146A	12.7.1941 From Versteegh to Elink Schuurman (Sydney)	<i>NEI: co-operation between KNILM and Qantas.</i> McVey of Australian postal service thought the time was favourable for a request to lift the ban on the transport of mail by the KNILM from Australia. Request that steps be taken.
147	1.8.1941 From Pabst (Tokyo)	<i>Japan: Pacific policy: embargo against Japan.</i> Press enthusiastic about occupation of Indo-China, which could form part of a larger thrust southwards.
148	1.8.1941 To Gerbrandy	<i>Lend-Lease Agreement.</i> Announcement of discussion referred to under No. 124A with comments on some parts of the draft agreement.
149	1.8.1941 From Michiels van Verduynen	<i>Pacific policy.</i> Eden had made a declaration on behalf of British Government to the effect that in the event of an attack on NEI, Great Britain, by virtue of the alliance, would be obliged 'to do the utmost in our power'. Extent of British aid would depend on attitude of USA. Declaration was a substitute for <i>ratification of ADA and ADB reports</i> , which Eden had secured from the War Cabinet only with the greatest difficulty.

No.	Date; from/to	Description
150	1.8.1941 From Hart to Welter	<i>Pacific policy: embargo against Japan.</i> Discussion with Leith-Ross on consequences of flexible application of embargo by USA for united economic policy envisaged towards Japan. No British pressure on USA to intensify embargo policy. Request that NEI export restrictions on tin, rubber and bauxite be brought into line with restrictions.
150A	31.7.1941 From Leith-Ross to Hart	<i>Pacific policy: embargo against Japan.</i> Observations on effect of freezing Japanese assets on trade of USA and Allies with Japan.
151	1.8.1941 From Maisky	<i>The Netherlands: trade relations with USSR.</i> Feonov had been designated for maintaining regular contact.
152	2.8.1941 From Steenstra Toussaint (Bangkok)	<i>Thailand.</i> Thailand wished to remain neutral and independent; Allies requested to show understanding of small concessions made to Japan.
153	2.8.1941 From Van Starckenborgh to Welter (Batavia)	<i>Pacific policy: embargo against Japan.</i> List of goods which because of their strategic value would fall under any ban on exports to Japan. Embargo would require common policy on the part of USA, NEI and UK in view of consequences. Gradual tightening up made conflict increasingly inevitable. If a common embargo policy were adopted it should be made clear to Japan on what conditions termination would be possible.
154	2.8.1941 From Van Bylandt to Groenman	<i>Canada: Sterling area.</i> Explanation of difference between Sterling area and Sterling bloc. Obscurity of Foreign Exchange Act in this matter not to be pointed out to Canadian government.
155	2.8.1941 From Pabst (Tokyo)	<i>NEI: restriction on rubber exports to Japan.</i> Passage in No. 12 regarding contents of II, No. 427 gave the erroneous impression that the steps referred to had raised Japanese expectations of favourable outcome.
156	4.8.1941 From Dutch Legation to Australian High Commission	<i>Australia: diplomatic relations with the Netherlands.</i> With urgently needed exchange of diplomatic representatives appointment of diplomatic agent in NEI was impossible. Suggestion that this official be given the title of Trade Commissioner.
157	4.8.1941 From Lamping	<i>Switzerland: Royal Decree A 1.</i> As Swiss government was not prepared to cooperate in implementation of A 1, Note should be dispatched reserving all rights and holding Switzerland responsible for any loss resulting therefrom.

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158	5.8.1941 To Loudon	<i>Lend-Lease Agreement.</i> Announcement of conclusion of agreement with the Netherlands preferably to be made by White House or State Department.
159	5.8.1941 From Loudon (Washington)	<i>Pacific policy.</i> Situation discussed with Welles. He considered consultation on implementation of American <i>embargo against Japan</i> impracticable on account of the constantly changing situation. USA warning to Japan that any move in southerly direction would be intolerable.
160	5.8.1941 Van Vredenburg	<i>Ratification of ADA and ADB reports.</i> Discussion between Van Bylandt, Hart, Leith-Ross and Van Vredenburg. Leith-Ross expected revision of the ill-conceived British standpoint of No. 149 following positive reaction of USA. <i>Pacific policy: embargo against Japan.</i> Leith-Ross admitted obscurity of British and American policy, but was working on positive British policy.
161	6.8.1941 From Michiels van Verduynen	<i>Australia: diplomatic relations with the Netherlands.</i> Australian government suggested calling the official in Batavia 'Agent General'. 'Consul General' was undesirable for internal reasons.
162	6.8.1941 From Michiels van Verduynen	<i>Ratification of ADA and ADB reports.</i> Bruce, angry at the fact that Australia had not been consulted about the declaration of No. 149 had asked for interview with Eden.
163	6.8.1941 From Schuller tot Peursum (Madrid)	<i>Spain: Cape Spartel.</i> Rights of Convention of 1865 reserved. Cabeza de Vaca called Spanish annexation a matter of secondary administrative importance.
164	6.8.1941 From Loudon (Washington)	<i>Pacific policy.</i> Co-operation with Halifax and Casey on Pacific problems was inadequate. With Welles and Hornbeck Loudon had discussed No. 153 and had endeavoured to assess firmness of US standpoint in regard to further Japanese expansion southwards.
165	7.8.1941 From Loudon (Washington)	<i>Atlantic Conference.</i> The writer did not expect results from <i>démarche</i> at Department of State regarding discussion of subjects relating to the Netherlands during possible meeting between Roosevelt and Churchill before decisions were made.
166	7.8.1941 From Loudon (Washington)	<i>Pacific Policy: embargo against Japan.</i> American oil embargo intensified. Exports of other strategic goods prohibited. No interference by US government in NEI oil policy by means of guidelines to US oil companies in NEI.

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No.	Date; from/to	Description
167	8.8.1941 From Loudon (Washington)	<i>Pacific policy: embargo against Japan.</i> USA had threatened Japan with complete embargo in the event of Japanese action against Thailand. Question of military aid could be discussed only between Roosevelt and Churchill.
168	8.8.1941 Van Kleffens	<i>Ratification of ADA and ADB reports.</i> Writer had expressed disappointment to Eden about No. 149 and had urged discussions between military authorities in preparation for possible cooperation, which Eden supported. <i>Pacific policy: embargo against Japan.</i> Implementation in accordance with common policy; Eden agreed with views expressed in No. 153.
169	8.8.1941 From Biddle	<i>USA: flying over Surinam and Antilles.</i> Interview requested regarding unlimited authorisation for US armed forces to fly over Surinam and Antilles.
170	10.8.1941 From Loudon (Washington)	<i>Surinam: defence.</i> US authorities considered protection of Surinam bauxite industry inadequate and urged strengthening of garrison. Failing this, independent action by USA could not be ruled out.
171	10.8.1941 From Loudon (Washington)	<i>USA: arms deliveries to NEI.</i> Hull would support request of No. 178 in War Department; support of British government highly desirable.
172	11.8.1941 From Van Starckenborgh to Welter (Batavia)	<i>Eastern Supply Council: membership of NEI.</i> In agreement with Van Mook's proposal for partial membership so as not to be dependent on the BPC for military and related orders outside the British Empire.
173	11.8.1941 From Van Starckenborgh to Welter (Batavia)	<i>France: consular representation in NEI.</i> Proposal that French Consul General, who had already arrived, be refused recognition and that consulate be transformed into 'office français'. What would be the relation between the 'office' and the power that would represent French interests in NEI?
174	11.8.1941 From Michiels van Verduynen	<i>Pacific policy.</i> Following Britain's refusal formally to ratify <i>ADA and ADB reports</i> the Netherlands was theoretically free, but in practice its fate was linked with that of Great Britain. <i>Embargo against Japan</i> might contribute to the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. Bruce had pressed for clarification of the US standpoint regarding the Pacific.
175	12.8.1941 Council of Ministers	<i>Defence of Surinam.</i> With reference to No. 170 discussion of ways and means of strengthening defence. Albarda suggested asking for US protection. Decision deferred. <i>Pacific policy.</i>

No.	Date; from/to	Description
176	12.8.1941 From Welter to Van Starkenborgh	Situation explained by Van Kleffens who together with Welter was trying to ensure that USA, Great Britain and the Netherlands would adopt a common policy towards Japan. <i>Embargo against Japan.</i> Summary of British and American embargo measures. As soon as the scope of these measures had been determined, further consultation to be held on Van Starkenborgh's proposals of No. 130A.
177	12.8.1941	<i>ADB-2 report.</i> Text of the ADB-1 (II, No. 371) report as adapted to the changed circumstances at the Atlantic Conference; all political clauses had been deleted.
178	12.8.1941 From Welter	<i>USA: arms deliveries to NEI.</i> Supported démarche at British government in conformity with Nos. 171 and 178A. Delivery of rifles and small-arms ammunition should also be urged.
178A	11.8.1941 From Van Starkenborgh to Welter (Batavia)	<i>USA: arms deliveries to NEI.</i> In view of threat of war, US government should be urged to expedite delivery of order of 162 bombers, whose operating range extended to Japanese air bases, since British and Dutch armed forces did not possess such aircraft.
179	12.8.1941 Law	<i>Inter-Allied meeting.</i> Michiels van Verduynen had inquired after plans for a subsequent meeting. The Netherlands Government considered the Inter-Allied Council to be a suitable venue for discussing practical and economic <i>post-war problems.</i>
180	13.8.1941 From Michiels van Verduynen	<i>Embargo against Japan.</i> Law did not feel that rigid enforcement of embargo would drive Japan to war.
181	13.8.1941 From H.M. The Queen to Roosevelt	<i>Queen's visit to USA</i> to discuss reconstruction of Europe and post-war world order postponed for the present owing to possible collapse of Germany. Suggestion that Beyen act as go-between for transmitting Roosevelt's ideas.
182	15.8.1941 Council of Ministers	<i>Pacific policy: joint warning to Japan.</i> With some hesitancy it was resolved that the Netherlands Government would associate itself with the American-British warning to Japan against further aggression which had been decided upon by Roosevelt and Churchill at their Atlantic Conference.
183	15.8.1941 To Loudon	<i>Ratification of ADB report.</i> US government to be informed of Netherlands' willingness to implement the report, and US standpoint to be elicited.

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No.	Date; from/to	Description
184	15.8.1941 From Welter to Van Starckenborgh	<i>Pacific policy.</i> Japan was prepared to negotiate a settlement in the Pacific with the USA on conditions favourable to Japan. USA prepared to negotiate for one month. US statement to Japan that any aggression during the negotiations could lead to war. The Netherlands were prepared to issue a statement as their response to any Japanese aggression only after USA and Great Britain had done so.
185	15.8.1941 To Welter	<i>Disappointment at non-ratification of ADA and ADB reports</i> to be made known to British government only if military consultation promised in No. 168 did not eventuate.
186	16.8.1941 To Albarda	<i>Egypt: KLM landing rights.</i> Advisable not to ask British government to mediate for extension of KLM's Batavia-Lyddá service to Cairo, as this might invite definite refusal.
187	18.8.1941 Van Troostenburg de Bruyn	<i>NSTC: Belgian cargoes.</i> Enclosure of No. 187A.
187A	14.8.1941	<i>NSTC: Belgian cargoes.</i> Implementation of Agreement of 20.7.1940, pertaining to transfer of goods and proceeds from goods carried aboard Netherlands ships for Belgian consignees and discharged in Great Britain after 10 May, was being held up by disputes regarding settlement of unpaid freight charges and other claims on the goods. Possible solution whereby transfer would be effected under guarantee of Belgian government that NSTC would be indemnified against all liability. Netherlands government would advise persons lodging claims to obtain settlement by means of arbitration.
188	18.8.1941 From Welter	<i>France: seizure of Dutch ships.</i> Van Kleffens disagreed with Van Starckenborgh's view that the threatened requisitioning of three Dutch ships by Vichy constituted insufficient legal grounds for Dutch retaliation against French ships. Vichy to be notified via Stockholm that if the French government did not release ships and crews within 14 days, Dutch retaliation would follow.
189	19.8.1941 Council of Ministers	<i>Defence of Surinam.</i> After three possibilities of strengthening the defence had been discussed, it was resolved to draw half of the 300 men needed from the Netherlands Legion in the UK, and the other half from the KNIL (Royal Netherlands East Indies Army) in the NEI.
190	19.8.1941 From Welter to Van Starckenborgh	<i>Surinam: defence.</i> Strengthening of the garrison was necessary as otherwise there was a chance of American or British troops being sent in.

No.	Date; from/to	Description
191	19.8.1941 From Hart	Thus it was in the national interest that 150 men of the KNIL (Royal Netherlands East Indies Army) be transferred to Surinam. <i>French North Africa: trade with USA.</i> It appeared from No. 191A that the British government could not persuade the US government to change its policy towards Vichy France.
191A	8.8.1941 From Lincoln to Hart	<i>French North Africa: trade with USA.</i> British navicerts were being issued for transport of goods by French ships to French North Africa from USA under the Franco-American Agreement. British government continued to regard this region as enemy territory.
192	20.8.1941 From Loudon (Washington)	<i>USA: arms deliveries to NEI.</i> In view of limited stocks and domestic policy implications, a renewed request for the delivery of small arms ammunition would serve little purpose. The writer recommended that delivery be urged via Churchill or Beaverbrook.
193	20.8.1941 From Van Starckenborgh to Welter (Batavia)	<i>USA: arms deliveries to NEI.</i> Mission from Manila investigating urgency of delivery of military equipment had gained favourable impression of preparations of NEI army and navy.
194	20.8.1941 From Welter	<i>China: trade with NEI.</i> Chinese proposal concerning consultations on improvement of trade relations was an attempt to revive the question of trade credits. Negotiations would serve a purpose only if political conditions in the Far East were such as to be conducive to normal trade between the two areas.
195	21.8.1941 From Steenberghe to Gerbrandy	<i>Royal Decree A 1.</i> The time was not yet ripe for action in the USA concerning the control of assets under A 1. In preparation for active control and the setting up of the necessary machinery the appointment of Kleyn Molenkamp as custodian for the USA was desirable. Control in other countries from London; cautious treatment of neutral countries and complete abstention in the case of <i>Switzerland</i> and <i>Sweden</i> .
196	20.8.1941 From Eden to Bland	<i>Pacific policy: joint warning to Japan.</i> Announcement of resolution contained in No 182. <i>Ratification of ADA and ADB-1 reports.</i> Van Kleffens had conceded that declaration of No. 149 had produced a negative effect in NEI and that fresh plans for military/technical co-operation with UK were now needed. Eden expressly requested that NEI be convinced of certainty of all possible British support in the event

No.	Date; from/to	Description
197	21.8.1941 From Bosch van Rosenthal (Berne)	of Japanese aggression. <i>Germany: exchange of honorary consuls with the Netherlands.</i> The consuls, who had been allowed to leave Germany, had not yet arrived in Switzerland, thus delaying the settlement of related matters.
198	21.8.1941 From Van Starckenborgh to Welter (Batavia)	<i>Australia: diplomatic relations with the Netherlands.</i> Appointment of diplomatic agent undesirable on account of China and Japan. Appointment of Agent General less difficult, provided his duties were clearly defined and made known.
199	21.8.1941 From Loudon(Washington)	<i>Pacific policy.</i> On being presented with note in conformity with No. 183 Welles had said that Roosevelt was pleased about British commitment towards NEI (No. 149). Roosevelt had threatened Nomura with war in the event of further Japanese southward expansion.
200	21.8.1941 Star Busmann	<i>NSTC: Belgian cargoes.</i> Suggestion for an arrangement differing from No. 187. In principle, claims to be settled after the war by arbitration, but possibility of involving the Court to be left open. Revenues now to be remitted to Belgian government, which would guarantee amounts that were subject to dispute.
201	21.8.1941 From Michiels van Verduynen	<i>Ratification of ADA and ADB reports.</i> Van Kleffens had contradicted intelligence received from Eden about disappointment in NEI at non-ratification by Britain and statement in No. 149.
202	21.8.1941 From Michiels van Verduynen	<i>Post-war relief: Europe.</i> Enclosure of No. 202A.
202A	20.8.1941 From Eden to Michiels van Verduynen	<i>Post-war relief: Europe.</i> Invitation to meeting of Allied governments on food and raw materials aid to Europe after the liberation. Coordination and organization of relief to be in the hands of a British office headed by Leith-Ross in consultation with representatives of Allied governments.
203	22.8.1941 From Loudon (Washington)	<i>USA: coffee imports.</i> Dutch percentage in volume of non-signatories fixed at 36.77.
204	22.8.1941 From Lamping	<i>Dealings in Dutch securities.</i> Loudon to be instructed to enter into discussions with State Department concerning the sale of Dutch-owned shares in the USA in contravention of <i>Royal Decree A 1</i> . Consideration should be given to invalidation of all certificates held

No.	Date; from/to	Description
205	22.8.1941 From Bentinck van Schoonheten (Cairo)	outside the territory of the Kingdom and to a ban on importing them after the liberation. <i>Egypt: closure of Netherlands consulates.</i> Bentinck had pressed for reopening of Netherlands consulates, which in practice were carrying on normally. He was not keen on the British Embassy's suggestion that an interim solution could be found by moving a subdivision of the chancellery to Alexandria and establishing consular agencies in the Canal Zone.
206	22.8.1941 From Welter to Albarda	<i>Egypt: KLM landing rights.</i> Contrary to No. 186 the writer suggested communicating to British government strong desire of the Netherlands to extend KLM's Batavia-Lyddá line to Cairo, with reference to <i>KLM cooperation with British airlines</i> on the basis of reciprocity.
207	23.8.1941 From Van Angeren	<i>Great Britain: Royal Decree A 1.</i> Information required about recently published decree laying down that permission from the Treasury was required for control of ex-enemy accounts. This could affect implementation of A 1 after recognition by British government.
208	25.8.1941 To Masaryk	<i>Czechoslovakia.</i> Netherlands government recognised Beneš as President of the Czechoslovakian Republic.
209	25.8.1941 To Gerbrandy	<i>Royal Decree B 30 (enemy territory): application to Finland.</i> Proposal to apply B 30 provisions relating to economic warfare to Finland, which was fighting with Germany against the USSR.
210	25.8.1941 From Michiels van Verduynen	<i>Pacific policy.</i> No. 199 had been read out to Eden; astonishment at the word 'commitment'. Text of Roosevelt's statement to Nomura not yet known at Foreign Office.
211	25.8.1941 Strang	<i>Inter-Allied Meeting.</i> Netherlands Government requested postponement of meeting owing to lack of time needed to study draft resolution of No. 202A.
212	26.8.1941 Council of Ministers	<i>Defence of Surinam.</i> Welter opposed to the the 'Van Kinsbergen' being placed under the command of the British CIC West Indies as the ship was needed for the defence of Surinam. Furstner would discuss the matter with the Admiralty. Inter-allied meeting on <i>post-war relief</i> postponed; meeting on <i>Atlantic Charter</i> was being prepared; Van Kleffens would inquire about meaning of item 4. <i>Loadline Convention.</i> Agreement in principle with Anglo-American

No.	Date; from/to	Description
213	28.8.1941 From Van Starkenborgh to Welter (Batavia)	proposal for deeper loading of ocean-going ships, but decision regarding application to Dutch ships had to rest with Netherlands authorities. <i>Germans interned in NEI.</i> Objection to departure of elderly internees because of possible aid to enemy in the event of Japanese attack on NEI.
214	28.8.1941 To Welter	<i>Pacific policy.</i> There was no doubt about the accuracy of the information in No. 199. Roosevelt's statement to Nomura had probably been oral.
215	28.8.1941 From Welter	<i>Embargo against Japan.</i> Loudon to explain to State Department that clarity concerning the real extent of the American oil embargo against Japan was urgently required, since further postponement of certain NEI deliveries was impossible. NEI was prepared to cooperate in further intensification of the oil embargo by means of freezing orders, provided a firm line of conduct was decided upon, as this offered the best chance of success with Japan.
216	28.8.1941 To Welter (draft)	<i>Royal Decree B 30 (A 6): application to France.</i> Proposal for application to unoccupied France and certain colonies, because operational sphere of A 6 was wider than that of the measures in force in the overseas territories, as a result of which these French territories were de facto being treated as enemy territory.
217	29.8.1941 To Michiels van Verduynen	<i>Atlantic Charter.</i> Before replying to No. 217A, Van Kleffens wished to know whether he was right in his view that the operational scope of the Ottawa agreements was not linked to joint access to raw materials.
217A	28.8.1941 From Welter	<i>Atlantic Charter.</i> Atlantic Charter and Ottawa agreements had different points of departure, viz. access to trade and raw materials on equal terms, imperial preference and discrimination. Further consideration of support of Atlantic Charter by the Netherlands was therefore desirable.
218	29.8.1941 From Michiels van Verduynen	<i>Embargo against Japan.</i> According to Sterndale Bennett it was impossible at that moment to fix ways and means of modifying the embargo. No change to be made in the embargo without prior consultation, but uncertain whether US would agree to this.

No.	Date; from/to	Description
219	29.8.1941 From Michiels van Verduynen	<i>Thailand: oil deliveries</i> from NEI were to be continued in view of the changed circumstances, though no rubber was available for export to Malaya.
220	29.8.1941 From Welter	<i>Royal Decree B 30 (enemy territory): application to Finland.</i> The writer was in favour of ending all commercial and financial transactions with Finland, but against demonstrative declaration in conformity with B 30 as suggested in No. 209.
221	29.8.1941 Sterndale Bennett	<i>Far East: embargo against Japan.</i> Report of discussion with Teixeira de Mattos on prior determination of possibility of modifying the embargo and on Anglo-American-Netherlands consultation on this point.
222	30.8.1941 From Loudon (Washington)	<i>Embargo against Japan.</i> Payment for oil exports from frozen assets in USA prohibited; only with free dollars. The same policy line requested of NEI. Imports from Japan to be ended in connection with barter position. Specification of absolutely essential imports from Japan requested.
223	30.8.1941 From Pabst (Tokyo)	<i>NEI: embargo against Japan.</i> Amau had inquired whether the conditions mentioned by Van Hoogstraten for the delivery of oil by NEI had been approved by government in London. Resumption of oil deliveries requested, as landing of troops in Indo-China was directed against China, not NEI. Open Japanese declaration to this effect impossible. Embargo had increased chance of conflict.
224	1.9.1941 From Kielstra to Welter (Paramaribo)	<i>Surinam: defence.</i> On rumour about German raider's intention of action against bauxite industry, Trinidad had been asked for aid.
225	1.9.1941 From Michiels van Verduynen to Eden	<i>Post-war relief for Europe.</i> Netherlands Government in agreement with draft resolution of No. 202A, on condition that the Netherlands would transport stocks already accumulated to the Netherlands in its own ships. The bureau would have to be interallied instead of purely British.
226	1.9.1941 To all Heads of Mission	<i>Netherlands Consular Service.</i> Imperative that the government could rely on the complete loyalty of all honorary consular officials. Officials of enemy nationality and pro-German sympathisers had been dismissed. Instructions to investigate whether, especially among naturalised Germans, there were persons who did not merit full confidence and to nominate them

No.	Date; from/to	Description
227	1.9.1941 From Roosevelt to Queen Wilhelmina (Washington)	for dismissal, even if it was not possible to fill the posts. <i>Surinam: stationing of American troops.</i> 65 per cent of bauxite needed for US war industry came from Surinam. As protection of these mines was inadequate, Roosevelt suggested sending 3000 American troops there.
228	2.9.1941 Council of Ministers	<i>Surinam: defence.</i> Agreement with British Admiralty's proposal to place H.M.S. Van Kinsbergen under the command of the C.i.C. West Indies. 60 men of the Netherlands Brigade would sail on her for Surinam. Inter-allied meeting on the <i>Atlantic Charter</i> postponed. <i>Pacific policy: joint warning to Japan.</i> Vis-à-vis Nomura Roosevelt had not used the agreed phrase 'even if it should lead to war'.
229	2.9.1941 From Welter to Van Starckenborgh	<i>Germans interned in NEI.</i> No practical objections to departure of majority of older internees, although this could be delayed owing to transport difficulties.
230	2.9.1941 From Michiels van Verduynen	<i>Atlantic Charter.</i> View expressed in No. 217 was correct. Reference to Ottawa agreements in Atlantic Charter was not based on sinister British ulterior motives, but on Churchill's responsibilities towards the dominions.
231	2.9.1941 From Michiels van Verduynen	<i>Pacific policy.</i> Cadogan not acquainted with the exact text of the statement made by Roosevelt to Nomura on 17.8. British decision regarding similar statement in Tokyo was expected shortly.
232	2.9.1941 From Sevenster (Vichy)	<i>France: Offices néerlandais.</i> German Government was putting pressure on Vichy to close down the Offices néerlandais, claiming that they were merely consulates in disguise. Sevenster feared that he would be faced with closure as a fait accompli. Continuation of present work through the supporting committee could only be of a temporary nature. Decision requested regarding <i>French consular representation in colonies.</i>
233	3.9.1941 From Loudon (Washington)	<i>USA: coffee imports.</i> Authorisation requested for submitting to the State Department, in accordance with the Foreign Office's preference, joint note for implementation of proposal of No. 114.
234	3.9.1941 From Welter to Van Starckenborgh	<i>NEI: exports to China.</i> Within the context of economic measures against Japan, the British government had formulated its policy as regards exports to occupied China and Shanghai: trade

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235	4.9.1941 Council of Ministers	restricted to transactions for which licences had been granted; foreign currency would then be furnished automatically. No licences for goods likely to strengthen Japan's war potential. Recommendation that the same rules be applied to NEI exports in consultation with representatives in China and Shanghai. <i>Surinam: stationing of American troops.</i> Discussion of No. 227. According to Welter, the Netherlands could not send the forces the US considered necessary for guarding the bauxite mines. Proposal to be accepted after consultation with Great Britain. Van Kleffens and other ministers were in agreement, provided supreme command rested with the Governor. Stationing of US troops conditional upon their departure once strength of Netherlands forces in Surinam was adequate. It was resolved to accept the proposal. Cost of stationing chargeable to the Netherlands.
236	4.9.1941 From Elink Schuurman (Sydney)	<i>Australia: diplomatic relations with the Netherlands.</i> Bruce would deal with the matter in London. For Batavia Australia preferred Agent General, but if necessary would agree to Consul General.
237	4.9.1941 From Van Starckenborgh to Welter (Batavia)	<i>Far East: embargo against Japan.</i> Policy of USA, Great Britain and the Netherlands towards Japan had to be clear-cut. Embargo measures not to be weakened by easing up on freezing decree. Fixing of dummy quotas for exports likewise advised against.
238	4.9.1941 From H.M. The Queen to Roosevelt	<i>Surinam: stationing of American troops.</i> The danger of enemy action against the bauxite mines was recognised and arrangements had been made to strengthen the Netherlands garrison. As the arrival of Dutch troops in Surinam would take some time, the offer to station American troops there was accepted, provided they left Surinam not later than upon the termination of hostilities.
239	4.9.1941 To Biddle	<i>Surinam: stationing of American troops.</i> Enclosure of No. 239A which together with No. 238 constituted the Netherlands's reply to No. 227.
239A		<i>Surinam: stationing of American troops.</i> American troops to leave Surinam upon termination of hostilities at the latest; the troops to be under Netherlands command; payment by the Netherlands; their task was to guard bauxite

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No.	Date; from/to	Description
240	4.9.1941 From Van Boetzelaer van Oosterhout (Washington)	mines and transports. <i>USA.</i> On Labour Day Roosevelt had exhorted the nation to greater effort, because the USSR's entry into the war did not ensure victory for the Allies. Press reactions to this. US Government in favour of a vigorous anti-Axis policy, but public opinion was still opposed to this. Roosevelt was not prepared to practice appeasement of Japan at the expense of China or NEI. Chances of settling Japanese-American disputes considered slender.
241	5.9.1941 From Loudon (Washington)	<i>China: foreign exchange policy.</i> Loudon had passed on to Van Starckenborgh request from Department of State that Dutch banks should adhere to the China Stabilisation Board's regulations for foreign currency transactions.
242	5.9.1941 To Welter	<i>ADB-2.</i> Furstner had received the during the Atlantic Conference amended and approved text of ADB-1 (II, No. 371). Suggested that Furstner should reply that the Netherlands Naval Command was adopting this text.
243	5.9.1941 From Sterndale Bennett to Michiels van Verduynen	<i>Ratification of ADA, ADB-1 and BD reports.</i> Reports did not lend themselves to ratification, only to approval by the governments concerned. Political arrangements outside the competence of the conference. Proposal that preparations for implementing the military clauses be commenced and that a procedure for political consultation in cases of necessary collective action as referred to in II, No. 253, paras. 23-27, be worked out.
244	5.9.1941 From Kielstra to Welter (Paramaribo)	<i>Defence of Surinam.</i> Enclosure of No. 244A. Strengthening of Surinam defences with aircraft and ships was essential to forestall American demand for use of bases.
244A	5.9.1941 From Kielstra to Loudon (Paramaribo)	<i>Defence of Surinam.</i> Kielstra had urged Hobbs to expedite delivery of arms ordered in the USA for the defence of Surinam. Dispatch of US troops without agreement between governments impossible. Hobbs had stressed importance of Surinam bauxite mines for war production. Writer had refused to supply maps of bauxite enterprises. Loudon should press US authorities for arms deliveries.
245	5.9.1941 From Steel to Teixeira de Mattos	<i>USA: coffee imports.</i> From consultation with American authorities it had become apparent that the draft memorandum from the British, Belgian and Netherlands governments concerning larger quotas of US coffee imports would

No.	Date; from/to	Description
246	5.9.1941 From Leith-Ross to Sargent	have to be supplemented on account of South American coffee producers. <i>Post-war relief for Europe.</i> Enclosure of No. 246A. Proposed new text of No. 246A para. (6) to meet Netherlands wishes regarding internationalisation of the Bureau.
246A	4.9.1941	<i>Post-war relief for Europe.</i> Discussion with Lamping of No. 225. Netherlands Government intended to reserve shipping space only for transport of relief goods required immediately in the Netherlands on the basis of fixed norms. The writer had explained to Lamping that the question of relief for Germany and Italy had not yet arisen. Discussion of Netherlands suggestions for amendment of No. 202A, paras. 2 (national relief activities) and 6 (Inter-Allied instead of British Bureau), text of which was enclosed.
247	6.9.1941 From Welter	<i>Atlantic Charter.</i> Principle of access to world trade on equal terms was irreconcilable with imperial preference of Ottawa agreements. Neither could there be access to raw materials on equal terms if Ottawa agreements were retained, since currency for buying raw materials in British territories was more difficult to earn by exporting to British territories, as was customary in international trading. Hence adherence to the Atlantic Charter could present problems in the future.
248	7.9.1941 From Loudon (Washington)	<i>Far East: embargo against Japan.</i> Hull was opposed to any change in the oil embargo for the present. Acheson favoured unity of policy between USA, Great Britain and NEI.
249	8.9.1941 From Teixeira de Mattos	<i>Great Britain: application of Royal Decree A 1.</i> Enclosure of Nos. 249AB. British ministries involved were sharply divided in their views.
249A	5.9.1941 From Makins to Michiels van Verduynen	<i>Great Britain: application of Royal Decree A 1.</i> Early reply to No. 116 to be expected. Netherlands Custodian for A 1 had instructed several British firms to settle with him their debts to persons in occupied Netherlands, in contravention of the British Trading with the Enemy Act. Pending the outcome of the negotiations regarding application of British Act and A 1, Custodian to be instructed to refrain from further action of this kind.
249B	5.9.1941 From Strang to Michiels van Verduynen	<i>Great Britain: application of Royal Decree A 1.</i> Measures were required to prevent the Netherlands Custodian's action leading to controversy

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No.	Date; from/to	Description
		between the two governments. The Custodian had to restore the status quo ante because of the danger that in legal proceedings doubt might be cast on the validity of the Netherlands Royal Decree.
250	8.9.1941 From Weyerman to Van Starckenborgh (Washington)	<i>Far East.</i> According to Military Intelligence Department the situation in the Far East had improved. Japan desired rapprochement with the USA. Information requested on oil exports from NEI to Japan since 1.8.1941.
251	9.9.1941 Council of Ministers	<i>Surinam: stationing of American troops.</i> After discussion with Hobbs, Kielstra feared that USA would assume responsibility for protection of bauxite mines if Netherlands Government failed to take timely measures.
252	9.9.1941 From Lamping	<i>Post-war relief for Europe.</i> Lamping had discussed Nos. 202 and 225 with Leith-Ross. He had raised objection to wording of resolution, which allowed scope for eventual extension of relief to what were at present enemy territories, such as Romania, Austria and Italy. According to Lamping, British opposition to amendments proposed by the Netherlands arose from British desire to act for and on behalf of Europe in negotiations with the USA. Most stubborn opponent of an inter-allied rather than a British bureau was Leith-Ross.
253	10.9.1941 From Loudon (Washington)	<i>USA: assets of Netherlands Bank.</i> Now that US Bank Act had been amended, Loudon suggested that the enforcement of real rights under KB A 1 should be arranged by means of discussions before the USA entered the war regarding the action expected to be taken by then by the Custodian of Enemy Property.
254	10.9.1941 From Loudon (Washington)	<i>Far East.</i> Press reports about a compromise between USA and Japan in the matter of trade between the two countries were unfounded.
255	10.9.1941 Van Bylandt	<i>Mexico: oil conflict.</i> In the course of discussions between USA and Mexico regarding compensation arrangement for property of US oil companies confiscated by Mexico in 1938, Mexico had promised that British companies would receive the same treatment. Compliance with British request for démarche in Washington in conformity with No. 255B.
255A	10.9.1941 From Teixeira de Mattos	<i>Mexico: oil conflict.</i> Discussion at Foreign Office. For political reasons US wished to settle oil dispute with Mexico. Great Britain was prepared, in conformity with US suggestion, to

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255B	9.9.1941 From Eden to Halifax	restore diplomatic relations with Mexico in the hope that in resolving the conflict USA would be prepared to present a common front with Britain. <i>Mexico: oil conflict.</i> Halifax to inquire what compensation arrangement USA wished to reach with Mexico. Resumption of the oil companies' operations in Mexico was not to be made absolutely impossible.
256	10.9.1941 From Van Boetelaer van Oosterhout (Washington)	<i>International Wheat Conference.</i> Enclosure of No. 256A. British Government should be asked for further details. Fresh steps to procure admission of the Netherlands as an observer were useless, but it would be advisable to press in Washington and London for further talks with representatives of allied importing countries, notably the Netherlands; about stockpiling for post-war relief. Further instructions requested.
256A	10.9.1941 From Peters	<i>International Wheat Conference.</i> Conference had divided post-war period into emergency period, during which sales of wheat in Europe would have the nature of relief, and a period of restoration of normal commercial sales aimed at division of the world wheat market, coupled with a production arrangement for exporting countries. The contents of the proposal regarding the wheat policy of the importing countries had not been disclosed.
257	10.9.1941 From Steenberghe to Council of Ministers	<i>Relief for occupied Netherlands.</i> It was necessary to put a stop to reports about differences of opinion within the Cabinet concerning relief for the occupied Netherlands. Discussions with British Government regarding II, No. 112 had not produced results. Summary of arguments which might moderate Britain's completely negative attitude. Humanitarian considerations, such as maintaining public health at a minimum permissible level, had also to be taken into account, although winning the war merited top priority. After comments on German food policy in occupied territory, Steenberghe put forward a limited relief plan for children up to the age of 21, pregnant women and nursing mothers; this plan should be discussed with British Government after approval by Council of Ministers. Press reports had indicated that British Government was supporting relief for occupied Greece.

No.	Date; from/to	Description
258	10.9.1941 From Loudon (Nonquitt, Mass.)	<i>Pacific policy.</i> From various indications Loudon had concluded that the territorial integrity of NEI would be at risk if Great Britain had its own way. Roosevelt, on the other hand, seemed inclined to allow the Netherlands more right of say than other small allied countries. For that reason contact with USA at ministerial level should be intensified. It would therefore be better to hold peace conference in USA. Inclusion of Republicans in US delegation was desirable. Netherlands views on post-war policy concerning Germany should now be made known to Roosevelt, before Washington and London presented their <i>policy for Germany</i> as an accomplished fact.
259	11.9.1941 To Pabst	<i>Japan.</i> Oshima's visit to occupied Netherlands considered discourteous towards Netherlands Government.
260	11.9.1941 From Welter	<i>Far East: embargo against Japan.</i> Enclosure of No. 260A with request that Pabst be instructed accordingly.
260A	8.9.1941 From Van Starckenborgh to Welter (Batavia)	<i>Far East: embargo against Japan.</i> Van Starckenborgh had once again explained to Ishizawa that there was a ban on exports to Japan of goods that increased Japan's war potential. Economic elaboration of this principle was Batavia's prerogative while London reserved the right to decide in political matters.
261	12.9.1941 To Loudon	<i>USA: coffee imports.</i> Request for explanation of the purpose of the note suggested in No. 233, as according to reports from NEI and Surinam, imports were regulated satisfactorily.
262	12.9.1941 From Van Starckenborgh to Welter (Batavia)	<i>Germans interned in NEI.</i> Reply to No. 229. In the event of invasion Japan might use older German internees, whom it was intended to expel, as interpreters and guides. Van Starckenborgh suggested deferring settlement on account of transport difficulties if there was no reply to No. 213.
263	12.9.1941 To Gerbrandy	<i>Great Britain: Royal Decree A 1.</i> In No. 249A British Government had overlooked the fact that it had already recognised A 1 and that an arrangement had to be made only for enforcement of the right of control by the Netherlands Government in connection with the Trading With the Enemy Act. Standpoint of No. 116 should be maintained. What was stated in the British note about amounts collected by

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264	12.9.1941 From Fein (Singapore)	the Custodian would have to be carefully investigated. The writer suggested that the Foreign Office be informed that pending arrangement, the Custodian had been instructed in accordance with No. 249A. <i>Great Britain: co-operation in Far East.</i> Duff Cooper's task was to bring about more effective co-ordination of British and Commonwealth agencies in Far East and closer contact with, inter alia, NEI. Fein had furnished information about co-operation between NEI and Singapore. Duff Cooper wished to call upon Van Starckenborgh.
265	13.9.1941 From Van Starckenborgh to Welter (Batavia)	<i>Far East: embargo against Japan.</i> The writer had pressed Grady for unabated continuation of embargo and contact between the respective governments regarding enforcement. He had stressed that embargo must not be directed against the needs of the Japanese people. <i>Talks between USA and Japan.</i> According to Grady no attempt was being made to appease Japan. Information on progress of talks was necessary to enable the Netherlands to keep clear of the conflict of interests of the great powers.
266	13.9.1941 From Welter	<i>Far East: embargo against Japan.</i> Enclosure of Nos. 266 ABC.
266A		<i>Far East: embargo against Japan.</i> Desirous of a clear-cut embargo policy towards Japan, NEI wanted export quotas to be fixed and announced in mutual consultation between NEI, USA and Great Britain. Uncertainty about imports could incite Japan to aggression against NEI. List of quotas for 29 products enclosed.
266B	11.9.1941 From Hart to Welter	<i>Far East: embargo against Japan.</i> Discussion of No. 266A with Leith-Ross et al. Britain was in principle opposed to any trade with Japan. Leaving Japan in uncertainty regarding the possibility of imports might bring about a change in Japan's foreign policy. Announcement of proposed small quota by NEI would encourage Japanese aggression. Netherlands approval of British standpoint requested. Uniform embargo policy impeded by lack of prior consultation with USA.
266C	13.9.1941 To Loudon	<i>Far East: embargo against Japan.</i> American oil policy towards Japan fully understood by Van Kleffens and Batavia. NEI prepared to adapt oil exports quotas to US standards, provided

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267	14.9.1941 From Pabst (Tokyo)	these were clear. Subsequent changes only after mutual consultation. British Government not informed of definitive American plans. <i>Far East: embargo against Japan.</i> Toyoda had suggested exporting rubber from NEI to Japan in exchange for already contracted exports to NEI.
268	15.9.1941 To Michiels van Verduynen	<i>Egypt: KLM landing rights.</i> In connection with II, No. 360, Van Starckenborgh, Welter and Albarda had pleaded making an official approach to the British Government. A carefully worded Note was therefore to be presented to the Foreign Office, emphasising allied interest in KLM's Batavia-Lyddda route and the temporary nature of Cairo as a terminal. Michiels van Verduynen was to insist on application of the principle of reciprocity in treatment of KLM and British airlines, in view of suspicion that British Government was using war situation to improve post-war competitive position.
269	16.9.1941 From Pabst (Tokyo)	<i>Far East: embargo against Japan.</i> Japanese Government regretted that confidential statements by Van Hoogstraten to Ishizawa had led to official démarche of No. 223. Enquiries as to when Japanese oil tankers would be able to sail from NEI.
270	16.9.1941 From Leith-Ross to Sargent	<i>Post-war relief for Europe.</i> Re-wording of para. 6 of draft resolution (see No. 202) discussed with Lamping. New version substituted a steering committee for an Inter-Allied bureau. Foreign Office's view requested.
271	17.9.1941 Council of Ministers	<i>Relief for the occupied Netherlands.</i> Proposal of No. 257 concerning limited relief approved. Gerbrandy against relief during the war. Information from Van Kleffens on disturbances in <i>Japanese-Dutch relations.</i>
272	17.9.1941 From Van Boetzelaer van Oosterhout (Washington)	<i>Far East: embargo against Japan.</i> USA embargo policy was not insincere. Trade with Japan had been brought to a halt and stern attitude was expected to persist. Restriction of NEI exports to Japan requested.
273	17.9.1941 From Albarda to Gerbrandy	<i>Diplomatic relations between USSR and the Netherlands.</i> Albarda had long time considered it an abuse that diplomatic relations had not been established with the USSR. The main reason for this had been fear of communist propaganda in the NEI. Now that the Netherlands and the USSR were allies this would have to change.

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274	17.9.1941 From Eden to Bland	In view of the peace conference this was in the Netherlands' own interest. <i>Restoration of diplomatic relations with the Holy See</i> should be effected simultaneously. <i>Atlantic Charter</i> . Rejection of Van Kleffens' proposal that an interpretative statement be made at the Inter-Allied meeting of 24.9. regarding free access to raw materials 'with due respect to existing obligations' under the Ottawa agreements, but Van Kleffens was encouraged to make such a statement himself on behalf of the Netherlands Government.
275	17.9.1941 From Eden to Bland	<i>Post-war relief for Europe</i> . In response to Van Kleffens' plea for an Inter-Allied Bureau (cf. No. 246A) Eden had said that this matter would be arranged in a manner satisfactory to all concerned.
276	18.9.1941 From Welter	<i>ITC: extension of 1937 Tin Agreement</i> . Request for No. 276A to be sent to Van den Broek via Loudon.
276A	17.9.1941 From Welter to Van Starckenborgh	<i>ITC: extension of 1937 Tin Agreement</i> . Minutes of meeting of 16.9. concerning extension by 5 years. Standard tonnages of 1937 increased by 8.5 per cent. Thailand wanted higher standard tonnage. Acceptance of NEI proposal for sanctions if permitted export quota was exceeded.
277	19.9.1941 From Van Boetzelaer van Oosterhout to Van Starckenborgh (Washington)	<i>Far East: embargo against Japan</i> . No certainty regarding US embargo in the near future. No change likely before end of secret talks between Roosevelt and Nomura. Questions about application of NEI freezing decree and imports from Japan of goods essential for the population.
278	19.9.1941 To Eden	<i>Post-war relief for Europe</i> . Netherlands Government stuck to proposed amendments to draft resolution concerning possibility of independent relief action (cf. No. 252) as present wording could present Government with difficulties in occupied territory.
279	19.9.1941 From Lamping	<i>Post-war relief for Europe: Czechoslovakia</i> . Enclosure of No. 279A.
279A	17.9.1941 From Philipse	<i>Post-war relief for Europe: Czechoslovakia</i> . Discussion with Erban about post-war supplies for Czechoslovakia via Rotterdam with Dutch ships, based on Czechoslovakian Government's own relief programme. Aid promised in principle. Transit trade to Czechoslovakia via port of Rotterdam would become important again

No.	Date; from/to	Description
280	19.9.1941 From Leith-Ross to Hart	after the war, and its transfer elsewhere, for instance to Antwerp, should be prevented. <i>Far East: embargo against Japan.</i> Great Britain had in principle stopped trading with Japan, except for a few commodities not obtainable elsewhere. The Dominions had been requested to take over this policy. Urgent request to NEI to drop intention of informing Tokyo of quotas after these had been fixed, as this did not accord with Anglo-American policy.
281	19.9.1941 From Biddle	<i>USA.</i> Request for permanent permission for American military flights over NEI.
282	20.9.1941 From Makins to Michiels van Verduynen	<i>Organisation and deployment of Netherlands armed forces in Britain.</i> Agreed in principle with amendments suggested in No. 82, but had submitted different text of articles in question. Enclosure of totally revised draft text.
283	20.9.1941 From Makins	<i>Post-war relief for Europe.</i> Writer had explained to Teixeira de Mattos that the Netherlands proposal concerning the express stipulation in No. 202A of the possibility of independent national relief operations undermined the basis for a joint approach to relief. He repeated Eden's suggestion that the statement to be made on behalf of the Netherlands Government at the Inter-Allied meeting on 24.9. should contain reservations in accordance with the contents of the amendments.
284	20.9.1941	<i>Post-war relief for Europe.</i> Report on Lamping's discussion with Hurcomb on the use of Netherlands merchant ships for the transport of relief goods. Netherlands Government's sole restrictive condition was that its own relief goods were to be shipped to the Netherlands as soon as it resumed government of the country after liberation. This point had been agreed upon by the British and Netherlands Governments.
285	21.9.1941 From Kasteel to Gerbrandy	<i>Diplomatic relations between USSR and the Netherlands.</i> Summary of reasons why the Netherlands had declined to establish diplomatic relations in the past. A new element was the fact that the Netherlands were now fighting with the USSR against Germany, and that trade relations were being maintained with the Government's knowledge.
286	22.9.1941 From Van Starckenborgh to Welter (Batavia)	<i>France: consular representation in NEI.</i> No objection to the establishment of a French agent operating under a protecting power after clo-

No.	Date; from/to	Description
287	22.9.1941 From Roosevelt to Queen Wilhelmina	<p>sure of the French consulate general.</p> <p><i>Surinam: stationing of American troops.</i> In agreement with conditions of No. 238. In connection with American neutrality, American troops could not be placed under Netherlands command; they would co-operate with Netherlands authorities in defending the bauxite mines under general Netherlands direction. The Netherlands should invite Brazil on the same conditions to participate at least nominally because of Inter-American agreements in the Havana Convention. No objection to prior notification the British Government.</p>
288	23.9.1941 Council of Ministers	<p>Statement concerning point 4 of the <i>Atlantic Charter</i> to be made at Inter-Allied meeting on 24.9. approved. No objection to draft resolution on <i>post-war relief</i>, provided use of stocks laid out by the Netherlands was guaranteed. <i>Surinam: stationing of US troops.</i> Announcement of No. 287, which would be discussed at next meeting. <i>NEI: embargo against Japan</i> not to be weakened because of unfavourable effect this would have on public opinion in USA and Great Britain.</p>
289	23.9.1941 From Van Starckenborgh to Welter (Batavia)	<p>During talk with Duff Cooper the writer had stressed the need for the Netherlands and Britain to be kept informed about <i>US-Japanese talks</i>. Notwithstanding War Cabinet's refusal to ratify ADA and ADB reports, Duff Cooper was convinced of need for British-Netherlands solidarity in the Far East. Van Starckenborgh had stated that joint action by the Netherlands and Great Britain in any war against Japan was inevitable; the consequences of future Japanese penetration in Thailand were discussed at length as <i>casus belli</i>.</p>
290	23.9.1941 Van Troostenburg de Bruyn	<p><i>France: consular representation in NEI.</i> Netherlands consulates in Indo China to be closed, and transformation of French consulate general in Batavia into 'office français' permitted so long as 'offices néerlandais' in France remained open.</p>
291	24.9.1941 From Van Angeren	<p><i>Great Britain: application of Royal Decree A 1.</i> Reply to No. 263. Recognition of legality of A 1 as Netherlands law left question of its judicial application vis-à-vis British creditors on British territory to the discretion of British Courts. In matters referred to in No. 249A, Netherlands Custodian had gone too far. Bri-</p>

No.	Date; from/to	Description
292	24.9.1941 From Van Embden to Bolkestein	<p>tish Government should be pressed for early finalisation of application of A 1 because meanwhile the chances of implementing it in neutral countries were steadily diminishing. <i>Diplomatic relations between USSR and the Netherlands.</i> In view of the common war with Germany and the need for mutual trust among the Allies, the establishment of diplomatic relations with the USSR was called for. Nor did international law any longer present obstacles to this step. Ideological considerations could not be allowed to play a part. Fear of communist propaganda in NEI was unfounded. After the war, the Netherlands Parliament would certainly approve the decision.</p>
293	24.9.1941 Inter-allied meeting	<p><i>Atlantic Charter.</i> Subscribed to by allied governments. The Netherlands made a reservation in respect of point 4. <i>Post-war relief.</i> Resolution regarding joint relief adopted. The Netherlands made a reservation in respect of stocks already purchased. USSR opposed to the exclusively British nature of the bureau of the Committee on Post-war Requirements (Leith-Ross Committee). Primary task was to draw up an inventory of post-war requirements. USA prepared to participate in relief.</p>
294	25.9.1941 To Loudon	<p><i>Royal Decree A 6: Philips N. V.</i> Philips' contact with occupied territory could be regulated only on the basis of the proposal contained in No. 40.</p>
295	25.9.1941 To Steenberghe	<p><i>Mexico: oil conflict.</i> In negotiations concerning compensation for nationalised property of American oil companies in Mexico, Netherlands interests had not been discussed. Serious doubts whether a better settlement was attainable for Royal Dutch Shell subsidiaries than for American companies.</p>
296	26.9.1941 From Van Starckenborgh to Welter (Batavia)	<p><i>Australia: Pacific policy.</i> Request for support for Australian pressure on London to reinforce British fleet in East Asia with battleships.</p>
297	26.9.1941 From Van Starckenborgh to Loudon (Batavia)	<p><i>Far East: embargo against Japan.</i> Oil exports from NEI to Japan halted for the time being. Basis for restricting trade with Japan was the permissibility of exports from NEI, not the needs of the NEI population. Arrangements had been made for payment of incidental barter transactions.</p>
298	26.9.1941 From Welter	<p><i>Eastern Group Supply Council.</i> This was a mainly British led organisation of British</p>

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		dominions and colonies east of Suez for co-ordinating contributions to the war effort. Exhaustive discussion of military, economic and political pros and cons of NEI membership, notably the question whether specific NEI interests would be in danger of being subordinated to British interests. Welter advocated associate membership, with constructive co-operation being conditional upon frank discussion of affairs.
299	27.9.1941 From Van Boetzelaer van Oosterhout (Washington)	<i>Far East: embargo against Japan.</i> Discussion with Acheson: embargo policy would not be changed without prior consultation of the Netherlands.
300	27.9.1941 Van Bylandt	<i>Ratification of ADA and ADB reports.</i> According to No. 289 ratification appeared to have been refused owing to opposition of the Admiralty. Furstner would now in consultation with Pound investigate whether in a limited number of cases the Anglo-Netherlands alliance against Japan could automatically become operative. Possibility of ensuring rapid reporting in an emergency was being examined.
301	27.9.1941 Van Troostenburg de Bruyn	<i>France: seizure of Netherlands ships.</i> Vichy had rejected Netherlands demand for release of Netherlands ships and crews in Africa, but had not requisitioned the vessels. If the Netherlands were to requisition the 'Dupleix' and to intern her crew, France might do the same by way of reprisal. The original plan was for the Netherlands to proceed to reprisals in response to French measures.
302	27.9.1941 From Eden	<i>Far East: embargo against Japan.</i> Van Kleffens' proposal for the setting up of a non-official co-ordination committee to direct embargo against Japan with seat in Washington had been held over on account of No. 280.
303	29.9.1941 Council of Ministers	<i>Surinam: stationing of American troops.</i> Discussion of No. 287. Welter was opposed to inviting Brazil to send troops in view of possible request from Venezuela with regard to Curaçao. His suggestion that stationing of US troops now be rejected was considered impracticable by the other ministers. At Van Kleffens' suggestion it was decided to reply to Roosevelt that the Netherlands would confer with Brazil about extra alertness in the Brazilian-Surinam frontier area, and that above all air defence was essential. No accomodation was available for

No.	Date; from/to	Description
304	29.9.1941 From Pabst (Tokyo)	American infantry. <i>US-Japanese talks.</i> Government was willing to come to an agreement with USA. Acceptance of US conditions by the military was doubtful.
305	29.9.1941 From British Legation	<i>Prize law.</i> The 'Arica' and 'Winnipeg', captured by HMS 'Van Kinsbergen' had not been declared prizes of war by the British Court. Provisional embargo. British Government wished to lease ships from the Netherlands. Same procedure to be followed with any Vichy ships seized in future.
306	29.9.1941 From Steenberghe	<i>USA: recognition of Royal Decree A 1: test case.</i> Writer was in agreement with more active implementation of A 1 as advocated in No. 145. He favoured test case to obtain recognition if this was not accorded by US Government in the near future.
307	29.9.1941 From Van Boetzelaer van Oosterhout to Van Bylandt (Washington)	<i>USA: diplomatic relations with the Netherlands.</i> There was a chance that, encouraged by his advisers, Roosevelt would promote mutual elevation of respective legations to embassies. Was there any objection to such a move?
308	30.9.1941 Council of Ministers	<i>Surinam: stationing of US troops.</i> Van Kleffens would discuss this with Eden, now that stationing in British Guyana had also been suggested. Measures against convoys of <i>French merchant vessels in NEI waters</i> to be discussed with British Admiralty. <i>USSR: establishment of diplomatic relations.</i> Careful consideration to be given to religious objections and risk of communist propaganda, but at the same time emphasis on major change in international position of USSR, which necessitated diplomatic relations. Albarda recommended simultaneous <i>restoration of relations with the Vatican.</i>
309	30.9.1941 From Queen Wilhelmina to Roosevelt	<i>Surinam: stationing of US troops.</i> Netherlands Government had objections to Brazilian participation in defence of bauxite mines and did not wish to go beyond inviting the Brazilian Government, on arrival of the US troops, to dispatch a mission to Paramaribo for the purpose of discussing more effective guarding of the common frontier. Surinam's primary need was for aircraft troops and anti-aircraft artillery.
310	30.9.1941 To Cadogan	<i>Surinam: stationing of American troops.</i> Information requested by Van Kleffens about British response to US request for permission of British Government to station troops in

No.	Date; from/to	Description
		British Guyana. Inquiry as to whether British Government had comments to make on No. 309.
311	1.10.1941 Teixeira de Mattos	<i>Japan: Pacific policy.</i> According to Ashley Clarke, Japan would soon be obliged by the embargo to decide whether or not to continue its policy of aggression.
312	2.10.1941 From Van Starckenborgh to Welter (Batavia)	<i>Far East: embargo against Japan.</i> It was wrong to leave Japan in uncertainty regarding the extent of the embargo. Co-operation with USA and Great Britain was possible only if information was furnished concerning the political use made of the embargo. The Netherlands should therefore demand information from the US regarding the <i>negotiations between USA and Japan</i> , since matters might be discussed there which were of interest to the Netherlands.
313	2.10.1941 From Van Bylandt to Scheltus	<i>Germany.</i> Even in the event of power being seized by the military, the Allies would demand disarmament as a condition for peace negotiations in accordance with the Atlantic Charter.
314	3.10.1941 Van Bylandt	<i>France: detention of Dutch ships.</i> Misrepresentation of the facts in French note on detention of the Dupleix in NEI needed to be put right. <i>Declaring France enemy territory (Royal Decree A 6)</i> would enable the question of the Dupleix to be settled and, more especially, the crack in the economic blockade of Germany to be closed by seizing ships en route from Indo China to Europe with rubber for Germany.
315	6.10.1941 Van Vredenburg	<i>Greece: diplomatic relations with the Netherlands.</i> So long as definitive place of establishment of Greek Government was not known, no temporary chargé d'affaires should be appointed.
316	6.10.1941 From Welter	<i>Far East: embargo against Japan.</i> Enclosure of Nos. 316ABC.
316A	3.10.1941 From Leith-Ross to Hart	<i>Far East: embargo against Japan,</i> Exports to Japan under embargo were sufficiently coordinated. Now imports from Japan would have to be arranged in joint consultation.
316B	25.9.1941 From Van Starckenborgh to Welter (Batavia)	<i>Far East: embargo against Japan.</i> A series of measures had been taken to implement the embargo. Trade was permitted on a barter basis only. Frozen Japanese balances in NEI to be used for settling claims for damages arising from Japanese military operations, notably in China. Pharmaceuticals and foods not to fall

No.	Date; from/to	Description
316C	4.10.1941 From Welter to Van Starkenborgh	under the embargo. <i>Far East: embargo against Japan.</i> Authorisation to take measures as proposed in No 316B. Settlement of claims for damages out of frozen Japanese balances was subject of consultation with Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
317	6.10.1941 From Bentinck van Schoon- heten (Cairo)	<i>Palestine: evacuation of Dutch nationals.</i> Enclosure of No. 317A, with which Bentinck agreed. Dutch nationals in Palestine not interested in evacuation. Organising it at the last moment would be virtually impossible.
317A	12.9.1941 From Hoofien to to Bentinck (Jerusalem)	<i>Palestine: evacuation of Dutch nationals.</i> British authorities denied making preparations for evacuation of non-Palestinians. Impracticable on account of large numbers. Hoofien had decided against compilation of list of persons to be evacuated, since evacuation in an emergency would be impossible owing to lack of transport.
318	7.10.1941 Council of Ministers	<i>USSR: establishment of diplomatic relations.</i> There being no unanimity on this matter, it was decided to defer discussion for a few weeks. Statements by Van Kleffens on <i>Surinam (stationing of US troops)</i> , measures against <i>French merchant ships in Sunda Strait</i> and the situation in the <i>Far East</i> .
319	7.10.1941 From Godfrey to Gerbrandy	<i>The Netherlands: diplomatic relations with the Holy See.</i> The Pope would have been very pleased with the accrediting of a Netherlands Envoy to the Holy See, but in view of war situation the establishment of a Netherlands Envoy in the Vatican was not possible owing to opposition on the part of the Italian Government. For the time being contact could be maintained via Apostolic Delegate in London.
320	8.10.1941 From Pabst (Tokyo)	<i>Far East: embargo against Japan.</i> Japan viewed NEI refusal to deliver raw materials for war as an unfriendly act, since deliveries of these materials were being made to USSR.
321	8.10.1941 From Van Starkenborgh to Welter (Batavia)	<i>NEI: exports to China.</i> The writer was in agreement with the proposals of No 234. China Stabilisation Board was thwarting implementation by failing to make sufficient currency, if any, available. NEI banks would have to comply with instructions of Stabilisation Board; appointment of NEI representative on Board very necessary.
322	8.10.1941 From Steenberghe	<i>Dealings in Dutch securities.</i> There were indications that Germany was selling securities from the occupied Netherlands in neutral countries.

No.	Date; from/to	Description
323	8.10.1941 From Belgian Legation to Ministry of Foreign Affairs	To protect these Dutch assets all securities recognisable as Dutch in foreign countries should be registered and a ban on importing non-registered shares after the war should be announced. <i>USA: coffee imports.</i> Agreement No. 323A requested in order that its presentation in Washington by British, Belgian and Netherlands representatives could take place at an early date.
323A	Draft for Memorandum to Hull	<i>USA: coffee imports.</i> Quotas for countries not signatory to Inter-American Coffee Agreement represented only 73 per cent of their exports to the USA between 1936 and 1940. Moreover, NEI and Belgian Congo had lost their European market. Request that enlargement of basic quotas for non-signatories be considered and recommended to other signatories.
324	8.10.1941 From Morton to Cadogan	<i>Europe: post-war reconstruction.</i> Allied Governments wished to commence talks on reconstruction. The initiative had apparently been taken by Van Kleffens who for the present only wished to ascertain informally with Spaak and Lie whether a common basis for such talks could be found. Makins suggested preliminary discussion between Eden and Van Kleffens on this subject.
325	9.10.1941 To Loudon	<i>Talks between USA and Japan.</i> US Government should be pressed for information regarding secret talks with Japan as outcome thereof was a matter of war or peace and directly involved NEI through embargo policy.
326	10.10.1941 From Loudon (Washington)	<i>Far East.</i> Discussion with Welles. No change in US policy was to be expected. Chance of peaceful settlement with Japan. Proposal of French Ambassador regarding Indo China. Different views were held in State Department as regards settling relations with Japan.
327	10.10.1941 From Loudon (Washington)	<i>Talks between USA and Japan.</i> Discussions were still exploratory, seeking basis for negotiations. Before commencement of negotiations there would be consultations with China, the Netherlands and Great Britain.
328	11.10.1941 From Elink Schuurman (Sydney)	<i>Australia: diplomatic relations with the Netherlands.</i> New government was prepared to give Australian officer in Batavia personal title of Consul General. Writer suggested that confirmation of Australian proposals be obtained via Bruce.

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No.	Date; from/to	Description
329	11.10.1941 From Loudon (Washington)	<i>USA: recognition of Royal Decree A 1: test case:</i> Loudon recommended that immediate steps be taken to obtain recognition from US Government and safeguarding of control of A 1 balances in USA by Netherlands Government. If necessary, a test case should be brought for that purpose.
330	11.10.1941 From Loudon (Washington)	<i>Mexico: oil conflict.</i> Like Loudon, Halifax would also point out to Welles that the settlement of claims for damages in respect of the nationalisation of American oil companies in Mexico by agreement between USA and Mexico might prompt other countries, notably Venezuela, to proceed to nationalisation.
331	12.10.1941 From Flaes (Peking)	<i>Japan.</i> Japanese officials on legation premises without permission. Fear that Japan would dispute immunity of legation building.
331A	30.9.1941 From Flaes to Japanese embassy (Peking)	<i>Japan.</i> Request for measures to prevent recurrence of unannounced entering of premises of Netherlands legation by Japanese.
331B	11.10.1941 From Japanese embassy to Flaes (Peking)	<i>Japan.</i> Persons referred to in No 331A had acted on the assumption that Netherlands legation would soon be vacated.
332	13.10.1941 Van Bylandt	<i>Post-war relief for Europe.</i> Van Bylandt had promised Babinski no support for his proposal for the establishment of an inter-Allied bureau instead of a British bureau for the co-ordination of relief of the <i>Committee on Post-War Requirements</i> .
333	13.10.1941 To Gerbrandy	<i>German war crimes.</i> Opinion of Netherlands Government was sought on principle and contents of No. 333A. It was proposed that judgement be reserved.
333A	Draft Resolution	<i>German war crimes.</i> Polish-Czechoslovak draft resolution. The German State was responsible for all crimes in violation of the international law of war. Those guilty would be tried in the countries where the crimes had been committed.
334	13.10.1941 From Steenberghe	<i>Great-Britain: application of Royal Decree A 1.</i> Reply to No. 263. Endeavour to come to a temporary arrangement whereby British authorities would no longer impose vesting orders on Netherlands assets under A 1, and would cease collecting amounts owing to the Netherlands, and whereby Netherlands custodian would likewise not seek recovery. After inter-ministerial consultation the matter should be settled with British Government in direct negotiation by means of delegations.

No.	Date; from/to	Description
335	14.10.1941 To Pabst	<i>Japan.</i> Pabst to request Japanese Government to notify presence of Japanese ships in East Indian archipelago to avoid misunderstanding and incidents.
336	14.10.1941 From Steenberghe	<i>International Wheat Conference.</i> Reply to No. 256. The Netherlands had to be represented at conference on account of its role in international wheat trade, and could not consider itself bound by resolutions of conference passed without it being consulted. Request to Van Kleffens to instruct Loudon on these lines.
337	14.10.1941 From Sevenster (Vichy)	<i>France: offices néerlandais.</i> Future of 'offices' obscure. For 'offices belges' reorganisation was required. The writer asked for decision in principle on whether he was to stay in France if chances of departure became uncertain. Asked reasons for <i>closure of French Consulate General in Batavia.</i>
338	14.10.1941 From Harinxma thoe Slooten (Lisbon)	<i>France: offices néerlandais.</i> French Government was resisting German pressure for closure. If closure was to take place, the writer shared Sevenster's view that the present organisation, under a different name, would have to be placed under the Swedish legation. Consular work of the 'offices' would in that case have to cease.
339	14.10.1941 From Beyen to Steenberghe	<i>Great Britain: sales of Dutch gold.</i> In connection with its delicate position vis-à-vis the Belgian Government, which had sold part of its gold reserves to Great Britain, the British Government would greatly appreciate an undertaking that the Netherlands Government was, if necessary, prepared to discuss the sale of gold. Suggestion that in the interest of good relations the Netherlands should waive dollar claims in respect of stranded cargoes originating from the dollar area and sold by NSTC after 10 May 1940. Enclosure of draft letter.
339A	2.9.1941 From Fraser to Beyen	<i>Great Britain: sales of Dutch gold.</i> British Government wanted assurance that in any future crisis the gold reserves of the Netherlands would be made available, since otherwise a fresh appeal to Belgium would be impossible.
339B	4.9.1941 From Fraser to Beyen	<i>Great Britain: sales of Dutch gold.</i> Chancellor of the Exchequer disappointed that Netherlands Government would not sell its gold at that moment, but pleased with the statement that the Netherlands Government would

No.	Date; from/to	Description
340	15.10.1941 To H.M. The Queen	be prepared to meet any future British need for gold. <i>Surinam: stationing of American troops.</i> Now that agreement had been reached in principle, Roosevelt suggested that further elaboration of the agreement be left to Van Kleffens and Biddle.
340A	15.10.1941 Van Kleffens	<i>Surinam: stationing of American troops.</i> Conversation with Biddle. Roosevelt was in agreement with proposal of No. 309 regarding Brazil. In connection with instruction to American ambassador in Brazil, Van Kleffens had been asked how the Netherlands Government would put forward its proposal in Rio de Janeiro. American Government wished to draw up text of communiqué in consultation with the Netherlands.
341	15.10.1941 From Welter	<i>France.</i> In agreement with No 341A.
341A	13.10.1941 From Van Starckenborgh to Welter (Batavia)	<i>France: merchant navy.</i> Action against French convoys was not possible without the use of force, which the importance of interception did not justify.
342	16.10.1941 From Loudon (Washington)	<i>USA: recognition of Royal Decree A1.</i> Steps mentioned in No. 329 should be taken without delay, as British Officials had arrived in Washington ostensibly for the purpose of negotiating the <i>pooling of Allied assets</i> under British supervision. Accuracy of this should be verified in London.
343	16.10.1941 From Bland	<i>Prize law: application to Finnish ships.</i> Request for agreement between American and British governments on the non-seizure of Finnish ships sailing specified routes to be declared similarly applicable to Netherlands authorities.
344	16.10.1941 From Welter to H.M. The Queen	<i>Making available merchant ships.</i> Agreement had been reached with British Government on the making available of 13 large freighters from NEI. Permission had also been granted for use of leased passenger vessels on North Atlantic route for carrying troops. Agreement in principle to make more freighters available had been indicated.
345	17.10.1941 From Welter to Van Starckenborgh	<i>Portuguese Timor.</i> Japanese-Portuguese agreement on Palau-Dilly air link was of strategic importance. Japanese consulate established. Establishment of Netherlands consulate was

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		necessary to check Japanese activities. Possible occupation by Australia had been discussed with Bruce. Had possibility of occupation in the event of emergency in NEI been examined yet?
346	17.10.1941 Van Bylandt	<i>Portuguese Timor.</i> Consultation with Great Britain and Australia concerning Portuguese Timor was required. Council of Ministers would have to lay down rules for action against Portuguese Timor.
347	17.10.1941 Teixeira de Mattos	<i>Far East.</i> Foreign Office did not expect immediate Japanese action; most probably in Manchuria in November.
348	17.10.1941 From Biddle	<i>NEI: use of airfields by US Air Force.</i> The writer requested ruling in principle on whether the Netherlands was prepared to make airfields available for heavy bombers flying between Hawaii and Philippines.
349	18.10.1941 From Michiels van Verduynen	<i>Portuguese Timor.</i> Talk with Bruce. After opening of air service between Palau and Dilly there would be grave danger of Japanese penetration. Military action against Portuguese Timor might be necessary, but preferably by Australia.
350	19.10.1941 From Loudon (Washington)	<i>Great Britain: pooling of Allied assets in USA.</i> According to a reliable source, British Government was endeavouring to bring about pooling. Netherlands Government's good name in financial matters thereby endangered on account of bad British reputation. Hence proposal to confer independently with US Government on use of non-invested assets of Royal Decree A 1 within the context of the war effort.
351	20.10.1941 To Loudon	<i>USA: assets of Netherlands Bank.</i> Ministry of Finance had no objection to proposal contained in No. 253, provided this was done on the basis of US Bank Act and not on that of Royal Decree A 1.
352	20.10.1941 To Furstner	<i>Far East: warning system.</i> Invitation for discussion on No 352 A.
352A	18.10.1941 Foreign Office	<i>Far East: warning system.</i> British authorities in the Far East were to receive instructions for rapid reporting in the event of Japanese military action. Suggestions that USA and the Netherlands organise a similar system. Decision regarding counter-action would continue to rest with governments concerned.

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353	20.10.1941 From Bos (Hong Kong)	<i>China: closure of consulate at Palembang.</i> Bos had again explained to Ministry of Foreign Affairs that request to close Chinese consulate at Palembang was rooted in wish to be able to refuse Japanese request for establishing a consulate there, and that it was not intended as an unfriendly act towards China. In response to insinuation that the Netherlands feared reprisals if the Japanese request were declined, Bos had pointed to NEI financial measures against Japan which proved lack of fear of Japan. On 17.10 the request was officially refused.
354	20.10.1941 From Van Bylandt to Bentinck van Schoonheten	<i>Diplomatic relations between USSR and the Netherlands.</i> Van Bylandt was doing his utmost to have Fein dispatched to Moscow as unofficial observer or agent of the Netherlands Government.
355	20.10.1941 From Eden to Bland	Talk with Van Kleffens. <i>Portuguese Timor:</i> in view of Japanese action Van Kleffens suggested organising counter-infiltration by Allied subjects. Instructions to Van Pallandt were being considered (cf. No. 377). Agreement concerning <i>Far East warning system.</i> Views exchanged on possible Japanese operations in the Far East.
356	21.10.1941 From Loudon (Washington)	<i>USA: recognition of Royal Decree A 1: test case.</i> Explanation of validity according to Dutch law was necessary in connection with Chase National Bank proceedings.
357	21.10.1941 From Van Angeren	<i>Royal Decree A 6: black list.</i> The writer advocated compilation of Netherlands black list corresponding as closely as possible to British and American lists. Close co-operation with British and American authorities was thus essential. Proposals for <i>modus procedendi.</i>
358	22.10.1941 To Loudon	<i>USA: recognition of Royal Decree A 1: test case.</i> In agreement with more positive action in conformity with No. 329. Assessment of need for test case left to Loudon.
359	22.10.1941 From Loudon (Washington)	<i>USA: recognition of Royal Decree A 1.</i> In reply to an informal question from a Treasury official, Molekamp had stated that the Government would itself undertake the custodianship of A 1 assets to avoid measures referred to in No. 342. Conversion of non-invested A 1 balances into US Treasury bonds was apparently expected by US Government. It was now imperative to initiate <i>test case</i> referred to in No. 145.

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360	22.10.1941 From Van Starckenborgh to Welter (Batavia)	<i>Portuguese Timor.</i> NEI was withholding all co-operation in Palau-Dilly flights, notably supplying fuel. Plan for possible occupation was ready, but would only be put into effect in consultation with Allies; occupation should definitely not be left to Australia. Military measures were not yet necessary.
361	22.10.1941 Biddle	<i>Surinam: stationing of US troops.</i> On instructions from President Roosevelt, the writer urgently requested Queen Wilhelmina to reverse the decision not to invite Brazil to dispatch a military mission to Paramaribo, as the US Government had already sounded Rio de Janeiro on this before accepting the Netherlands proposal of No. 309.
362	22.10.1941 From Bentinck van Schoonheten (Cairo)	<i>Egypt: closure of Netherlands consulates.</i> Reopening of consulates in Alexandria and Port Said permitted. Attempt to reopen vice consulate in Suez had failed. The writer suggested that the matter be raised anew after the elapse of a few months.
363	22.10.1941 From Loudon to Van Starckenborgh (Washington)	<i>Pacific policy.</i> USA would not sacrifice NEI for a settlement with Japan, but wished to avoid armed conflict without appeasement (Asian Munich). Various schools of thought on Far Eastern policy within State Department. If, in the most favourable instance, a basis for discussions between USA and Japan should be found, the Netherlands would be consulted. Territorial integrity of NEI beyond dispute in USA, but Loudon had his doubts about Churchill's intentions. Rapprochement between USA and NEI imperative, to which expressions of confidence in US Far Eastern policy would contribute.
364	24.10.1941 To Gerbrandy	<i>War crimes.</i> No. 364A, drawn up because British Government had considered No. 333A premature and too specific, was acceptable to the Netherlands. British Government had been pressed for early discussion between the Allies.
364A	21.10.1941 From Roberts to Michiels van Verduynen	<i>War crimes.</i> British Government was of the opinion that the Allies should issue a statement regarding war crimes (including the shooting of hostages), though without any specific threats of reprisal. Enclosure of draft resolution.
365	24.10.1941 From Michiels van Verduynen	Discussion with Bruce. Australian Government was seriously alarmed at developments round <i>Portuguese Timor</i> and via British Government would request <i>stationing of Australian troops</i>

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366	25.10.1941 From Loudon (Washington)	<i>in Netherlands Timor.</i> <i>Royal Decree A 6: Philips N.V.</i> Philips' directors in agreement with Corvo's conditions dated 18.6.1941 governing contact between Philips subsidiaries in neutral countries and Philips Eindhoven. Immediate entry into force requested because of emergency at Philips Turkey.
367	25.10.1941 From Loudon (Washington)	<i>USA: recognition of Royal Decree A 1.</i> No. 144A defined position of Netherlands Government in regard to custodianship of A 1 assets too rigidly, and could be used as argument for future American measure to use those assets to cover the war costs. Their use for that purpose should not be ruled out by the Netherlands Government. Berle had advised against steps towards recognition as set out in No. 144A. Through the case currently before the Supreme Court, the US Government might be able to decide on the use of A 1 assets by the Netherlands Government without a ruling in accordance with the proposals for amendment of No. 144A.
367A	1.10.1941 From Berle to Kleyn Molekamp (Washington)	<i>USA: recognition of Royal Decree A 1.</i> Advised against formal request to State Department for recognition of acts of custodianship of Netherlands Government in USA in respect of A 1 assets; Ruling possible only via legal proceedings.
368	27.10.1941 From Welter	<i>ADA and ADB-2 reports.</i> Enclosure of Nos. 368AB.
368A	20.10.1941 From Van Starckenborgh to Welter (Batavia)	<i>ADB-2 report.</i> The writer was in agreement with political clauses added to No. 177.
368B	26.3.1941 From Berenschot and Helfrich to Van Starcken- borgh (Batavia)	<i>ADA report.</i> Detailed elaboration for NEI of what was to be regarded as 'direct act of war'. Every government determined for itself what constituted an act of aggression. In the event of British declaration of war on Japan, NEI had to follow. Direct Japanese attack on NEI territory would be an unconditional act of war, requiring an armed response.
369	27.10.1941 From Welter	<i>Pacific policy.</i> The writer was in agreement with proposal of No. 369A, for which the approval of the Council of Ministers and the Queen would have to be secured.
369A	25.10.1941 From Van Starckenborgh to Welter (Batavia)	<i>Pacific policy.</i> Netherlands interests being inseparable from those of Britain and America, the Netherlands would have to fight immediately, even if the conflict did not break out in

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370	27.10.1941 From Craandijk to Van Bylandt (Batavia)	the South Pacific. Also of importance as regards external prestige and morale in NEI. <i>Information for representatives in the Far East.</i> Van Mook had instructed the writer to investigate ways of improving the provision of information on the political and economic policy of the NEI administration. He felt this should be entrusted to the office of the Governor General. After the war a branch of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should be established in the NEI to strengthen <i>the NEI's influence on foreign policy.</i>
371	28.10.1941 Council of Ministers	<i>Netherlands: Pacific policy.</i> Decision to ask the Queen to authorise proposal of No. 369A. <i>Portuguese Timor.</i> Van Kleffens had discussed situation with Eden.
372	28.10.1941 From Van Starkenborgh to Welter (Batavia)	<i>Implementation of ADB report: defence zones.</i> Helfrich was opposed to American proposal that USA, Great Britain and NEI fix individual defence zones in the Pacific before this was warranted as a reprisal against Japan. If USA should nevertheless proceed to do so, the Netherlands could not lag behind.
373	28.10.1941 Van Vredenburg	<i>Portuguese Timor.</i> By virtue of ADB 1 (II, No. 371) and ADB 2 (No. 177) Timor was part of the Australian operational area.
374	28.10.1941 From Van Bylandt to Welter	<i>Safeguarding of Netherlands interests in Japan, China and Manchukuo.</i> Sweden was prepared to look after interests in Japan; Switzerland in occupied China, Shanghai and Hong Kong. Peking to be notified accordingly. Measures to be taken to postpone departure of Japanese representatives from Netherlands colonies until arrangement had been made for departure of Netherlands consuls and diplomats. Safeguarding of Japanese interests not to be permitted if Japan caused difficulties regarding protection of Netherlands interests.
375	28.10.1941 To Steenberghe	<i>Dealings in Netherlands securities.</i> In the preparation of measures against securities from occupied Netherlands Royal Decree A 1 should be taken into account. Measures to be confined to registration and import ban on securities and corresponding coupons and share certificates bearing a Dutch stamp. Registration in all countries, irrespective of measures taken by governments.

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376	28.10.1941 From Biddle	<i>Surinam: stationing of American troops.</i> US Government proposed that the draft communiqué be amended as follows: no mention of the types of American units to be stationed in Surinam and of their relation to the Netherlands administration in Surinam. Biddle requested notification as soon as instructions had been dispatched to the Envoy in Rio de Janeiro.
376A	28.10.1941	<i>Surinam: stationing of American troops.</i> Amended draft text of the Netherlands-American communiqué.
377	29.10.1941 To Van Pallandt	<i>Portuguese Timor.</i> Pointing to very considerable Netherlands interests, Van Pallandt was to express serious concern at fear of Japanese infiltration in Portuguese Timor following conclusion of Portuguese-Japanese agreement on Palau-Dilly air link.
378	30.10.1941 From Welter	<i>USA: coffee imports.</i> Although the outsiders' quota of the Inter-American Coffee Agreement did not hamper sales of NEI and Surinam coffee in the USA, the writer was in agreement with submission of No. 323A.
379	31.10.1941 To Daniels	<i>Surinam: stationing of American troops.</i> In Note to Brazilian Government Daniels was to inform latter about agreement on stationing reached with USA. Verbally he was to request special military alertness in frontier area with Surinam and the dispatch of military representatives to Paramaribo for consultation on enhancing the efficiency of joint security measures. American Ambassador was au fait with the situation, and Daniels could act in cooperation with him.
380	31.10.1941 From Van Starckenborgh to Welter (Batavia)	<i>Japan.</i> Replacement of Konoye Government by Tojo Government was the result of internal situation, notably growing influence of young officers. Any approach to Japan on the part of the democracies would be construed as weakness and would encourage further aggression.
381	31.10.1941 From Welter	<i>NEI: use of airfields by US Air Force.</i> Agreement with No. 381A.
381A	29.10.1941 From Van Starckenborgh to Welter (Batavia)	<i>NEI: use of airfields by US Air Force.</i> No objection to proposal of No. 348, provided reciprocity guaranteed. Not prepared to grant blank authorisation for contact between USA and local authorities about making airfields suitable for US heavy bombers. Airfields in outer islands unsuitable for this purpose. These matters to be dealt with direct between

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382	1.11.1941 From Foreign Office to Netherlands Legation	Batavia and Manila. <i>Implementation of ADA report: Australian troops in NEI.</i> Preparatory to stationing on Timor and Ambon, admission of quartermasters was requested. Arrangement to be worked out for early decision on dispatch of main body.
383	1.11.1941 From Foreign Office to Teixeira de Mattos	<i>USA: arms deliveries to NEI:</i> British Government saw no possibility of supporting NEI request for accelerated delivery of 162 bombers by USA.
384	3.11.1941 From Van Pallandt (Lisbon)	<i>Portuguese Timor.</i> Instructions in No. 377 carried out. According to Portuguese authorities no grounds for uneasiness on the part of the Netherlands, since Japanese infiltration was being guarded against.
385	3.11.1941 Van Weede	<i>German war crimes.</i> Star Busmann could attend discussion of No. 333 ad audiendum and if necessary declare Government's readiness to support statement condemning punishment of innocent persons for acts committed by others, without elaborating plans for punishing war crimes.
386	3.11.1941 From Bosch van van Rosenthal (Berne)	<i>Peace proposals.</i> Hitler reputed to be about to launch peace plan providing for incorporation of a large part of Eastern Europe and independence for West European states. Fear that large proportion of population of occupied territory would opt for Germany if Great Britain rejected this peace offer.
387	3.11.1941 From Bentinck to Van Starkenborgh (Cairo)	<i>Egypt: KLM landing rights.</i> According to chairman of British Airways, extension of KLM's Batavia-Lyddá line to Cairo was only possible by chartering KLM machines to that company. No positive result was to be expected from British pressure on Egypt.
388	3.11.1941 Ronald	<i>Europe: post-war reconstruction.</i> At Eden's request the writer had presented Van Kleffens a summary of British activities mainly concerned with internal reconstruction problems. International aspects as discussed by Van Kleffens, Spaak and Lie were not yet under discussion. USA and Great Britain were now discussing post-war economic policy on which Dominions and Allies would be informed subsequently. It had been agreed that the exchange of mutual information would remain informal for the present.

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389	4.11.1941 Council of Ministers	<i>Netherlands: Pacific policy.</i> Queen Wilhelmina in agreement with No. 369. Statements by Van Kleffens on <i>Portuguese Timor</i> (No. 377). <i>Surinam: stationing of US troops (Brazil)</i> (No. 379) and Polish draft resolution condemning German <i>war crimes</i> (shooting of hostages No. 333A). In People's Council in Batavia native members had asked questions about acceptance of Article 3 of the <i>Atlantic Charter</i> by the Netherlands Government.
390	4.11.1941 From Daniels (Rio de Janeiro)	<i>Surinam: stationing of American troops (Brazil).</i> Brazilian Government had accepted invitation of No. 379. Details would be discussed in interview with President and US ambassador.
391	4.11.1941 To Welter	<i>Portuguese Timor.</i> Enclosure of No. 391A. After No. 377 further steps would depend on fresh developments.
391A	4.11.1941 From Foreign Office	<i>Portuguese Timor.</i> British and Australian governments were deliberating on necessary preventive measures and contingency plan in the event of actual Japanese action against Portuguese Timor. Views of Netherlands Government requested.
392	4.11.1941 Lamping	<i>Post-war relief for Europe: committee on post-war requirements.</i> Talk with Benthall on USSR's attitude towards British bureau for the committee. Lamping suspected that the UK was seeking to strengthen its own position by winning the support of the other Allies for its viewpoint. In this dispute the Netherlands should hold aloof.
393	4.11.1941 Steenberghe	<i>Relief for the occupied Netherlands.</i> Discussion between Lamping and Drogheda regarding No. 271. According to Drogheda relief for Greece was not a new development necessitating a change in the British standpoint. Draft memorandum to Eden: despite known British objections to breaking the blockade, permission to be requested for food aid for pregnant and nursing women and other persons up to the age of 21 in the occupied Netherlands; Netherlands Government would not tolerate passing over of the occupied Netherlands for any other occupied territory in the matter of relief. <i>Germans interned in NEI.</i> German Government had complained of relatively bad treatment of internees. If the Netherlands' reply to the German proposal of six months ago for the abolition of internment were deferred any
394	4.11.1941 From Scheltus (Stockholm)	<i>Germans interned in NEI.</i> German Government had complained of relatively bad treatment of internees. If the Netherlands' reply to the German proposal of six months ago for the abolition of internment were deferred any

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395	5.11.1941 From Van Starckenborgh to Welter (Batavia)	longer, 2000 prominent persons in the occupied Netherlands would probably be interned. <i>Implementation of ADA report: Australian troops in NEI.</i> No objection to implementation of proposal contained in No. 382.
396	5.11.1941 To Elink Schuurman	<i>Australia: diplomatic relations with the Netherlands.</i> Elink Schuurman was to explain to the Australian Government that appointment of Netherlands envoy in Canberra was impossible without appointment of Australian envoy to Netherlands Government in London.
397	5.11.1941 To Loudon	<i>Pacific policy.</i> War with Japan was unavoidable. Strengthening of armed forces by USA, British Empire and the Netherlands was proceeding. Admission of Australian quartermasters to Timor and Ambon requested. Closer contact with US Government important in connection with <i>post-war world order</i> since British Government departments had no constructive ideas on this subject and higher officials were little interested in post-war political, economic and military problems. Discussions were going forward with Belgian and Norwegian governments about the post-war economic organisation of Atlantic seaboard countries and German membership thereof.
398	5.11.1941 From Foreign Office to Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs	<i>USA: arms deliveries to NEI.</i> Inquiry whether the Netherlands Government was prepared to make 18 Catalina flying boats earmarked for NEI available for service in the Atlantic area.
399	5.11.1941 From Groenman (Ottawa)	<i>Canada: trade with NEI.</i> Canadian Government saw no possibility for barter trade with NEI to avoid currency problems.
400	6.11.1941 From Van Starckenborgh to Welter (Batavia)	<i>Talks between USA and Japan.</i> As No. 325 had produced no results, Welter should again press US authorities for information about talks. Otherwise there was the danger that the USA would take acting on behalf of the Netherlands for granted. Position of the Netherlands vis-à-vis the USA was not the same as the British.
401	6.11.1941 Van Voorst tot Voorst	<i>Contraband.</i> The writer was in agreement with Van Starckenborgh's suggestion that, deviating from policy pursued till then, destination of contraband in Japanese ships should be investigated.
402	6.11.1941 From Eden to Bland	<i>Portuguese Timor.</i> Eden had informed Van Kleffens about proposals made to Portugal for offering aid to Portuguese Timor and initia-

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403	7.11.1941 From Pabst (Tokyo)	ting secret staff talks; British desire for participation by the Netherlands had been made clear. Discussion of general situation in the <i>Far East</i> . <i>Talks between USA and Japan</i> . The purpose of Kurusu's mission might be to ask the price of Japanese neutrality in a conflict between the USA and Germany.
404	7.11.1941 From Welter to Van Starckenborgh	<i>France: merchant shipping</i> . Decision to intercept and search for <i>contraband</i> , notably rubber, all French ships passing the East Indian archipelago.
405	7.11.1941 From Van Starckenborgh to Welter (Batavia)	<i>Netherlands: consulate in Portuguese Timor</i> . Establishment of a consulate economically unnecessary; for political reasons only if Australia also intended to open a consulate. Van Starckenborgh suggested discussing this in Sydney.
406	7.11.1941 Van Karnebeek	<i>War Crimes</i> . Discussion with Berg. Norwegian Government favoured Allied declaration as desired by the Netherlands, but would, if necessary, agree to amended version of No. 333A. Consultation with Netherlands Government on joint line of policy desirable.
407	8.11.1941 From Van Pallandt (Lisbon)	<i>Portuguese Timor</i> . Portugal had requested information on the termination of petrol supplies from NEI and avoidance of Portuguese Timor by Netherlands shipping lines. Van Pallandt had pointed out that, despite Portuguese measures, the danger of Japanese penetration persisted.
408	10.11.1941 To Loudon	<i>Surinam: stationing of American troops</i> . American troops would soon be able to depart for Surinam, but because of campaign on Hilversum radio about Britain selling out Curacao to the USA, short postponement of departure requested.
409	10.11.1941 To Loudon	<i>Talks between USA and Japan</i> . USA should be urgently requested to give information on talks, since their outcome would decide whether the Netherlands were at war or not.
410	10.11.1941 To Pabst	<i>Far East: warning system</i> . Instructions for the dispatch of open alarm telegrams to London and Batavia in the case of obvious danger of hostile action by Japan.
411	11.11.1941 Council of Ministers	<i>Great Britain: Pacific Policy</i> . Decision to dispatch No. 411A. <i>Germans interned in NEI</i> . German demand for extradition would not be acceded to (No. 394). Recognition of <i>Comité</i>

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		<i>National Francais</i> approved. <i>NEI: French merchant shipping</i> . Ships carrying rubber en route from Indo China to Madagascar would be seized in NEI waters. No objections to <i>stationing of Australian troops on Ambon</i> . (No. 382). Loudon instructed to ask for information on <i>negotiations between USA and Japan</i> . Majority opposed to nomination at that time of NEI members for post-war imperial conference on constitutional reforms.
411A	11.11.1941 From Gerbrandy to Churchill	<i>Great Britain: Pacific policy</i> . Disappointment about the fact that Churchill in his Mansion House speech did not mention the Netherlands as one of Britain's partners in the Pacific.
412	11.11.1941 From Kielstra to Welter (Paramaribo)	<i>Surinam: stationing of American troops (Brazil)</i> . Kielstra suggested changes in Netherlands-American and Brazilian communiqué so as to avoid damage to the international prestige of the Netherlands.
413	11.11.1941 Van Vredenburg	<i>Jewish refugees</i> . British Government had requested admission to Curacao of 100 Jews who had been refused entry to Brazil. Teixeira de Mattos had pointed at inadequate accommodation. The situation was the same in Trinidad.
414	12.11.1941 From Pabst (Tokyo)	<i>Japan</i> . Netherlands nationals were not being allowed to leave Japan. Pabst recommended that corresponding measures be taken against Japanese in NEI.
415	12.11.1941 From Loudon (Washington)	<i>USA: post-war reconstruction</i> . Little attention was as yet being paid to these problems. Internal developments would determine the extent to which the USA participated in reconstruction. If New Dealers remained in power the USA would favour an open trade system which allowed only non-discriminatory import duties. Expansion of international trade on a multilateral basis. No thought would, however, be given to the need to restore a European import surplus from services and overseas investment or to the point that recovery of a highly impoverished Europe would be possible only by a substantial improvement in exports. Developments in these fields offered extremely unfavourable prospects for Europe.
416	12.11.1941 From Loudon (Washington)	<i>USA: coffee imports</i> . During discussions at State Department, where British-Netherlands-Belgian objections to the small quota for non-signatories to the Coffee Agreement were ex-

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416A	5.11.1941 From Netherlands Legation to Department of State (Washington)	plained, it appeared that negotiations about increasing the quota would be possible after 1.10.1943, provided South American producers were guaranteed access to the European market after the war. <i>USA: coffee imports.</i> Summary of the implications of the Coffee Agreement for NEI and Surinam.
417	13.11.1941 From Loudon (Washington)	<i>Talks between USA and Japan.</i> USA would use discussions with Kurusu to gain time. Reinforcement of Japanese troops in Indo-China reported.
418	13.11.1941 From Loudon (Washington)	<i>Defence of Curacao.</i> Loudon recommended the dispatch of anti-aircraft batteries from Britain for protection of oil refineries in Aruba and Curacao, as British authorities were seriously concerned at lack of effective air defence. Delay was extremely dangerous.
419	13.11.1941 Inter-Allied Commission	<i>German war crimes.</i> In view of Star Busmann's objections to Tschoffen's draft resolution, the meeting had prepared an abridged draft based on the latter; it upheld the principle that war crimes should be adjudged as ordinary crimes.
420	13.11.1941 To Dejean	<i>Recognition of CNF.</i> Netherlands Government recognised CNF as representative of all Free Frenchmen fighting on the side of the Allies.
421	13.11.1941 From Bland	<i>Australia: diplomatic relations with the Netherlands.</i> Official proposal for the maintenance of diplomatic relations between the Netherlands and Australia at the level of envoys.
422	14.11.1941 To Gerbrandy	<i>Switzerland: recognition of transfer of statutory seat of limited liability companies.</i> Proposal for official protest to Swiss Government about non-recognition of the Act of 26.4.1940 on account of non-recognition of transfer of Polak's Frutal Works N.V.
423	14.11.1941 To Gerbrandy	<i>Switzerland: recognition of KB A 1.</i> Proposal for further démarche in Berne, explaining scope and purport of A 1 and holding Swiss Government responsible for detrimental consequences of non-application, notably in clearing transactions with the occupied Netherlands.
424	14.11.1941 From Welter	<i>Implementation of ADA report: Australian troops in NEI.</i> The writer was in agreement with the proposals of No. 424A. Question of possible occupation of <i>Portuguese Timor</i> should be discussed by Council of Ministers.

No.	Date; from/to	Description
424A	12.11.1941 From Helfrich to Furstner (Bandung)	From Van Starckenborgh to Welter: <i>Portuguese Timor</i> : In the event of disquieting forms of Japanese infiltration, occupation to be proceeded to, supported by Australian troops. <i>Implementation of ADA report: Australian troops in NEI</i> . Scope of No. 395 undesirable. Implementation to be arranged direct between Canberra and Batavia.
425	14.11.1941 From Steenberghe	<i>NSTC: disposal of Belgian cargoes</i> . Approval requested of draft Royal Decree regulating disposal, regarding which there was now agreement between all parties concerned.
425A	Draft Royal Decree	<i>NSTC: disposal of Belgian cargoes</i> . The State of the Netherlands indemnified the NSTC from all claims arising from the transfer of goods and proceeds falling under the agreement of 20.7.1940 to the Belgian Shipping Commission.
426	15.11.1941 From Loudon (Washington)	<i>Pacific policy</i> . Japan was uncertain about its political course. Kurusu had not come up with new proposals. No grounds for weakening American <i>embargo measures against Japan</i> .
427	15.11.1941 From van Vredenburg to Schoenfeld	<i>France: American protection of interests in NEI</i> . French agent in Batavia was compelled to correspond with Vichy Government via American Government. Direct correspondence would be treated as ordinary mail.
428	15.11.1941 From French Ministry for Foreign Affairs to Swedish Legation (Vichy)	<i>France: American protection of interests in NEI</i> . As US Government was not in agreement with title 'Agent of French Government with American Consulaté' French Government had suggested 'French Consular Official seconded to Batavia'.
429	15.11.1941 From Eden to Gerbrandy	<i>Great-Britain: Pacific policy</i> : Answer to No. 411A. It had to be prevented that Japan would use German step by step tactics in the Far East. Public utterances had to be limited in this stage of building up strength. Churchill acknowledged the prompt collaboration of the NEI and should pay his tribute to NEI firmness in face of common danger at a suitable opportunity.
430	17.11.1941 From Van Starckenborgh to Welter (Batavia)	<i>Talks between USA and Japan</i> . Intended close co-operation with USA and UK in war against Japan entitled the Netherlands to information on US talks as a matter of course. Acquiescence in withholding of information was wrong in principle in view of status of independent Power and necessary preparations for approaching war. This was to be clearly stated

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431	17.11.1941 Van Kleffens	in Washington and London. <i>Talks between USA and Japan.</i> The writer had expressed to Biddle his disappointment at the withholding of information on discussions with Japan in Washington.
432	17.11.1941 To Sevenster	<i>France: 'Offices néerlandais'.</i> Reply to No. 337. Sevenster not to remain in unoccupied France if chance of departure to Spain became uncertain. <i>French consulate general in Batavia</i> had been closed because inequality of status of mutual representatives was unacceptable.
433	17.11.1941 From Loudon (Washington)	<i>International Wheat Conference.</i> The writer had presented No. 433A, and request refused. Rebuttal of Steenberghe's criticism contained in No. 336.
433A	23.10.1941 From Netherlands Legation to Department of State (Washington)	<i>International Wheat Conference.</i> The Netherlands wished to be admitted to the conference as an observer and requested full information about the matters discussed.
433B	30.9.1941 From Van Boetzelaer van Oosterhout (Washington)	<i>International Wheat Conference.</i> According to Feis, the discussions had entered upon a delicate stage, but there were no grounds for anxiety on the part of the Netherlands.
433C	14.11.1941 From Netherlands Legation to Department of State (Washington)	<i>International Wheat Conference.</i> The Netherlands Government reserved all rights in regard to resolutions concerning post-war wheat trade adopted by the conference without consulting the Netherlands.
434	17.11.1941 From Van Bylandt to Craandijk	In any future <i>reorganisation of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs</i> , a bureau staffed with diplomats and having the status of a government department would have to be established at the Governor General's office in Batavia.
435	17.11.1941 From Eden to Bland	Talk with Van Kleffens. <i>Far East.</i> If the question of reinforcing the British fleet in the Far East should lead to Anglo-American staff talks, the Netherlands would wish to participate. <i>Portuguese Timor.</i> Van Kleffens desired full Netherlands participation in Anglo-Portuguese staff talks, for which Eden promised to use his best endeavours.
436	17.11.1941 From Beyen to Keynes	<i>Reparations.</i> In fixing and imposing reparations care should be taken to ensure that there would be no unfavourable consequences for the world economy or for the future economic position of Europe. Special attention should be given to restitution for certain financial transactions and to the recovery of plundered goods. The principal objective should be a sound

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437	18.11.1941 Council of Ministers	European economy. Reparations should take the form of goods rather than money. <i>Portuguese Timor.</i> Van Kleffens had informed Eden that the Netherlands wished to participate in Anglo-Portuguese defence talks. <i>Surinam: stationing of US troops.</i> Arrival on 23.11.
438	18.11.1941 From Pabst (Tokyo)	<i>Japan: Pacific policy.</i> Military action by Japan without Pabst's knowledge was possible. Thus advisable for NEI to be on the alert.
439	18.11.1941 To Steenberghe	<i>USA: recognition of Royal Decree A 1.</i> The writer was opposed to the proposal of No. 367 to abandon the fiduciary nature of A 1 and to use the assets for the conduct of the war and the post-war reconstruction of the Netherlands. Discussion of Loudon's amendments to No. 144A.
440	18.11.1941 From Van Bylandt to Gerbrandy	<i>France: declaration of enemy territory.</i> Repetition of proposal to declare Royal Decree A 6 also applicable to Vichy France in connection with certain incidents in Argentina involving British authorities.
441	18.11.1941 From Van Bylandt to Michiels van Verduynen	<i>Finland: declaration of enemy territory.</i> Royal Decree A 6 had been declared applicable to Finland before Soviet and British declaration of war.
442	18.11.1941 From Groenman (Ottawa)	<i>Canada: trade with NEI.</i> Canadian trade-balance with NEI showed a deficit. Groenman wondered whether Canadian data covered all trade, notably that going via Singapore.
443	19.11.1941 From Loudon (Washington)	<i>Talks between USA and Japan.</i> Discussion between Kurusu and Hull. Any settlement reached should not be regarded as a bridge between the Axis powers and the USA. USA had offered deliveries of oil and rice in exchange for withdrawal of Japanese troops from Indo China. Van Kleffens' views on this proposal requested.
444	19.11.1941 To Loudon	<i>Talks between USA and Japan.</i> Personal reaction of Van Kleffens to No. 443. Japan should not be given the impression of pliancy. Withdrawal of Japanese troops from Indo China was precondition for settlement which offered no scope for strengthening of Japanese war potential.
445	19.11.1941 Star Busmann	<i>War crimes.</i> Following inter-allied consultation some amendments had been made to No. 419A.
446	19.11.1941 From Furstner	<i>USA: arms deliveries to NEI.</i> Proposal of No. 398 had been discussed with British authorities in September. Co-operation had been promised

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		on condition that British aircraft replacements would be made available, and subject to improvement of politico-military situation in the Far East, which had not taken place.
447	20.11.1941 From Loudon (Washington)	<i>Talks between USA and Japan.</i> The aim of the talks, according to Hull, was to achieve a limited settlement as a first step towards a general settlement. According to the State Department, the aim was to keep Japan neutral.
448	20.11.1941 To Loudon	<i>Surinam: stationing of American troops.</i> Van Kleffens pointed out that the Dutch text of the communiqué and the broadcast by Gerbrandy would be published only in Surinam, Curacao and NEI, as agreed with US Government, since reference was made to the question of command and to the costs being borne by the Netherlands.
449	20.11.1941 From Gerbrandy to Van Starckenborgh	<i>Portuguese Timor.</i> The need for preventive occupation of Portuguese Timor had not arisen. The disadvantages were likely to outweigh the advantages.
450	20.11.1941 From Van Starckenborgh to Gerbrandy (Batavia)	<i>Pacific policy.</i> If strong Japanese force should cross the Davao-Waigeo equator line NEI would open hostilities against Japan.
451	20.11.1941 From Kielstra to Gerbrandy (Paramaribo)	<i>Surinam: defence.</i> Even with stationing of US troops, deployment of KNIL unit was of vital importance. The writer was opposed to suspension of preparations for departure of KNIL unit from NEI.
452	20.11.1941 To Gerbrandy	<i>Surinam: stationing of American troops.</i> Schoenfeld had been requested to convey to Washington Kielstra's objections to American troops being quartered in tents.
453	20.11.1941 From Welter	<i>ADB-2 report.</i> In agreement with No. 453A. Approval of ADB-2 to be notified to British Admiralty under proviso that Netherlands naval air force would remain under strategic command of NEI Naval Commander-in-Chief and that in principle naval units would operate under national Commander-in-Chief, unless transferred to the Allied Command for a specific purpose.
453A	15.11.1941 From Van Starckenborgh To Welter (Batavia)	<i>ADB-2 report.</i> Agreement with ADB-2 (No. 177). Objection to placing NEI Navy under strategic command of Singapore in so far as this was not intended for local defence. Reservation to this effect should be made. Command situation for Netherlands naval air force should be more clearly defined, as should demarcation

No.	Date; from/to	Description
454	21.11.1941 From Kielstra to Gerbrandy (Paramaribo)	of spheres of responsibility. <i>Surinam: stationing of American troops.</i> Despite communiqué and Gerbrandy's broadcast, Kielstra anticipated that stationing would have an adverse effect on internal political situation in Surinam.
455	21.11.1941 To Van den Tempel	<i>NSTC: disposal of Belgian cargoes.</i> Proposed amendment to No. 455A, on account of technical defects. Enclosure of No. 455A.
455A	draft Royal Decree	<i>NSTC: disposal of Belgian cargoes.</i> The State of the Netherlands indemnified the NSTC from all claims arising from the transfer of goods and proceeds falling under the agreement of 20.7.1940 to the Belgian Government.
456	21.11.1941 From Termijtelen	<i>France: merchant shipping.</i> enclosure of No. 456A.
456A		<i>France: merchant shipping.</i> Since France's capitulation in June 1940 there had been far-reaching co-operation between Vichy and Germany, which conflicted with the status of a neutral power as claimed by Vichy. Transport of rubber for Germany by French ships should be halted by ordering these ships to be seized by the Netherlands navy in NEI, as British navy was prevented from doing so under the terms of the Decoux Agreement.
457	21.11.1941 From Keynes to Beyen	<i>Reparations and post-war reconstruction of Europe.</i> Problems put forward in No. 436 were so intricate that public statements at that moment could cause serious difficulties later. The writer would communicate anew with Beyen on completion of British discussions.
458	22.11.1941 From Loudon (Washington)	<i>Surinam: stationing of American troops.</i> Owing to No. 448, Slotemaker could not, solely on the basis of communiqué (No. 376A), provide more publicity than the White House. Purpose of approach to State Department had been to seek scope for publicity.
459	22.11.1941 From Steenstra Toussaint (Bangkok)	<i>Thailand.</i> Position of Thailand less stable owing to strong Japanese pressure and uncertainty about military and economic support from the Allies and the USA. Summary of problems between Japan and Thailand.
460	22.11.1941 From Loudon (Washington)	<i>Talks between USA and Japan.</i> Hull had reviewed the position and summarised the negotiations in 1941. Kurusu had proposed temporary and limited settlement, with withdrawal from Indo China in exchange for inter alia oil deliveries forming the basis for agreement.

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No.	Date; from/to	Description
461	22.11.1941 From Kielstra to Gerbrandy (Paramaribo)	Hull was in favour of a temporary settlement, followed by a general one. American draft for same had already been discussed. Co-operation of Netherlands and British Governments requested in easing embargo against Japan. <i>Surinam: stationing of American troops.</i> Proposed amendment to communiqué (No. 376 A) and Gerbrandy's broadcast so as to avoid impression that the Netherlands had taken the initiative for the stationing of American troops in Surinam.
462	23.11.1941 To Loudon	<i>Talks between USA and Japan.</i> Agreement with limited arrangement proposed in No. 460. Prepared to ease embargo against Japan on certain conditions. Hull's programme for a general arrangement not feasible.
463	24.11.1941 From Van Starckenborgh to Gerbrandy (Batavia)	<i>Talks between USA and Japan.</i> Reply to No. 443. Main object of the Netherlands vis-à-vis Japan was withdrawal from Indo China. Prepared to supply oil and rice as a prelude to such withdrawal. USA desired greater willingness to make concessions so as to bring about an acceptable settlement.
464	24.11.1941 From Loudon (Washington)	<i>Talks between USA and Japan.</i> Hull had discussed draft modus vivendi with Loudon, Halifax, Casey and Hu Shih. The object was to come to an arrangement for the entire Pacific. Gradual limiting of embargo measures coupled with a reduction of Japanese forces in Indo China. More stringent demands in regard to China proposed by Hu Shih rejected by Hull, as these would make arrangement impossible.
465	24.11.1941 From Michiels van Verduynen	<i>Implementation of ADA report: Australian troops in NEI.</i> Enclosure of 465A.
465A	24.11.1941 From Michiels van Verduynen to Foreign Office	<i>Implementation of ADA report: Australian troops in NEI.</i> Presence of Australian infantry not yet advisable, only that of Air Force units. Quartering and arrival to be arranged direct between Canberra and Batavia.
466	24.11.1941 From Bolkestein	<i>Diplomatic relations between USSR and the Netherlands.</i> Discussion in Council of Ministers about the arguments against establishment of diplomatic relations. Conclusion that on formal juridical and political grounds establishment of relations was desirable.
467	25.11.1941 Council of Ministers	<i>Constitutional reforms.</i> Van Starckenborgh to be instructed to defer preparations for State conference. <i>Talks between USA and Japan.</i>

No.	Date; from/to	Description
468	25.11.1941 Van Bylandt	Situation report. <i>China: International Volunteer Air Corps.</i> Netherlands participation requested. Purpose was protection of Burma Road.
469	25.11.1941 From Michiels van Verduynen	<i>Implementation of ADB report: defence zones.</i> In the course of a talk with Law in connection with No. 450 the writer had pressed for the setting up of defence zones in view of increased Japanese military activity.
470	25.11.1941 From US Legation	<i>France: protection of interests in NEI by USA.</i> Enclosure of Nos. 470 AB.
470A	3.10.1941 From French Embassy to Department of State (Washington)	<i>France: protection of interests in NEI by USA.</i> NEI authorities and French representative had come to an arrangement concerning French agent, who was to work under American representative.
470B	28.10.1941 From Department of State to French Embassy (Washington)	<i>France: protection of interests in NEI by USA.</i> American conditions for a French agent to work under American representative in NEI.
471	25.11.1941 From Lamping to Albarda	<i>Dealings in Dutch securities.</i> Post-war ban on imports practicable only in respect of securities negotiable in the Netherlands. Not applicable to foreign securities bearing Netherlands bourse stamp. In connection with risk of forged registration certificates, securities should be deposited with Netherlands legation or their acquisition by the Government considered. Registration of non-Netherlands securities from Dutch ownership necessary. In the case of securities that had remained on the Continent, a joint declaration with Allied Governments relating to post-war measures in respect of securities claimed to have been sold regularly should be considered. Such a declaration was particularly important as a means of influencing the present attitude of neutral countries.
472	26.11.1941 From Loudon (Washington)	<i>Talks between USA and Japan.</i> American proposal for modus vivendi not presented. Situation was serious.
473	26.11.1941 From Loudon (Washington)	<i>Talks between USA and Japan.</i> Pressure was being put on Hull not to reject Japanese proposals. Those concerned were finding a ready ear with Roosevelt. Loudon would if necessary inquire after Hull's definitive proposal to Kurusu.
474	26.11.1941 Van Kleffens	<i>Talks between USA and Japan.</i> Van Kleffens had told Biddle that unilateral action by USA could give Japan the impression that the

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No.	Date; from/to	Description
475	26.11.1941 From Hart to Gerbrandy	ABCD front was no longer intact. <i>Talks between USA and Japan.</i> Proposal in No. 472 was disappointing. Improvement in Japan's position and weakening of ABCD front. By promising delivery of certain raw materials important areas of negotiation would be surrendered. Only realistic basis for negotiations with Japan was political and military concessions by Japan in exchange for easing of embargo against Japan.
476	26.11.1941 From Furstner to Gerbrandy	<i>ADB-2 report.</i> Furstner opposed to reservation proposed by Van Starckenborgh in No. 453A, concerning the placing of the NEI fleet under the strategic supreme command of Singapore, as defence of NEI was essential part of Allied strategy.
477	27.11.1941 To Loudon	<i>Talks between USA and Japan.</i> Preliminary reaction to No. 464, based on No. 475.
478	27.11.1941 From Loudon (Washington)	<i>Talks between USA and Japan.</i> Loudon expected discussion between Roosevelt and Kurusu to be the last, and that negotiations would be broken off. Modus vivendi (No. 464) to be abandoned owing to reinforcement of Japanese forces in Indo China for action against Siam, and announcement of Chinese offensive.
479	27.11.1941 Van Kleffens	<i>Post-war Europe.</i> Informal talks with Gutt and Lie on post-war political questions. Gutt was in favour of dividing left bank of the Rhine between surrounding countries; consequences to be studied by military experts. Lie advocated ban on Germans piloting aircraft. Van Kleffens had pointed to possibilities of evading such a ban and had recommended post-war co-operation in defence.
480	27.11.1941 From Van Breugel Douglas to Van Bylandt (Batavia)	<i>The Netherlands: Pacific policy.</i> Tolerant policy of the Netherlands towards Japan could only lead to even more aggressive policy on Japan's part. <i>China: diplomatic relations with the Netherlands.</i> Staffing of Netherlands legation and its transfer to Chungking would demonstrate serious nature of relations.
481	28.11.1941 From Loudon (Washington)	<i>Talks between USA and Japan.</i> Report on talk with Hull. Because of indications of imminent Japanese aggression, he had not presented proposal for modus vivendi, but instead memorandum containing general principles. Unlike Hornbeck, Loudon considered talks ended. Possible Japanese targets of attack. Military aid from

No.	Date; from/to	Description
482	28.11.1941 To Loudon	USA possible in a few weeks' time: negotiations continued for that reason.
483	28.11.1941 From Van Starckenborgh to Gerbrandy (Batavia)	<i>Pacific policy: Thailand.</i> Views on possible Japanese attack on Kra Isthmus. <i>Talks between USA and Japan.</i> Agreement with No. 462. Optimum programme of deliveries to Japan difficult to attain and fulfilment improbable. In the event of provisional arrangement, Manchuria should not form stumbling-block and should if possible be excluded from negotiations for definitive arrangement. Abrogation of alliance with Germany and Italy to be demanded.
484	28.11.1941 Van Kleffens	<i>Surinam: stationing of American troops.</i> The writer had expressed to Biddle disappointment at large proportion of infantry in American contingent in Surinam; had made it clear that the Netherlands had sufficient infantry available but urgently required air force and anti-aircraft personnel. Had asked Biddle whether this large number of infantry meant that the USA had intentions that reached further, for instance, against French Guyana.
484A	28.11.1941 From American Legation	<i>Surinam: stationing of American troops.</i> Governor of Surinam had protested against dispatch of American infantry as being contrary to the agreement between the Netherlands and US Governments. Request that Kielstra be sent clarifying instructions in this matter.
485	28.11.1941 To Gerbrandy	<i>Great Britain: application of Royal Decree A 1.</i> Discussion with Colban. Norway was experiencing the same difficulties in implementing measures identical to A 1. Norwegian-British negotiations likewise in deadlock. Colban shared view that, against the wishes of the Treasury and the Bank of England, the Board of Trade was adhering to the clearing agreement of No. 249A.
486	28.11.1941 From Gerbrandy	<i>Diplomatic relations between USSR and the Netherlands.</i> Reply to No. 466. Formal criteria did not suffice for answering the question about establishing diplomatic relations. The fact that the Netherlands and USSR were both fighting Germany would not blind one to the atheist nature of the USSR's regime or to its totalitarianism, which was just as reprehensible as Nazism. There was no doubt about unreliability of Soviet regime. The writer asked for Van Kleffens' advice on possibility of indepen-

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No.	Date; from/to	Description
487	29.11.1941 From Helfrich to Furstner (Bandung)	dent trade relations between the Netherlands and USSR in evidence of the Netherlands' good will and as possible stepping stone to diplomatic relations in due course. <i>Implementation of ADB-2 report.</i> From Van Starckenborgh to Gerbrandy: Intended to accede to request from Singapore for stationing of two NEI submarines in Gulf of Siam for reconnaissance. Instructions to be given to open hostilities with Japan if necessary.
488	29.11.1941 From Van Starckenborgh to Gerbrandy (Batavia)	<i>Portuguese Timor.</i> Arguments of No. 449 against occupation were inconclusive; they ignored the gravity of the situation. Explanation of the situation and request to reconsider the decision.
489	29.11.1941 From Dejean	<i>Independence of Syria and Lebanon.</i> Comité National Francais had on 14.7.1941 taken over mandate of Syria and Lebanon from Vichy, and these territories had on 27.9 and 26.11. respectively been declared independent by High Commissioner Catroux. Netherlands recognition requested.
490	30.11.1941 From Helfrich to Furstner (Surabaya)	<i>Implementation of ADB report.</i> Van Starckenborgh to Gerbrandy. Opposed to the placing of two NEI submarines under the operational command of the Commander-in-Chief China, but would accept Gerbrandy's decision and make his own view known in Singapore.
491	30.11.1941 From Furstner to Helfrich	<i>Implementation of ADB report.</i> Gerbrandy was persisting in decision to place two NEI submarines under the operational command of the Commander-in-Chief China at Singapore when these were placed at his disposal.
492	30.11.1941 From Pabst (Tokyo)	<i>Talks between USA and Japan.</i> Japan was prepared to make concessions regarding China. Also other symptoms of moderation.
493	30.11.1941 From Steenstra Toussaint (Bangkok)	<i>Thailand: transfer of payments to NEI.</i> Thailand requested temporary exemption from obligation to pay for imports from NEI in dollars. The writer recommended that request be granted on condition that payment in dollars would be resumed at the earliest opportunity.
494	1.12.1941 Gerbrandy	<i>ADB-2 report.</i> Dispute between Van Starckenborgh and Furstner about withdrawing armed forces from Allied Command (Nos. 453A and 476) less serious than it appeared. It was important to know whether the possibility of doing so under ADB-1 (II, No. 371) had for

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495	1.12.1941 From Speekenbrink to Lamping	military reasons been omitted from ADB-2. An interim solution would be to make withdrawal subject to the approval of Allied Command. <i>Prize Law: Finland.</i> Cross had stated that Great Britain would probably declare war on Finland. In connection with seizure of Finnish ships clarity regarding the attitude of the Netherlands was required. Council of Ministers would have to make a decision.
496	2.12.1941 Council of Ministers	<i>Pacific policy.</i> In the event of British-Japanese war the Netherlands would side with Great-Britain. Eden considered the situation alarming. <i>Finland.</i> In connection with British ultimatum to Finland, Finnish ships at Curacao would be detained pending British declaration of war.
497	2.12.1941 From Steenstra Toussaint (Bangkok)	<i>Thailand: visas for NEI.</i> Authorisation requested for issuing visas for NEI to foreign nationals in Thailand in the event of Japanese attack.
498	2.12.1941 From Loudon (Washington)	<i>Pacific policy.</i> Roosevelt had asked Halifax what Britain's attitude would be in various possible situations if the expected Japanese attack on Thailand materialised.
499	4.12.1941 To Loudon	<i>Talks between USA and Japan.</i> Neutralisation of Thailand would make it possible for Japan to withdraw from Indo China without loss of face. Department of State to be sounded on this.
500	4.12.1941 Van Vredenburch	<i>Portuguese Timor.</i> Following talk with Lord Cranborne, Michiels van Verduynen was opposed to telegram to Van Starckenborgh. The Netherlands should not give Portugal any indication that they knew about British-Portuguese talks at Singapore. Report on discussion between Michiels and Cadogan would follow.
501	4.12.1941 From Gerbrandy to Van Starckenborgh	<i>Portuguese Timor.</i> Van Pallandt instructed to ask Salazar to allow the Netherlands to participate in staff talks with the UK concerning Portuguese Timor. Occupation of Portuguese Timor permitted only in case of immediate necessity.
502	4.12.1941 To Gerbrandy	<i>NEI: trade relations with USSR.</i> All deliveries to USSR went via the UK. It would be rather inconsiderate towards the British to change this arrangement. Van Starckenborgh did, however, prefer direct delivery of all goods except rubber and tin. Some observations

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503	4.12.1941 From Hart to Gerbrandy	concerning organisational procedure. No illusions about practical results. <i>NEI: trade relations with USSR.</i> Reply to Gerbrandy's question in No. 486. NEI was now supplying USSR via sales to British Government. Even in the case of direct supplies to USSR, consultation with British Government would still be necessary. Van Starckenborgh's proposal for direct delivery to USSR could cause difficulties with the British. Hart suggested sounding Feonov and Driagatov on Russian desire for direct trade relations, and making a possible proposal only if the desire was serious. An alternative possibility was to have this sounding done by, say, the Nederlandse Handel Maatschappij. According to Roëll, the British authorities would have no objection to direct delivery of non-strategic raw materials to USSR.
504	4.12.1941 From Gerbrandy	<i>France: declaration of enemy territory.</i> Agreement with proposal of No. 440. Provisions of Royal Decree A 6 went much further than British measures in the matter of trading with the enemy, and Welter was therefore opposed to application of A6 to unoccupied France.
505	4.12.1941 Makins	<i>Portuguese Timor.</i> Michiels van Verduynen's interview with Cadogan. In Lisbon British Government would support the Netherlands proposal for consultation on the defence of Portuguese Timor. Van Starckenborgh had been instructed not to take any action, pending this démarche.
506	5.12.1941 From Van Starckenborgh to Gerbrandy (Batavia)	<i>Germans interned in NEI.</i> The writer maintained the view that internment in NEI should not be related to that in the Netherlands. He continued to favour the proposal of II, No. 355. Owing to changed circumstances a solution appeared almost impossible.
507	5.12.1941 From Biddle	<i>Surinam: stationing of American troops.</i> Half the infantry referred to by Kielstra were to be regarded as anti-aircraft troops. In message from Roosevelt to Queen Wilhelmina the dispatch of 930 infantry had been proposed.
508	5.12.1941 From Cadogan to Michiels van Verduynen	<i>Far East: co-operation between the Netherlands and Great Britain.</i> With reference to No. 243 Cadogan presented a proposal for a mutual understanding whereby in the event of an attack on one of the parties' territory in the

No.	Date; from/to	Description
509	5.12.1941 Cranborne	Far East, the parties would work together against the aggressor. The Netherlands could, if it desired, conclude a similar agreement with Australia and New Zealand. <i>Portuguese Timor.</i> Discussion with Michiels van Verduynen on 4.12. Had explained why the Portuguese Government did not wish the Netherlands to participate in secret Anglo-Portuguese staff talks, and had promised that British authorities would pass on all information to Netherlands authorities. Foreign Office had no objection to Netherlands démarche in Lisbon to secure Netherlands participation in the staff talks. Support for that démarche requested.
510	6.12.1941 To Van Pallandt	<i>Portuguese Timor.</i> If possible, Portuguese Government to be informed that in the case of war, Australian troops would be stationed in Netherlands Timor. Expectation that arrangement for stationing of Netherlands and Australian troops in Portuguese Timor would also be possible.
511	6.12.1941 From Loudon (Washington)	<i>Talks between USA and Japan.</i> Roosevelt was no longer contemplating an arrangement which would save face for Japan.
512	6.12.1941 From Gerbrandy to Van Starckenborgh	<i>Pacific policy.</i> USA wished, simultaneously with Great Britain and the Netherlands, to address a warning to Japan against further aggression.
513	6.12.1941 From Gerbrandy to Van Starckenborgh	<i>Implementation of ADB report.</i> If USA placed its fleet under British command, the same course was to be followed with the Netherlands fleet in NEI without asking.
514	6.12.1941 From Van Pallandt (Lisbon)	<i>Portuguese Timor.</i> Campbell astonished at instruction in No. 501. Salazar agreed to information being supplied to the Netherlands on Anglo-Portuguese staff talks at Singapore. Discussion with Salazar on defence of NEI.
515	6.12.1941 From Hart	<i>China: financing of imports.</i> Pending a reply to No. 515A, banks in Shanghai to be advised for the present to issue foreign currency for imports from NEI only in consultation with China Stabilisation Board.
515A	4.12.1941 From Gerbrandy to Van Starckenborgh	<i>China: financing of imports.</i> In connection with establishment by USA, Great Britain and China of China Stabilisation Board as organ for control of foreign exchange for imports into Shanghai and unoccupied China, several amend-

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516	7.12.1941 From Loudon (Washington)	ments had been made to 515A. Payments now only possible at listed banks, including Nederlandsche Handel Maatschappij and Indische Handelsbank. Advice requested on inclusion of NEI in this arrangement. <i>Declaration of war on Japan.</i> American press had inquired after Netherlands attitude to attack on Pearl Harbour. Message from Roosevelt to the Queen on the way.
517	7.12.1941 From Gerbrandy to Van Starckenborgh	<i>Talks between USA and Japan.</i> If Roosevelt had received no satisfactory reply from Emperor Hirohito by 9.12., USA, the Netherlands and Great Britain would separately issue to Japan the warning referred to in No. 512.
518	7.12.1941 From Van Starckenborgh to Gerbrandy (Batavia)	<i>Portuguese Timor.</i> Military defences of Netherlands Timor were being strengthened. Talks had commenced on the <i>dispatch of Australian troops</i> to Ambon/Timor as part of the implementation of ADB report.
519	7.12.1941 Van Bylandt	<i>Pearl Harbour.</i> Report received from liaison officer with Admiralty that hostilities between USA and Japan had commenced. This report was supplementary to radio reports about Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour.